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Independent Voters i The Characteristics
and Significance of Non-aligned Voters in
American Politics
John R« Dempsey, B.A., The University of Notre Dame
M.A., The College of William and Mary
Directed byi Dr. John H. Fenton
Self-identified Independent voters in the
presidential electorates of 1952-1972 are examined
utilizing data compiled by the Survey Research Center
of the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research.
In an electorate-by-electorate analysis, Independents
are compared with Republican and Democratic party
identifiers in terms of their demographic and socio-
economic characteristics, positions on political issues,
and electoral behavior. Changes in the character of the
Independent vote which have occurred over time are
examined in an effort to discern trends and predict
future probabilities. In general the study concludes
(in support of literature previously published on the
subject) that Independents, particularly in the last
two presidential electorates, resemble Republicans
more closely than Democrats. It is argued that th®
vi
socioeconomic and 'ideoligical • similarities between
Independents and Republicans will continue to lead the
majority of Independents into the Republican column
(in presidential elections) unless the repercussions
of Watergate and a faulty economy are so strong as to
reverse the pattern which has been established during
the past decade.
The 'political responsibility' of Independents
is examined to determine whether they possess the 'ideal
citizen* traits generally ascribed to them by con-
ventional wisdom, or whether they conform to the less
laudatory picture of them painted by modern social
scientists. Analysis reveals a mixed picture in this
regard with Independents conforming to parts of both
images. They appear highly knowledgeable about
political affairs and exhibit well-developed issue
positions (as traditional wisdom claims) but are less
likely to participate in or be concerned about partisan
elections (as argued by modem social science research)
e
In trying to explain the phenomenon of self-
identified Independence, and the reasons for its
increase in contemporary times, the study cites a
number of explanations and examines their validity in
light of the survey data. Disaffection with the party
vii
system, sociological and ideological cross-pressures,
youth, and the uncertainty attendant to transition
from one party to the other all are shovm to affect
(positively) the incidence of Independence. The
large number of young voters currently in the
electorate, disaffection with the political parties
as a result of Watergate and the Viet Nam War, the
large number of 'transitional' voters generated by
the recent political realignment, and the tendency for
traditional partisan cleavages to have been 'out of
synch' with the important issues of the late 1960's
all are seen as having precipitated the large increase
in Independence which occurred between 196^ and 1972.
Because many of the phenomena responsible for
the currently high rates of Independence are temporal
phenomena which will shortly pass into history (if they
have not already done so), it is concluded that the rate
of Independence will shortly stop its ascent and begin
to return to more normal levels. Despite the impending
'return to normalcy' (or at least 'near-normalcy') it is
felt that the long range effects of the
196i+-1972
Independence 'boom' will be beneficial to the American
party system by nudging it in the direction of issue
definition and political responsiveness.
viii
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INTRODUCTION
The average citizen will
give close and constant
attention to public affairs,
recognizing that it is in
his interest as well as
his duty. He will try to
comprehend the main issues
of policy, bringing to them
an independent and impartial
mind, which thinks first not
of his own but of the general
interest.
—James Bryce, Modern Democracies
In looking at the recent history of electoral
behavior in this country it is apparent that a number of
changes are occurring in the electorate. The most obvious
change, of course, is that only eight years after according
a presidential candidate of the Democratic party the
largest electoral landslide in our country's history,
American voters gave an equally impressive majority to a
Republican candidate in 1972. And, judging from the public's
ressonses to politically oriented public opinion polls taken
during the past decade, it appears that this large Democratic-
to-Republican shift was precipitated not only by the
personalities and styles of the candidates involved j but
»
1
2by shifts in the voters' attitudes (in a generally conserva-
tive direction) on some issues.^
There have been other changes as well. The once
"solid" South, upon which the Democratic party has been
dependent for many of its presidential election victories
since the Civil War, now seems—after two decades of
vacillation—to be rather firmly in Republican hands, at
least in national elections. ^ And the fabled New Deal
Coalition—the agglomeration of workers, city dwellers.
Catholics, blacks, first generation "ethnics," and poor
^Chapter II discusses this phenomenon in some
detail, outlining how the electorate's attitudes on
political issues have changed over the years. The conser-
vatizing trend referred to here was perhaps most noticeable
when the electorates of 1964 and I968 were compared.
Especially on issues dealing with how much the federal
government should be involved in the lives of its citizens,
the voters of I968 felt more strongly than they had in 1964
that the government in Washington was becoming "too powerful"~
a position traditionally associated with political conservatism.
This tendency, and possible explanations for it, are discussed
at some length in Chapter II.
2john Fenton reports the increase of Republican
strenrth in the South in "An Analysis of the Results of the
Presidential Election of 1972," in Stanley Bach and George
Sulzner, eds.. Perspectives on the Presidency (Lexington,
Mass.. D-.C. Heath. 1974), pp. 116-128. Fenton 's analysis
of eleven southern states shows that, between 1948 and 197^ 1
the number of Republican Senators from those states has
increased from zero to seven, the number of Republican U.S.
Representatives has increased from two to thirty-four, and
that, while the Republican candidate for President won none
of those states in 1948, he has captured 4, 5. 3» 5. and 11
of those states in the last five presidential elections
respectively.
3people, allied in support of the party of Franklin Roosevelt--
seems somewhat less cohesive today than it has been in the past.
3
Looking at the picture from a different perspective—
again with the aid of population polling techniques—we
can see that today's electorate is younger, more affluent,
and possesses a higher mean educational level than the
voters who gave Lyndon Johnson his majority in 196^.^ At
the same time, it is an electorate somewhat less likely to
go to the polls. The rate of voter turnout, which had been
rising in this country during the past half century, has now
leveled off and appears to be beginning something of a decline.
5
^Since 196^, when it reached a high of 51?^» Democratic
identification in this country has dropped to 35^ according to
survey results released in April of 197^ by the Center for
Political Studies at the University of Michigan. In the 1972
presidential election many groups which have traditionally and
nominally been considered as Democratic voters (Catholics,
Jewish people, blue-collar workers) gave the Republican candi-
date a higher percentage of the vote than at any time in recent
memory (53^, 29;^, k8fo for Catholics, Jews, and blue-collar
workers respectively).
^In 196^ the electorate's mean educational level was
years I in 1972 it was 11.6 years. Though the 1972 elec-
torate contains a higher proportion of young people-
traditionally better educated than their elders—the 196^ to
1972 increase is still noteworthy.
5The rate of voter turnout in the past eight presi-
dential elections is as follows. 19;+^ (53^^). 19^8 (5 1/0
1952 (62%), 1956 (60/0 » i960 (6^0, 196^ (63/), 1968 ( 63/O
.
1972 (56/0. Sources I 19^^-1964, William Flanigan, The
Political Rphavior of the American Electorate , (Boston* Allyn
and Bacon, 1968),p. l6> 1968 and 1972, The4^„7 ,3 World Almanac,
annual publication of the Newspaper Enterprise Association.
1,
There are in short, a number of important ways
in which the American voters of contemporary times differ
from their counterparts of a decade ago. One of the most
notable and potentially far-reaching of the changes which
have occurred since 1964 is the rise in the percentage of
Americans who refer to themselves as "Independents." As
shown in Table i - 1, the percentage of Independents-
after holding fairly steady for a quarter of a century-
has risen from 22f. in 196if to in 197^. Among young
voters (those aged 18 to 29) the incidence of Independence
is now nearly fifty percent.
^
As the Table shows the increase among Independents
has come at the expense of both major parties, but the
figures for the years 196^1-1974 would indicate that the
Democrats have been hurt more than Republicans in recent
times.
The importance of these figures is underscored by
the knowledge that, since 1940. the Independent
vote for
President has split four times in favor of the
Democrats
and five times in favor of the Republicans.
And. in those
6Thoueh no age breakdown is available for the
February. ?97fsS?vey of the Center for Political
Studies
(which showed the overall rate of ^^^^Pf
1972 SRC survey (which showed an overall ^^^^P^f^^^^/®''^^
of -^m indicated that the percentage
of persons under
thirty whS called themselves Independents
was 49.8^.
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6nine presidential elections, the Independents have been on
the winning side eight times.? (Only in i960, when the
Independent vote split fifty-four to forty-six percent for
then-Vice-President Nixon, have a majority of Independents
voted for the losing candidate.)
These data are obviously of great interest, both
to the academic student of electoral behavior, and to the
"practicing" political actor. To the political scientist,
schooled in the discipline's generally accepted contention
that party identification is the single most important
determinant of electoral choice, they represent the
possibility that a new model of electoral behavior— one
based on something more than simple party identification-
may be needed, if the votes of these partyless Independents
are to be properly understood. To the political actor, or
politician, these figures dictate a re-thinking of some of
the traditional wisdom of American partisan politics. Such
a re-thinking is evident in a comment made by then-President
Richard Nixon in 1971
«
7As is the case in every election described in
this study, the voting records are based on the
respondents
Recollections of their votes in the election just past.
Given people's general propensity to side with
a winner, it
mav be that some of the figures for the
winners are inflated.
This is a phenomenon that research of this
sort has to
accept as almSst irremedial. and one can
?nly hope that
its instance is not so major as to undermine the validity
of the study's general conclusions.
We will never have a time again, in my opinion,
in this country where you are going to have a
polarization of only Democrats versus
Republicans .1 think you are going to have
the Independents controlling basically the
balance of power.
o
If the "practicing" politicians are taking notice
of the newly-numerous Independents, political scientists
seem to know relatively little about them. Are Independents,
as they are sometimes pictured, discerning and dispassionate
political actors who weigh issues and candidates carefully
and cast their votes thinking only, as Bryce would phrase
it, of the "general interest?" Or are they political misfits
whose propensity to switch allegiances (and thus decide
elections) raises some troublesome questions about the nature
of our electoral process? Do they represent a segment of
the electorate seriously alienated from what they see as the
baseness of "mainstream" party politics? Or are they simply
people whose desire to vote for "the person" leads them to
avoid the major party labels? Can we say that they represent
the ideological center of the American political spectrum—
between the Democrats on the left and the Republicans on the
right? Or, perhaps, do they themselves represent one (or maybe
both) of the ideological extremes? To these and other important
^President Richard M. Nixon, ABC Television Interview,
March 22, 1971; cited in Walter DeVries and V. Lance Tarrance,
The Ticket-Splitter I A New Force in American Politics (Grand
Rapids, Michigan I William B. Erdmons, 1^/2).
8questions concerning Independent voters, political
science has very few satisfactory answers. And where
answers exist at all they are often conflicting and
confused*
The purpose of this study is to examine Independent
voters in depth, and to attempt to answer questions like
the ones above about a group that has in ten short years,
become the largest "party" in American politics. In the
paper, I will rely heavily on the extensive survey data
which have been gathered over the years by the Survey
Research Center at the University of Michigan for the
Inter-University Consortium for Political Research. The
study is intended to answer questions on three broad fronts
i
1) Who are the Independents, and how do they compare with
party members in tenns of demographic characteristics,
political attitudes, and political interest and involvement?
2) Why do persons choose to identify themselves as Independ-
ents, and why has their number risen so greatly in recent
years? 3) What impact are the Independents having now
on the two major parties, and what will be the impact on
the political system if their numbers continue to increase
»
at the expense of the two-party system?
In the study, I have chosen to focus on "self-identified"
Independent voters—voters who, when asked their political
I9
affiliation, respond, "Independent." Self-identified
Independents should not be confused with the ticket-
splitters, or floating voters about whom much has been
written in recent years. 9 Though a large percentage of
self-identified Independents split their tickets (and many
ticket-splitters are Independents )10 -the two categories are
not identical. Split-ticket voting is no doubt an important
and rather novel phenomenon in American politics, but it is
different from the phenomenon of self-identified Independence,
and I suggest that the explanations behind the two are not
necessarily the same. While some of the explanations behind
self-identified Independence (the presence of sociological
cross-pressures, for example) can also be suggested as
explanations for split-ticket voting, some others (such
as alienation from the party or* political system) probably
cannot. Self-identification as an Independent reflects,
at the very least, de facto disassociation (whether
9See, for example, Angus Campbell and Warren Miller,
"The Motivational Basis of Straight and Split-Ticket Voting,"
American Political Science Review , 51 » June 1957. and H. Daudt,
Floating Voters and the Floating Vote (Leideni H.E. Slenfert
Kroese, N.V., 1961) and DeVries and Tarrance, The Ticket-
Splitter » A New Force in American Politics , 1972.
l^As Chapters II and IV relate. Independents were more
likely than either Democrats or Republicans to be ticket-
splitting voters in the six election years examined. In 1972
e
for example, over two-thirds of all Independents interviewed
claimed to have split their ballots, compared to less than
half of either group of partisans.
10
conscious or not) from the traditional American two-party
system. 11 This is not to say that the majority of
Independents do not still cast their votes and focus
their political interest within the framework of the
two-party system; they do. But the data indicate that
at least in this regard, an increasingly large number of
Americans are becoming estranged from one of the "grand
Sinnbols" of our democracy. V/hatever the motivation
behind such an estrangement (an estrangement which is not
manifest, per se , by split-ticket voting) it is worthy
of investigation.
An additional reason for the selection of the self-
identified Independent is that Independence represents a
movement by the electorate away from party identification.
A continued increase in the number of these voters could
conceivably result in further declines in the ranks of the
parties and what Walter Dean Burnham sees as the consequent
deterioration of those parties as viable political agencies.
A part of this study's concluding chapter examines the
llchapter IV of this study discusses the attitudes
of Independents toward political parties and associated
concepts in an effort to determine if these attitudes play
an important role in motivating either partisanship or
Independence. The reference here to disassociation merely
reflects the fact that, whatever their motivation,
political Independents are effectively less a part of the
two-party system than are party identifiers.
11
.on
potential impact which continued movement in the directi,
of a
-partyless- politics may have on the American political
system. ^2
In dealing with self-identified Independents, a
number of problems and procedural difficulties are inevitable.
First, of course, is the problem of isolating the Independents
Since the research in this study has been conducted
primarily with Survey Research Center data, the Center's
questionnaires have pre-determined the method of selecting
Independent voters. Generally, this arrangement has been
very satisfactory, but a few small difficulties have arisen.
Though all the SRC's questionnaires ask what the voters
"consider- themselves politically (thus providing a sound
index of voter self-identification) the phrasing of the
question sometimes varies slightly from year to year.
Matters are complicated, too. when the questionnaires
ask those respondents calling themselves Independents
whether they "lean** toward one major party or the other.
In overcoming these problems. I have tried to follow two
simple rules. First, in each case where a group of
Independent voters are introduced into the study, the basis
^^The term 'partyless' politics—and the notion that
a continued weakening of the parties could lead in its
direction—comes from Walter Dean Burnham, "The End of
American Party Politics" in Burnham. ed. Politics America t
The Cutting Edge of Change (Mew Yorki D. Van Wostrandj 1973).
p. 13^.
12
for defining them as Independents has been made explicit.
In some cases, the questions themselves are reproduced
in the text of the study. Second, in cases where survey-
questions inquire about the partisan direction in which
Independents may •'lean," I have included all Independent
respondents—regardless of their marginal partisan
sentiments—in the Independent category. 13
The study itself consists of five chapters. The
opening chapter reviews the literature which currently
exists on the subject of Independents, and discusses the
ways in which the present study can partially fill some of
the gaps now existing in that body of literature. Both
books and articles which have been written about
Independents, as well as the more general voting studies
(which normally deal with Independents in the short space
of a sub-chapter or a few paragraphs) are discussed.
The second chapter, beginning the core of the
study, examines the demographic characteristics, political
attitudes, and voting patterns of Independent voters in
13in some instances the different 'types* of
Independent voters are compared and contrasted with each
other. Also some cases exist where it is useful to com-
pare one type of Independent with a certain type of partisan.
By and large, however, when the term Independent is used,
it is intended to include (unless otherwise specified)
all Independents, even those who profess to "lean" toward
one or the other of the two major parties*
13
the presidential electorates from I952 through 1972. The
Survey Research Center data give us the opportunity
to observe and compare this information about Independents
with similar information about their partisan contemporaries
in each of those election years. The data help us examine
whether (and how) Independents differ from partisans with
respect to income and education levels, age, religion,
type of occupation, social class, and other demographic
traits. They also tell us how the Independents have voted
in past elections and how their votes compared with those
of the party identifiers. Finally, they enable us to get a
fairly thorough picture of the Independents* attitudes on a
number of important political issues. Of special concern
in this chapter are the changes which the Independents have
undergone during this period
—
particularly those changes
which affect the Independents* position relative to partisans.
One problem inherent in analysis of this sort
(especially when discussing 'trends' among Independents,
or comparing the Independents in one election year with
those in another) is trying to decide whether a change among
Independents reflects an actual change occurring among a
fairly constant population group, or whether it reflects
the influx of new voters (possessing the 'new' characteristic
reflected in the alleged change) into the category. For
example, it would be difficult at first glance to analyze
a sharp increase in pro-civil rights attitudes among
Independents from one election year to the next. Would
such a change reflect a liberalizing trend among
Independents, or might it suggest that the Independents
of the first electorate are now calling themselves
Republicans (or Democrats) and that the Democrats (or
Republicans) of the first electorate—many of whom may
have had pro-civil rights attitudes—are now calling
themselves Independents?
Since the Independents are such a large and
heterogeneous group in society, it is obvious that both
these explanations are operative in some proportion in
all election years. The problem, of course, is in trying
to decide which, if any, situation is dominant. Though,
as noted, neither explanation can claim to definitively
describe all the Independents and the changes they
undergo, it is possible to test (at least indirectly) the
constancy of the group's membership over time. The best
way to do this using the survey data is to compare the
voting records of Independents with their recollections
of votes in past elections. If, for example, the
Independents of I968 claim to have voted Democratic in
196^ in roughly the same proportion as Independents actually
15
voted Democratic in 196^. it would lend some credence to
the notion that the group has some semblance of consistency
and does not fluctuate wildly—with large numbers of
•dropouts' and 'dropins from year to year. Such a
conclusion would also have import for the discussion
(to be undertaken in Chapter IV) of the extent to which
short-term historical forces influence the size and
character of the Independent category. On the other hand,
evidence that the Independents of I968 recalled a
Democratic vote in 196^ vastly different from the 196^
vote of Independents actually observed might lead us to
argue that the category's membership did vary greatly from
election to election. Table i - 2 represents the Democratic
vote for President of Independents in 196^, 1968, and 1972,
along with their recollections of their votes in the
previous elections. The problem of selective over-recall
(remembering voting for a winner when some other vote, or
no vote at all, may have been the case) is partially
controlled in the comparison when we remember that even
the "current** vote is, in fact, a recalled vote since it is
recorded in a post-election interview.
As the Table shows, the only instance of a great
disparity between actual and recalled votes (and, by
implication, between the compositions of the Independent
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categories in different electorates) exists between the i960
Democratic vote of Independents and the i960 vote recalled
by Independents in the 1964 sample. While it is certainly
possible that many of the 1964 Independents were people
who had been Democrats four years earlier, that is quite
unlikely, since 1964 marked the 'high water* of
Democratic identification {51%)— a. fact difficult to
square with any thesis arguing that the 1964 Independents
were Democrats of i960 who defected. Far more likely is
the possibility that, with the pro-Kennedy sentiment so
prevalent in 1964, many Independents recalled a i960
Kennedy vote which in fact they did not cast. They were
not alone in this memory lapse, since 63.9;^^ of all the
voting respondents in the 1964 sample recalled a i960
Kennedy vote, when Kennedy's actual I96O percentage was
roughly ^9%,
These figures suggest, if only tentatively, that
the membership in the Independent category does not
fluctuate wildly from year to year. While Table i - 2
certainly does not offer conclusive proof to that effect
it does suggest that there is indeed a certain membership
consistency to the Independent category from election year
to election year. While many people undoubtedly do drop •
in and out of the category from year to year thus,
18
ipso facto, changing its character (as •dropouts' and
•dropins' undoubtedly change the characters of the two
major parties over time) we can still describe the
category's changes and trends in a meaningful way as
having been influenced by circumstances and the passage
of time, as well as by possible changes in membership.
If we keep in mind the potential variability of the
Independent category and remember to regard it as
something other than a closed group, statements about
its changes in character can be made with some assurance
of accuracy.
Though Chapter II deals with the Independents in
all presidential electorates from 1952 to the present, a
major emphasis has been placed on the years 1964, I968,
and 1972. During these years the greatest growth in the
number of Independents has occurred. These three elections
have also occurred in what some political scientists are
calling a period of "realignment."^^ These two conditions
not only make the 1964-1972 period a very interesting one
for our purposes but they also add challenges to the
research by presenting the opportunity to explore the
^^The question of realignment^ and its possible
effects on the current rate of Independence, is discussed
in Chapter IV.
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"short-terra** forces associated with realignment which
may have affected the size and character of the Independent
vote during the past decade.
In the third chapter, one of the questions
perennially asked about Independent voters is addressed!
are Independents, on the whole, more knowledgeable about
and involved in politics than party members, or are they
less so? (or, perhaps, is there no essential difference
between Independents and partisans in this regard?) Since
Independents seem to be rapidly on the increase in this
country and are playing a more central role in election
outcomes, this question takes on added importance.
The dominant opinion of the discipline's voting
scholars is expressed in the language of The American
Voter I
Independents tend as a group to be somewhat less
involved in politics. They have somewhat poorer
knowledge of the issues, their image of the
candidates is fainter, their interest in the
campaign is less, their concern over the outcome
is relatively slight, and their choice between
competing candidates, although it is indeed
made later in the campaign, seems much less to
spring from discoverable evaluations of the
elements of national politics. 15
^^Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller
and Donald Stokes, The American Voter (New York* John
Wiley and Sons, i960), p. 83.
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This dominant academic doctrine is at odds with the layman's
conventional wisdom which has traditionally regarded the
Independent as an ideal democratic citizen, making political
choices on the basis of merit rather than party label, on
rationality rather than blind loyalty. Chapter III
attempts to provide some answers to this important question.
The fourth chapter looks at some of the reasons
why people choose to call themselves Independents, and
why their numbers have risen so rapidly in recent times,
to these questions, a number of possible answers suggest
themselves. It is possible that Independent voters are
somewhat more alienated from "the System" (be it the party
system, or more generally the political system) than are
the party identifiers. Perhaps one can explain political
Independence by the presence of one or a number of
sociological or ideological cross-pressures. It may be
that the Independent is reluctant to claim a party label
because of a preference for voting for "the person," or
because of a distaste for adhering to what is perceived as
a "party line." Perhaps the Independents are voters in
transition from one party to the other—finally having
mustered the courage to abandon the party of their
forebears but as yet unable to ally themselves with the
party of their forebears' traditional opponents. It is
I
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possible, too, that many Independents are simply young
voters who desire to test the political waters slowly,
without firmly committing themselves to a political party
or a set of policies. Other possible explanations might
include temporal historical circumstances, such as the
presence of an unusually unpopular candidate at the head
of one party's ticket, or conditions which call into
question the honesty and integrity of party officials
and, by implication, the viability of the party system.
In this chapter, the survey data available from
the SRC studies are supplemented by a number of open-
ended personal interviews with Independents in several
sections of the country. These interviews have been
designed to ascertain the Independents' perceptions of
their political world and to discover the reasons they
have chosen not to align themselves with either major
party. While not random in character, and thus not
introducable as empirical evidence, they are useful in
supplementing and illustrating in personal terms the
findings of the survey data.
In the final chapter the recent increase in the
number of Independents is assessed both with regard to
its current impact on the two major parties and its
potential longer-range implications for the American
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political system. In this chapter inverviews with party
elites have been employed to determine the way the situa-
tion is currently being viewed by the two major parties,
and the strategies they are developing to cope with it.
Concerning the longer-range implications, a brief
assessment is made of what the situation's logical
extension—further decline in party identificatioh and
movement toward a
-partyless" politics—might mean to
the country's political system. On a theoretical level,
the ramifications of a "partyless" politics are discussed
within the framework of the literature which already exists
on the functions and roles of parties in politics.
The final chapter also discusses where the level
of political Independence is likely to go in future years.
Speculating on how much more the rate of Independence will
rise in the future (if at all), or how much we can expect
it to fall (again, if at all) the chapter explores the
effects which the Independents are likely to have on the
electoral politics of the future and the role which the
Independent voters may play in the continuing evolution
of the American political system.
CHAPTER I
PERTINENT LITERATURE
In addition to dealing with works and studies which
focus specifically on Independent voters, this chapter
discusses a number of the more general works on voting
behavior which have been produced over the years. Research,
especially in a field as clearly delimited as voting
behavior, is usually an ongoing process—where the con-
clusions and results of one study are often the foundation
of the next. It thus makes sense to begin by discussing
some general voting works—specifically, those associated
with Paul Lazarsfeld and Bernard Berelson and with the
research team of the Survey Research Center at the University
of Michigan. Though some of these studies deal with
Independents only in passing (if at all) they are important
because they have been instrumental in laying some of the
'•ground rules" of the field, and influencing the direction
of subsequent research efforts.
Once the general works have been discussed, some
of the more specific studies which treat Independents in
depth are considered. Generally speaking, they are presented
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in the order of their publication dates. 1 The discussion
of each piece is built around five questions (questions
which the present study seeks to answer)
i
1) How does the author define and isolate the
Independent voter, and what implications does
this chosen definition hold for the balance of
the author's research?
2) What does the research tell us about the
demographic characteristics, voting patterns,
and political attitudes of Independents?
^There are three important works which will not
be discussed in the text of this review (because they
deal with categories of voters somewhat removed from the
self-identified Independents) but merit at least passing
reference. Two of these, H. Daudt's Floating: Voters and
the Floating Vote (I96I) and V.O. Key's The Responsible
Electorate
» Rationality in Presidential Voting, I936-I96O
(Cambridge I Harvard University Press, 1966) deal with
voters who switch party allegiance from one election to
the next. The works are somewhat similar in that they
attempt to refute the rather low opinion of switching
voters held and presented by the authors of The American
Voter . A third work, Walter DeVries and V. Lance
Tarrance's The Ticket-Splitter » New Force in American
Politics (1972) is currently much discussed and might
easily have been included in this review. However,
DeVries and Tarrance define their category so widely
—
"the ticket-splitter is likely to be basically a
Republican or Democrat, but one who occasionally splits
off to vote for a candidate of another party" (p. 37)
—
that it bears only superficial resemblance to the subjects
of this study.
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3) Do the authors attempt to examine the reasons
which may motivate political Independence—
and, if so, what are their conclusions?
^) What is the general level of political interest
and political involvement that is attributed to
Independents?
5) Do the authors attempt to assess the political
impact of the Independents, from either a short
or long-range point of view, and what conclusion
do they reach?
Not every work, of course, addresses each of these questions.
But by taking each piece of research in its turn, we can
begin to form some impression of what political science
knows about the Independent voter.
General Works i The Lazarsfeld-Berelson Studies
The People's Choice , ^ by Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard
Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet was published in 19^4 and became
an early landmark in social science's attempt to examine
systematically the nature of electoral choice in our society.
It was also the first major study to utilize the "quantitative
^Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, Hazel Gaudet,
The People's Choice (New Yorki Columbia University Press,
19^^).
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approach" to the study of politics, suggested by the
pioneering work of Stuart Rice in 1928.3 The book reports
the findings of a panel study conducted with a representa-
tive group of voters of Erie County, Ohio, in the I9/10
presidential election. Strangely enough, the study was
not originally designed to add to our knowledge of voting.
£er_se. In his 1959 essay describing some of the ••landmark-
studies of voting behavior, Peter Rossi reports that
The People's Choice was conceived, not because of the
authors' special concern with political events of 19i^0.
but because of their desire to gain a better understanding
of the "psychology of choice."^ Lazarsfeld. the study's
senior author, likened the voting decision to a "consumer's
choice" and sought to understand, in psychological terms,
the components of that decision. However, to what was
probably the surprise of the authors, their panel study
appeared to indicate that the roots of electoral choice
lay in sociological, rather than psychological explanation.
^Stuart Rice, Quantitative Methods in Politics
(r^Iew York I Knopf, 1928)
.
^Peter Rossi, "Four Landmarks in Voting Research."
in Eugene Burdick and Arthur Brodbeck (eds.) American Voting
Behavior (Glencoe. Ill.i The Free Press, 1959 )» p. 15 . Rossi
mentions that Lazarsfeld came to the study of voting behavior
only when he failed to obtain the financial support necessary
for a study of consumer preferences.
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Using the analogy of the consumer once more, the researchers
discovered that the voters possessed strong 'brand loyalties 'i
-most of them had long-standing attachments to one or the
other political party. "5
Out of this early research came a widely accepted
picture of the American voter bound, as it were, in some-
thing of a sociological straightjacket . The act of voting,
as The People's Choice describes it, is a social act, with
social motivations and explanations. Persons from like
social and economic backgrounds, "...tend to see the world
through the same colored glasses,"^ and thus are prone to
vote in similar ways. In Lazarsfeld's unequivocal terms,
"Social characteristics determine political preference."'?'
In such short space, it would be inappropriate to
offer specific criticisms of The People's Choice , and the
picture of the American voter it produced. Suffice it to
say that the study was the first of its kind, and, while
suffering the crudeness and occasional over-zealousness
that pioneering efforts often do, it was nonetheless the
model from v/hich many subsequent voting studies took their cue.
^Ibid . , p. 17.
^Lazarsfeld, et al . , The People's Choice (19^^).
p. 18^1'.
7ibid. , p. 27.
The People's Choice does not deal specifically with
Independent voters. In 19^^, when the book was published,
only one voter in five called himself an Independent, and
perhaps the authors were not interested in this group
enough to warrant detailed mention of them in the text
of the study. In fact, the authors' measure of voter
self-identification (what they called their "Index of
Political Predisposition''^) does not have a place for
Independent preference—one is either "slightly,"
"moderately," or "strongly" a Republican or a Democrat.
Ten years later, when Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and
William McPhee published Voting .^ their controversial
study of the 19^8 electorate in Elmira, New York, little
had changed in their apparent estimate of the importance
of Independents. In Voting , the authors introduce the
concept of "linear direction" in their description of
partisan political attitudes. By setting up their direc-
tional models along dichotomous lines ("pro and con,"
"left and right," "Democratic and Republican"^^) , they
^Ibid., p. 26.
^Bernard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld, and William
McPhee, Voting i A Study of Opinion Formation in a
Presidential Campaign (Chicago University of Chicago
Press, 195^)'
lOlbid., p. 1^.
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effectively removed the possibility that Independents
could play any meaningful role in their analysis.
Like its predecessor, Voting leans heavily toward
a sociological explanation of the voting act. Interaction
with members of one's own social and economic group colors
the voter's perception of the issues and candidates,
solidifies party loyalties, and plays a major role in the
electoral choice. In the authors' words, "...the political
parties maintain fairly constant rates of support which
differ markedly from one stratum to the next. In order
to account for this, one has to assume that political
discussion goes on mainly within certain groups and is
much less likely to cross social barriers of all kinds.
While their dichotomous method of defining partisan
attachment effectively defines the concept of Independence
out of the study, the authors of Voting do include in their
analysis two categories of voters who resemble in some ways
the Independents which the present study seeks to examine.
These voters are, for Berelson and his colleagues,
"changing voters" and "neutrals."
Speaking first of the "changing voters" (a category
of voters who were later the subject of a debate between
V.O. Key and H. Daudt on the one hand, and the Survey
^^Ibid., p. 299.
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Research Center team on the otherl2), Voting takes an
inclusive view and places in this category both those
voters who change their minds during the campaign
("switchers" as the SRC would define them) and those
changing their loyalties between campaigns ("switchers-
or "floating voters" as Key and Daudt would define them).
Concerning this changing vote, a succinct explanation is
offered
i
...changes of vote are characterized not onlyby inconsistencies in the past but by incon-
sistencies in their present position on
subsidiary political matters. It is the
people with "cross-pressured" opinions on
the issues or candidates or parties—that
is, opinions or views simultaneously support-
ing different sides—who are most likely to
be unstable in their voting position. . .13
While these "changing voters" are by no means identical
to the self-identified Independents which the present
study will examine, neither are the categories mutually
exclusive. The presence of the "cross-pressures" which
Berelson and his associates describe will later be
^^See Key, The Responsible Electorate (I966),
p. 7.
^^Berelson, et_al., Voting (195''^), p. 19-
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examined as one of the possible explanations of self-
identified Independence.
The
-neutral voters- mentioned in Voting are
somewhat closer to the subjects of the present study.
Unfortunately, "neutrality- was defined in Voting ,
not as describing political self-identification, but
as describing the voters* attitudes towards the parties,
candidates, and issues of the 19^8 campaign. Nonetheless,
some of the discoveries about these neutral voters are
worthy of mention. In general, these findings are
consistent with those of later studies (to be discussed
below) which looked at Independents in more detail and
pictured them as being somewhat less interested and
involved in politics than party members. Berelson*s
team concluded that, "the more strongly the voter
favors or opposes parties and candidates, the more
interested he is in the election. v/hile conceding
that the "...interested neutral is precisely the image
^^For a discussion of "cross-pressures" in general,
and specific consideration of those mentioned in the Elmira
study—as well as a review of the methodological diffi-
culties associated with cross-pressure models, see
Patrick M. Horan, "Social Positions and Political Cross-
Pressures « A Re-Examination," American Sociological
Review , 36 (August 1971), pp. 650-66O.
15Berelson, et al .. Voting . (195^)s>P» 2^.
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es
of the 'ideal' political man who exists in some hopeful
theories and most civics text books....- they conclude
that such voters are few and far between. "The classic
•independent voter* of high interest but low partisan-
ship is a deviant case. "16
General Works, The Survey Research Center Studi
With the publication of The Voter Decides ^^
195^, the academic study of voting behavior turned on
important corner on the way toward its present level of
development. In a major departure from past works, the
authors of The Voter Decides employed a national cross-
sectional sample of respondents, rather than the single
IMA'» PP« 26-2?. It is difficult to include
Votmp; in a discussion of social science literature
without at least passing reference to that study's final
chapter, "Democratic Practice and Democratic Theory." In
it Berelson, the chapter's author, applauds what he calls
the "functional apathy" of the American electorate, in
what amounts to an empirical justification of the theory
of democratic elitism. Excellent criticisms of this
theory of democratic elitism and Berelson 's refinements
of it, are available in Peter Bachrach, The Theory of
Democratic Elitism; A Critique (Boston i Little, Brown,
1968)} Jack L. kValker, "A Critique of the Elitist Theory
of Democracy," American Political Science Keview , 60 (I966),
pp. 285-95; and James Wright, "Political Alienation in the
United States, I956-70," unpublished dissertation,
University of Wisconsin, 1973, Chapter 5, pp. ^92-500.
^^Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and V/arren E.
Miller, The Voter Decides (Evanston, 111.! Row, Peterson,
and Co., 195^).
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area studies used by Berelson and Lazarsfeld. All
subsequent Survey Research Center-sponsored research
on presidential elections has employed the national
sample format.
The Voter Decides is not a work whose place in
history is assured by the startling or profound nature
of its findings. Rather it is best remembered for its
introduction of the use of the national sample, and its
movement away from the sociological, or group-centered
explanation of the voting act toward a more perceptual,
or psychological explanation which emphasized the
potential for direct contact between candidates, issues,
and voters. In its discussion of the 19k8 and I952
election campaigns, The Voter Decides breaks fresh ground
on the subjects of political participation, attitudes
on political issues, and party identification—subjects
whose full implications were to be explored in depth by
The American Voter six years later.
In describing the electorates of the 1948 and
1952 campaigns, Campbell and his associates were the
first to deal specifically with what I have earlier
called 'self-identified Independents.' As is their
(i960).
1 fi
Angus Campbell, et al .. The American Voter
usual practice, the SRC researchers isolated the
Independents by asking their respondents what they
usually
-think of themselves politically. In I952,
according to the study, about one voter in five was
an Independent. The conclusions of their research on
Independents are sketchy at best, but they offer us
at least a point of departure from which to view the more
detailed analysis which The American Voter was later to
produce.
For the most part, the Independents of I952
seemed to be concentrated heavily in the Northeast, with
relatively few in the Midwest or South. 19 As might be
expected, these voters seemed less receptive to the idea
of straight-ticket voting than did their partisan counter-
parts. ^0 On the subject of the Independents* degree of
political participation, the research of The Voter Decides
yields a mixed picture 1 the Independents of I952 seemed
to participate somewhat more frequently than Democrats,
and somewhat less frequently than Republicans.^^ Nearly
twice as many Independents as partisans (of either stripe)
^^Carapbell, et al., The Voter Decides (195^), p. 93.
^
^Ibid .. p. 95. ^^Ibid., p. 101.
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described their voting history as having been spent
supporting the candidates of
-different parties. -22
Though the authors of The Voter Decides
mentioned no conclusions about Independent voters in
the text of their study (the above observations are
culled from a number of charts and graphs), their use
of self-perception as the key to political identification
represents an important turning point and lays the
groundwork for the more systematic examination of
Independents in The American Voter .
The American Voter , published in i960, is, at
least at this writing, the most extensive study ever
undertaken of American voting behavior. Relying on data
from national samples of the 19^8, 1952, and I956
presidential electorates, ^3 the study's authors—Angus
Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald
Stokes—built a complex and detailed picture of the
2^Ibid., p. 105.
23^The American Voter
, for all its useful insights,
was, as just described, written with data collected in the
1952 and 1956 presidential election campaigns, along with
a smattering of data collected in 19^8. It is interesting
that social science still regards the v/ork as Scripture
when some of the ingredients in its model of voting behavior
seem less important today than they were at the time of
the study's samples. Dwight Eisenhower was by no means a
typical presidential candidate and it would seem reasonable
to suggest that some of the forces operative in an election
which involved his candidacy may have in fact been rather
unusual temporal phenomena.
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American electorate which, while not without its critics,
remains authoritative to this day. In perhaps its most
important contribution, The American Vnt.Pr^ greatly refines
and expands the treatment given party identification by
the earlier voting studies. It also pays more detailed
concern to the voters* perceptions of the candidates and
issues. And it begins to deal, if only in preliminary
fashion, with the enormously complex phenomenon of
political ideology.
One other area in which The American Voter goes
beyond the work of its predecessors is in its treatment
of Independent voters.
Isolating Independents by self-identification,
the first conclusion drawn by The American Voter is that
the voting history of Independents is far less consistent
than that of party identifiers. For example, when
respondents were asked in 1956 whether they had always
voted for the same or different parties in presidential
elections, of Independents recalled a history of
having voted for different parties, compared with 40;^
of the "weak" party identifiers and 18^5^ of the "strong"
party identifiers .^^
^^Campbell, et al .. The American Voter (i960), p. 70.
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Perhaps the most interesting of The American
Voter's findings about Independents concern their general
levels of interest, knowledge, and participation in
politics. As mentioned in our introduction, the authors
do not equivocate on this question. 25 Describing the
electorate of I956, the authors show the Independents to
have been considerably less interested in the partisan
political events of that year, and point out—-in convincing
support of their thesis—that ^-9/0 of Independents claimed
not to care very much (or not care at all) about the
outcome of the presidential election. In contradiction
of the picture then popularly held of Independents, the
study concluded that, in reality, those voters are "...far
from being more attentive, interested, and informed. .. "26
As The American Voter describes them. Independents are
anything but 'ideal citizens.*
In offering their explanations of self-identified
Independence, Campbell and his colleagues refuse to be
satisfied with the notion that it represents nothing more
than passive non-alignment 1
V/e do not suppose that every person who describes
himself as an Independent is indicating simply
his lack of positive attraction to one of the parties.
Some of these people undoubtedly actually are
repelled by the parties or by partisonship itself
23ibid .. p. 83. ^^Ibid.
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and value their position as Independents.
Certainly independence of party is an idea of
some currency in our society, and it seemslikely that a Dortion n-P ±hr,<sa ^A,y^r^ 4.1
In a later passage, the notion that Independence has
"currency in our society" is expanded 1
The ideal of the Independent citizen, attentive
to politics, concerned with the course of govern-
ment, who weighs the rival appeals of a campaign
and reaches a judgment that is unswayed by partisan
prejudice has had... a vigorous history in the
tradition of political reform... and has such a hold
on civic education today... 28
deal with Independent voters in other than a passing
fashion. Like its findings in other areas, The American
Voter 's conclusions about Independents are not beyond
criticism. In later chapters, this study will examine
some of those conclusions in depth and make some judgments
as to how well they are standing the test of time.
The earliest political science research which deals
specifically and exclusively with Independent voters is
Samuel Eldersveld's I952 article, "The Independent Votei
The American Voter was the first major study to
Independent Voters 1 Research and Commentary
27ibid., p. 69. 2^Ibid., po 83.
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Measurement. Characteristics, and Implications for Party
Strategy...29 As might be expected, given the early date
of Eldersveld's work, little was known about the nature
of the Independent vote. This he readily admits,
Independents may be many or few; they may beincreasing or not, areal patterAs may or mav notexist; Independents may be of many undetermined
^hfplf^^t^ intelligent or'^ficklet andt e effec s of independent voting on the
i""?-^
system may be benificent or dangerous.
votin^?^ ^^ov^ledge about independlnt
:r'infniLus:3§^^'^ well-documented,
To help clear up some of these ambiguities, Eldersveld
marshals data from three separate studies31 in an effort to
classify various types of Independent voters and learn a
little about their social and political characteristics.
His first task is to isolate political "independence."
In doing so, he rejects exclusive adherence to either an
aggregative method of defining Independents as those
responsible for inter-election party shifts, or a totally
subjective method, such as self-identification. In fact
29samuel Eldersveld, .'The Independent Vote* Measure-
ment, Characteristics, and Implications for Party Strategy "
American Political Science Review
. ^6, (1952), pp. 732-754.
30lbid., p. 735.
^^Eldersveld includes data from the SRC 19-^8 election
study, an aggregative study of the 1950 Michigan guberna-
torial election, and a survey of a sample of the voters
of Washtenaw County, Michigan, conducted in 19^9 with the
assistance of Survey Research Center personnel.
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he states unequivocally that "...self perception may be
completely erroneous." (i.e.. the voter who perceivei
himself to be independent may in fact, by virtue of hii
demonstrated voting behavior, be a confirmed Democrat
or Republican) 32 He settles on a method which ascertains,
through responses to survey questions, the respondents*
voting histories, and defines as Independents people
who have a history of splitting their ballots or
supporting different parties in different years.
Using this behavioral index as his guide, Eldersveld
examines several characteristics of the Independent vote.
When he looks at the Independents* political participation,
he concludes that, "on voting turnout. Independents do
not have the high record generally believed; certainly it
is not superior to all types of partisans . "33 His research
showed Independents to have fairly high levels of income
and education, and suggested that "...a larger percentage
of men (than women) were bona-fide Independents. The older
voters did not reveal as much split-voting and independence.,
a smaller percentage of union members were Independents than
non-members. 3^ In suggesting implications for parties*
electoral strategy, Eldersveld advised, on the basis of
his research, that "...the party which has most appeal to
^^Ibid.. p. 737. 33ibid.. p, 7^6» 3^ibid., p. 751
certain social and demographic groups-the educated,
prosperous, middle-aged-will presumably have more
success in attracting Independents . "35
Another 1952 study of Independents by Alan Meyer
was included in William McPhee and William Glaser's 1962
Public Opinion and Gonp-ressional K1 Pnt.i .... . 36
Meyer's definition of Independence, like the one used in
this study, is perceptual in nature, but includes a
different group of voters than those to be investigated
here. In his work, Meyer included both people calling
themselves Independents and people who claimed to have
switched party allegiance in the recent past. But he
limited his bona-fide "Independent" category to only
those voters with high levels of interest and participation
in politics. Similar voters with low interest he labeled
-apathetic." By so defining his categories, Meyer removed
any chance that his analysis could address itself to the
important question of the Independent's level of
-^^JJlld., p. 751.
3^Alan Meyer, "The Independent Voter," in William
N. McPhee and William A. Glaser (eds.) Public Opinion and
Con/^ressional Elections (Glencoe, Illinois 1 The Free Press.
1962), pp. 65-77. As it appeared in the McPhee and Glaser
reader, Meyer's article was revised by the editors on the
basis of new information which had come to their attention
since the article's original preparation in 1952.
if2
participation and involvement. And, by including persons
who have recently shifted party allegiance, he obscures
the question of whether self-identified Independents are
voters in "transition" from one party to another.
From the perspective of my own areas of interest
in the subject, the most interesting aspect of Meyer's
analysis is that Independent voters (as he defines them)
tend to exist in environments of what he calls "mixed
stimulation. "37 in Meyer's words, his data suggest
"...that exposure to conflicting pressures in one's
social milieu, pressures for political interest but not
in one party alone, is associated with maximum independent
voting. "38
In 1959
»
Robert Agger wrote a short study of the
Independent voters in the 1952 presidential electorate .39
Agger's paper sought to determine whether self-identified
Independents differed markedly from partisans in three
general respects t demographic characteristics, overt
37ibid,, p. 7^.
IMl' » P» 75' Meyer's conclusions in this regard
are rather similar to those offered by Berelson and his
associates in Voting
. (195^), pp. 18-20.
^^Robert Agger, "Independents and Party Identifiers!
Characteristics and Behavior in 1952," in Burdick and
Brodbeck, American Voting: Behavior (195^), pp. 308-329.
^3
participation, (i.e., actual physical participation in
voting and other political processes) and what he termed
"psychological participation." Utilizing both Gallup
and SRC data in his analysis, he concluded that the
Independents in 1952 bore a striking resemblance in these
three areas to the Republicans of that year, but that
Independents seemed to be, " . . .more *cross-pressured ' than
either Democrats or Republicans . "^0
On the question of overt participation. Independents
were located in between the rather inactive Democrats and
the highly involved Republicans, though their performance
in 1952 was somewhat closer to that of the Democrats.
V/hen looking at "psychological participation" (the extent
to which the respondents had interests in and opinions
about political issues) he found that Independents
actually seemed more concerned with issues than either
group of partisans, even when education was controlled.
Since Agger was writing in the light of The Voter Decides
and other early works which had painted a rather dim view
of Independents, these findings were probably somewhat
surprising to him. They led him to suggest (in a way which
Walter Dean Burnham would develop later) that there may
^^Ibid., p. 316.
indeed be two groups of Independents in the electorate-
one 'high* and the other 'low* on the scale of 'ideal
citizen* traits.
In 1968, William Flanigan published a small
research compendium, The Political Behavior of the
American Electorate. The book has been updated a number
of times since, and while Flanigan makes no claim that
all the research he is reporting is original, he does
provide us with a useful reference for examining current
voting behavior research. Since most of the data he uses
are SRC-originated, Flanigan is dealing primarily with
self-identified Independent voters. And, while much of
what he reports is supportive of the SRC's basic findings
he offers dissenting views in a number of important areas.
Cognizant of the dim view taken of Independents in The
American Voter and other studies, Flanigan contends that,
"the case against the Independents has been overstated. "^2
While he concedes that Independents are often less
interested in political campaigns and outcomes than are
partisans, he contends that it is possible "...that these
^^V/illiam Flanigan, The Political Behavior of the
American Electorate (Bostont Allyn and Bacon, I968).
^2ibid., p. 41.
^5
measures of 'high interest' in the campaign and 'great
concern' with the outcome of the election are tapping
the enthusiasm of the partisans for their party's
Presidential candidate rather than a more general
interest in politics. "^3 m concluding his section on
Independents. Flanigan describes them in a far more
positive light than most previous studies.
The most nearly correct view of the Independent.
I believe, is that Independents are not muchinterested in politics and government and
certainly not much concerned with partisanpolitics—they are not emotionally involvedm party clashes. On the other hand, Independents
appear to have the information and the perspective
on political affairs necessary for an evaluation
of issues and candidates as competent as couldbe expected of partisans. Independents are no
wiser or more virtuous than partisans; nor arethey less so.'^^
An interesting aspect of Flanigan's work is that
while using the same data employed by the SRC teams, he
comes to different and somewhat more optimistic
conclusions. If nothing else, this shows once again
that the "facts- do not "speak for themselves," and
that different researchers—starting with different
assumptions and with different goals in mind—can view
^3rbid., p. 42. ^^Ibid.. p. 43.
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the same data and interpret them in somewhat different
ways • ^5 ^
In his 1971 study of 'critical • elections and
what he sees as the decline of American parties, Walter
Dean Burnhara speaks of a rapid rise in the number of
Independents, the beginning of which, "can be pinpointed
with some assurance as falling between 1964 and 1966.-'^6
Burnham points to Gallup data which show the rate of
Independence at JOfo in I969 and claims that, "for what
is probably the first time since reliable survey data
became available nearly a generation ago. the proportion
of strong party identifiers in the total electorate is
less than the proportion of independent identifiers . "4?
^^This does not impugn the "integrity" of the
research in question, but simply makes explicit aninescapable fact, the analysis (for that matter, the
collection) of data is not a neutral, impersonal enter-
prise, but one which incorporates and is to a certain
extend bound by the normative predispositions of the
researchers. The present study is not excepted from
this characterization.
^^V/alter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections and
the Mainsprings of American Politics (New Yorki W.W. Norton.
1970 ), p. 121.
^''^IhiA* t P* 121. The reference to 'strong party
identifiers' in Burnham's statement is to those persons
who claim a 'strong' identification with the party of
their choice.
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In addition, Burnham speculates that the nature
of Independence itself "...may have undergone a profound
political change since the 1950 's." Basically, Burnham
is confronting data from the 1964 SRC survey which do
not wholly support (at some points even contradict)
The American Voter 's generally low opinion of
Independents. ^8 light of this, Burnham suggests
that "...there is some kind of bimodality in operation
in their demographic profile," and that, "...Independents
tend to split between those with high to very high
scores of political efficacy and those with low to very
low scores. "^9
Observing that many of the new, post-1966
Independents have come from the Democratic ranks, Burnham
cites Gallup data on the new group and argues that,
"...the recent decline in Democratic identification and
Ibid
. , p. 122. Burnham's data reveal the
Independents to be rather distinctly "middle class"
in 1964. He states i "The significant point is that none
of the groups among which Independents have the largest
share... is the kind of group associated with low political
participation or efficacy. If it is indeed true that the
profile of the 1964 Independent can be read in terms
analagous to those used by the authors of The American
Voter , it would have to follow that there is a rather
steep upward gradient in the proportion of individual
voters who are political 'know-nothings* as one ascends
in each social category toward the top of the social
scale. But this, if true, would be a significant
political anomaly."
^Ibid., p. 127.
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increase in independent adults is concentrated toward
the top Of the social structure.
..
"50 Burnha^n uses
these findings to support a thought-provoking
conclusion!
It may be entirely likely that there are at
structure of electoral politics at the present
wh?c\'drnot^havr''r' and symbols"'nicn do not have rauch meaning in terms oftheir political values or cognitions :5l
Burnham's work reminds us that Independents are not a
monolithic or unchanging group, and that certain of their
numbers may conform to a number of different descriptions.
His thesis is an interesting one, and it is all
the more pertinent because of its recent vintage and its
discussion of the increase of Independents which has
occurred during the past decade. Burnham believes the
increase is partially attributable to the disintegration
of the American parties
i
The evidence lends some credence to the view
that American electoral politics is undergoing
a long-term transition into routines designed
only to fill offices and symbolically reaffirm
"the American Way." There also seem to be
50lbid., p. 128. 51ibid., 127.
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tendencies for our political parties gradually
to evaporate as broad and active intermediaries
between the people and their rulers, even as
they may well maintain enough organizational
strength to screen out the unacceptable or
the radical at the nominating stage. It
is certain that the significance of party as
link between government and the governed has
now come once again into serious question. 52
E« M. Schreiber has puzzled over the recent
increase of Independents and come up with an explanation
quite different from Burnham's. Schreiber rejects the
notion that the parties face imminent collapse and
argues that "...party identification still remains the
single best predictor of votes both at the presidential
level and at the lower levels of government. "53 Schreiber 's
1971 essay is an attempt to assess and understand, in
electoral terms, the import of the rise in Independence
that occurred between 196k and 1970.
Focusing on the components of that increase,
Schreiber concludes it has occurred almost exclusively
among whites, has been especially marked in the South,
and outside the South, has been most notable among
young voters. He attempts to make his data politically
52v/alter Dean Burnham, "The End of American
Party Politics," in Burnham (ed.) Politics/America t The
Cutting Edge of Change
. (1973). p. 132.
53e, Schreiber, "'V/here the Ducks Are ' 1
Southern Strategy Versus Fourth Party" Public Opinion
Quarterly , 35» Summer 1971»P» I66.
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useful when he advises that, on the basis of the political
attitudes he has observed in the new Independents, con-
servative electoral strategies would be most effective
in trying to gain their allegiance. His data dispute
the notion that the new Independents constitute a
potential power base for a new radical-left party
i
There may or may not be an attempt to raise a
new left-oriented party to contest the I972
presidential election, but if such an attempt
is made, the data presented here suggested that
white Independents will prove less than a ready-
made constituency, outside as well as inside
the South. 5^
Schreiber argues that a "Southern Strategy**
by Republicans would be an effective course in 1972
(as it apparently was) and sees only disaster should
the left attempt the formation of a new party. Pointing
out that such a party would come not from Independents but
from Democrats, he concludes that **...on the basis of the
data examined here, it appears that the fourth party
strategy in 1972 would create conditions that would almost
guarantee a Republican plurality and thereby make a
•Republican majority' unnecessary. •'55
Another scholar concerned with the recent rise in
Independent voters is James Sundquist. Sundquist begins
his discussion of Independents by attempting to describe
5^Ibid., p. 167. ^^Ibid.
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the ten million voters he claims have deserted the major
parties during the past six to eight years. From a
demographic viewpoint, Sundquist says that "...the increase
(among Independents) was entirely attributable to whites. ••56
Many of those whites were Southern Democrats and, among
that group, •'the growth of independent political attitudes
...is entirely among those opposed to government action to
enforce school integration.... Southern integrationists
show no increase in independent voting.^57 in addition to
these defecting Southerners, Sundquist shows that the
Democrats also lost a large number of Northern Catholics
during this period.
The new Independents, of course, have not come
exclusively from the Democratic ranks. According to
Sundquist, the 1960*s also brought a new loss of ^fo in
the portion of the electorate considering themselves
Republicans. These Republican losses occurred primarily
among middle-class, college-educated suburbanites.
Additionally, both parties suffered from an inability to
attract the allegiance of many young voters—a fact whose
significance is underscored when we consider the large
^^Jame s Sundquist, •'V/hither the American Party
System?" Political Science Quarterly , 88, December
1973. p. 571.
57ibid .. p. 571.
numbers of young voters who have been coming into the
electorate in recent years.
Searching for a way to explain these defections,
Sundquist suggests that the answer may lie in the nature
of the politics of the past ten years. He argues that
the 1960's were a period whose politics revolved around
three central issues—the Vietnam War, the race issue,
and the 'social issue' (an agglomeration of concerns,
usually said to encompass crime, drugs, rebellious youth,
and 'permisiveness '58)
. According to Sundquist, these
were not 'normal' political issues which could easily be
absorbed into the traditional post-New Deal partisan
structure. He uses these 'abnormal' issues as a partial
explanation for the decline of the parties and the rise
of Independence I
By cutting across the existing line of party cleavage,
these issues blurred the distinction between the
major parties and created polar forces that found no
satisfying expression through those parties. 59
When we identify the voters most directly affected by these
issues (Southern whites on the race issue, and young voters
^^The 'social issue'—and all its implications—
are discussed thoroughly by Richard Scammon and Ben
Wattenberg, The Real Majority (New Yorki Coward-McCann,
1970) , Chapter I.
•59sundquist, "Whither the American Party System?"
(1973), p. 578.
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on Vietnam, for example) we identify many of the voters
Who, in Sundquisfs words, «...are rejeoting the major
parties and calling themselves independents . "60
Still another explanation for the recent increase
is suggested by Rita Hauser.61 „auser argues that the
newly-numerous Independents are really Republicans and
Democrats who were disenchanted and driven from their
parties by those parties' selections of "extremist"
presidential candidates in 196k and 1972 respectively.
-Both candidates." (Goldwater and McGovern) writes Hauser.
-were moralistic, ideological, and far removed from the
center point... and the center, where the country really
sits, turned away. "62 curious irony, the defection
of alienated Democrats and Republicans into the Independent
column has ensured the continuation of the situation they
abhor. The new Independents* departure has permitted the
parties to be captured by "...the fringe element who view
politics as passion rather than persuasion, as blind loyalty
rather than broad tolerance and who, by default of the
independents' participation in party affairs, nominates
^°rbid., p. 578.
^^Rita Hauser, "The Center Can Hold," guest
columnist m the New York Times . December 11. 1973. p. ^5c.
62ibid.
5^
the candidates from within its narrow nest. -63 Thus a
vicious circle is joined in which large numbers of voters
are driven from the parties by undesirable candidates, and
their departure ensures that such undesirable candidates
will continue to be nominated in the future.
The validity of Hauser's theory is subject to
question-especially since the parties seem to have more
flexibility than she ascribes to them, and can seemingly
bounce back from even the gravest of defeats. Nonetheless,
her essay is interesting in that it suggests (as does
Sundquisfs work, to some extent) that 'short term' forces
may be playing an important role in the contemporary
upsurge of Independence. Chapters IV and V of this study
examine some of those short term forces and assess their
impact on political identification.
By way of summation, it may be said that the
picture of Independents painted by social science is
complex and, at times, even somewhat contradictory.
There is much disagreement, for example, on the question
of the Independents' overall political awareness and
astuteness. Some researchers believe that Independents
are generally less involved and less aware of political
things than are partisans, (Campbell, et al .. i960) while
^3ibid.
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others argue a more favorable impression of Independents
(Agger, 1959; Flanigan, 1968) or suggest a 'bimodality'
among the Independents, with some of their number highly
interested and involved and others less so (Burnham, I970).
In general the literature describes the Independents
as a group located above the median in terras of income,
occupation, and education (Eldersveld, 1952, Agger, 195^),
but Walter Dean Burnham (1970) argues that the Independents
are split in terms of their demographic and socioeconomic
traits—some located near the 'top' of the socioeconomic
scale, with others near the 'bottom.'
A host of variables are cited as possible explana-
tions of political Independence. Sociological and
ideological cross-pressures are often suggested by the
researchers, (Berelson, et__al.
, 1954; Meyer, 1962;
Agger, 1959) as are the overall decline in the strength
of political parties (Burnham, 1970), the 'partyless
issues' of the 1960's (Sundquist, 1973), and the
alienation of many voters resulting from the parties'
falling into the hands of 'extremist' factions (Hauser,
1973) • As for the possible consequences of the currently
large number of Independents, Burnham (1970) argues that
their presence can only hasten the continuing decomposition
of the political parties—with rather ominous policy
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consequences-6^ and Hauser (1973) concludes that their
desertion of the parties can only perpetuate the condition
(i.e., control of the party by extremist factions) they
seem to abhor.
V/e have learned during the past twenty years of
research that political Independents are not a monolithic
group, and that the phenomenon of political Independence
is not a simple one to describe. The general thrust of
recent literature has pointed out, for example, that a
tendency toward bimodality (both in socioeconomic terms,
and on 'ideal citizen' traits) exists in the Independent
category. Also, research has indicated that temporal
political circumstances appear to affect the rate of
Independence. By and large, however, many of the
ambiguities which Eldersveld described in 1952 still
surround our knowledge of the Independent voter. Many
important questions remain unanswered. Some remain
unasked. This study hopes to reduce both of those
categories
.
^^Some of these possible consequences, ominous and
otherwise, are discussed in Chapter V.
CHAPTER II
THE INDEPENDENT VOTERS, I952-I972
In this chapter Independent voters are examined
as they have appeared in the national electorate in the
six presidential elections from I952 to 1972. The data
used came from the national samples of voters conducted
by the Survey Research Center and examine the Independents
voting habits, political attitudes and beliefs, and their
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. In each
case, and for each year, an effort has been made to
compare the Independents to their Democratic and
Republican contemporaries.
Since no presidential campaigns or elections occur
in historical vacuums, included in the chapter are brief
discussions of the historical and political climate in
which each of the six elections took place.
1952
Eisenhower V. Stevenson
At the time that Harry S. Truman decided not to
seek re-election in 1952, his personal popularity was at
a very low ebb. Though history would lead many of them
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to change their judgments, many Americans in I952 believed
Truman had bungled his conduct of the Korean V/ar, been
responsible for the rampant inflation of the time, and
in many respects, lacked the "stature- to be an effective
President. With military affairs and the dignity of the
Presidency thus on the voters' minds, the climate was
ripe for the election of one of our country's greatest
military heroes, General Dwight D. Eisenhower. The
enormously popular "Ike" Eisenhower, and his running
mate, Richard Nixon of California, coasted to a landslide
victory in November over their Democratic opponents,
Governor Adlai E. Stevenson of Illinois and Senator
John Sparkman of Alabama.
Perhaps more surprising than the outcome of the
election itself was the nomination of Eisenhower to head
the Republican ticket. Though relatively little was
known about the General's political beliefs early in
1952, he was generally held to be a 'moderate' on
domestic issues and a mild 'internationalist' in world
affairs. His nomination marked a departure from
Republican philosophy of the past which had traditionally
advocated a virtual isolationism in foreign policy and
sought primarily, as its domestic policy, to roll back
and overturn many of the New Deal reforms. Though
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Thomas E. Dewey, the party's nominee in 19^^^ and 19k8,
was himself a moderate Republican, it was not until
Eisenhower's showdown victory over Taft in I952 that
the Republican image of domestic ultra-conservatism
and international isolationism was effectively muted in
the public mind. Eisenhower's nomination signaled the
resignation of the GOP to the fact that mainstream
America was likely never to return to the politics of
the nineteen-twenties. This resignation was precipitated,
if not by changes in Republican philosophy, by calculated
political pragmatism. "The sequence of elections before
1952," writes V.O. Key, "had, by their cumulative impact,
made it plain that the Republican party could not win the
Presidency if it seemed clearly to threaten the gains of
the principal beneficiaries of the New Deal."l Realizing
this, the delegates to the Republican National Convention
left Senator Robert A. Taft and what had come to be known
as his "standpat Republicanism" standing in the wings.
Instead, they selected Eisenhower on the first ballot
—
a decision that was destined to return them to the White
House for the first time in twenty years.
^V.O. Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups
.
(New York I Thomas Y. Growell, Fifth Edition, I969),
p. 193.
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For their part, the Democrats went to a third
ballot before nominating Adlai Stevenson. Stevenson came
into the convention as something of an underdog, since
Senator Estes Kefauver of Tennessee had been the most
successful vote-getter in the Democratic primaries.
Kefauver had alienated many Southern white Democrats
by his strong civil rights position and angered the
party
-bosses" in many Northern cities by his past
efforts to link parts of their organizations to the
fringes of organized crime. Without these "bosses" and
the vote from the South. Kefauver's cause was lost, and
the convention moved to Stevenson.
Despite (or because of) his polished oratory
and quick wit. Stevenson proved a relatively ineffective
campaigner. No competition for Eisenhower's infectious
grin and firendly style. Stevenson was unable to excite
an electorate who viewed the General with fond memories
of the past and great hopes for his returning 'dignity'
to the office of the Presidency. Stevenson and Sparkman
were beaten soundly in November, receiving only 89
electoral votes and ^4.5^ of the popular total.
Though the 1952 election had all the earmarks of
a 'personality contest' (that abberation of democracy so
widely decried by civics books—and candidates who are
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losing.), there were several issues which generated voter
interest. The Korean War, the "loss" of China, and
America's seemingly weakened position in world affairs,
an played on the voters' minds. Most of these issues'
were "naturals" for Eisenhower's Republican candidacy,
and he successfully argued that his long experience in
world affairs would be a tremendous asset in the
Presidency.
While Stevenson argued that a Republican victory
would mean an end to the social progress of the past
twenty years, the GOP could point to the so-called
"Truman scandals" (an amalgam of alleged bribings,
fixings, and unwarranted pardonings) as evidence of the
Democratic mismanagement which deserved voter repudiation.
And, with Eisenhower-a fairly 'progressive' Republican-
at the head of the GOP ticket. Democratic charges of
Republican arch-conservatism were somewhat muted in
their effect on the voters.
Whether the international and domestic difficulties
of the Truman administration made a Republican victory
inevitable in 1952 is difficult to say. What is certain
is that the nomination of Dwight D. Eisenhower, and the
change in Republican direction which it marked, made the
GOP a far more attractive party in 1952 than it had been
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at any time since the twenties. And. by according him a
landslide victory in the November elections, the voters
proved that they did, indeed, "like Ike."
The 1952 national electorate was composed of
Democrats, 25.6/. Republicans and 21. 2f. Independents-
figures which were obtained by observing respondents'
answers to the question, "Generally speaking, do you
think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an
Independent, or what?"
The Independents in 1952 contributed in no small
way to Eisenhower's landslide victory. 2 Two thirds of the
Independents voted for the General, as did 96.1^ of the
Republicans and one fourth of the Democrats. There was
'
also something of a volatile quality to the Independent
vote of that year, since in 1952, 4if.8/. of the Independents
claimed a history of having voted for different parties
^Another possibility, of course, is that the
Eisenhower candidacy was responsible for driving many 19^8
Democrats, now fond of the General, into the Independent
camp. There is, as mentioned in the introduction, no
precise way of determining which explanation is dominant,
but Table i - 2 would seem to indicate that individual
candidacies are not responsible, by themselves, for
percipitous changes in the composition of the Independent
category. Also, it should be remembered (as shown in Table
i - 1) that the rate of Independence stayed fairly constant
from 19^8 to 1952. Democratic identification, in fact,
increased slightly during the period--a fact which casts
doubt on any thesis that the Eisenhower candidacy, per se
,
was responsible for major changes in party identification.
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in past presidential elections. When we delete from
their numbers the 23.6/. of the Independents who had not
previously voted (because of age and assorted reasons)
we see 58. 7f. of all 'eligible' Independents to have been
"floating voters" at one time or another. Such a
'floating' tendency was exhibited by only one-quarter
of the partisan voters. Further evidence of the
Independent's "independence" in voting patterns comes
when we see that almost one fourth of them claimed to
have split their tickets "about evenly" in 1952, compared
to only 13.2;^ of the Republicans and 11.4^ of the Democrats.
As mentioned above, one of the most important
issues of the 1952 campaign was American involvement in
Korea. A measure of its salience can be gleaned when we
compare the voters' attitudes toward Korea with voter
attitudes on the more contemporary problem of American
involvement in Viet Nam. 3 It will surprise few that,
when asked in I968 if they felt that American involvement
in Viet Nam had been a mistake, ^l,6fo of the electorate
said that it had been. In 1952, 38.9;« of the American
voters believed that our involvement in Korea had been
^In depth analysis of American public opinion on
the wars in Korea and Viet Nam is available in John Mueller's
War, Presidents, and Public Opinion (New Yorki John Wiley
and Sons, 1973) » especially Chapter 3«
6^
a mistake. Though this figure is not as high as the
number of Americans who dissented over Viet Nam. it is
a substantial figure, and gives a good indication of the
extent to which the Korean question was a controversial
one in 1952. When we examine opinion on Korea along
partisan lines, we see that 370/^ of the Independents
felt that America involvement there was a mistake, as
did 35.7/^ of the Democrats and 5^.3fo of the then "dovish"
Republicans. Significantly, however, even though the
Republicans were least supportive of initial involvement
(no doubt because it was undertaken at the order of a
Democratic President), they appeared as supportive as
the Democrats and Independents of pursuing an 'escalation*
policy designed to result in a military victory. Over kO/o
of the Republicans sought such a military victory, as did
39.0^ of the Independents and 35.1?^ of the Democrats.
Among the domestic issues of concern in 1952 were
the question of the federal government's role in the affairs
of the citizenty, federal involvement in civil rights
matters, and the controversial Taft-Hartley Act. Concerning
the role of the government, respondents were asked if they
believed that, "...the national government should do more
in trying to deal with such problems as unemployment,
housing, and so on." The 1952 Independents were as
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enthusiastic as Democrats in their support of government
involvement, with 20. 9^^ of their number arguing for a
larger governmental role. Holding that same position
were 17.9^ of the Democrats and 13.2'/$ of the Republicans.^
When the focus was narrowed, however, to elicit opinions
on whether or not the government should "...take an
interest in whether negroes have trouble getting jobs...,**
the Independents hedged somewhat, and like the
Republicans were less supportive of that type of
activity than Democrats.
5
On the subject of the Taft-Hartley Act, the
Independents joined both Republicans and Democrats in a
general endorsement of the Act's propriety. They were,
however, less supportive of the Act than Republicans,
only 2.7/^ of whom favored its repeal compared to 9.7;^
of the Independents and 15*5/° of the Democrats.
In looking at the demographic and socioeconomic
I
characteristics of the electorate in 1952, some interesting
patterns emerge. The Independents of that year were
concentrated most heavily in the Northeast and Midwest,
with relatively few of them (proportionately speaking)
^The observed difference in this case between
Independents and Democrats is not statistically significant.
5\Vhen asked, 21. of the Independents stated the
federal government should take such an interest, compared
to 29.8;^ of the Democrats and 19 of the Republicans.
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residing in the South. Over one fourth of the North-
easterners called themselves Independents then as did
21.8^ of the people in the Midwest. In the South,
barely one person in ten was an Independent (nearly
lQ)''/o of the Southerners were still Democrats in 1952)
and in the West the percentage of Independents was
18.2^, The Independents tended to be city dwellers
more than did the party members with over a third of
their numbers residing in central cities, compared to
about one-fourth of both Democrats and Republicans
There were fewer blacks among the Independent ranks
than among the Democrats, but more than among the
Republicans.
The Independents of the 1952 electorate tended
to be slightly more numerous among the younger age
groups in society than among the older groups.
Figure II - 1 graphically presents the percentage of
Independents among the various age groups in the 1952
electorate. V^hile the incidence of Independence generally
seems somewhat higher among the younger age groups, there
is no precipitous drop once the 21-2^ and 25-28 age groups
have been passed, and the decline in Independence with age
^J)7 ,9% of the Independents were central city dwellers
s
compared to 2k,7fo of the Democrats and 29^3% of the
Republicans
•
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is barely perceptible among voters over thirty, m I952.
there seemed no wide gap between 'old' and 'young' voters
in terms of their preference for political Independence.
On the socioeconomic indices, Independents
generally occupied a middle position—somewhere 'below*
the Republicans and 'above* the Democrats. Where vari-
ations from this trend occurred they were instances of
the Independents pushing 'upward' on the socioeconomic
scale, in one or two cases approaching the levels held
by the Republicans.
One such index was income, where 13.^ of the
Independents reported a family income in excess of
$7500 per year, compared with 12, 5fo of the Republicans
and only 4.3^ of the Democrats.? At the other end of the
income scale, only 29.1^ of the Independents earned less
than $3000 per year—a figure about the same as the
31.0^ of the Republicans who earned that amount (35.^
of the Democrats in 1952 earned less than $3000 a year).
The relatively high income of the Independents (in 1952,
there was no significant difference between the income
levels of Independents and Republicans) was very probably
a reflection of their occupational status since, in that
?The observed difference between Independents
and Republicans in this case is not statistically
significant.
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year, they clustered disproportionately toward the 'high
status' side of the occupational scale. The percentage of
their numbers (l6.6f.) who were either professional people
or upper level managerial personnel was as high as that of
the Republicans and higher than that of the Democrats.
8
The Independents were about as likely as partisans
to be members of union families in 1952.9 and. when asked
if they perceived themselves as being a member of a social
class, Independents located themselves between the
Republicans and Democrats—less "working class" than
the Democrats, but not as "middle class" as the Republicans. 10
The educational levels of the Independents in 1952 appear
somewhat more impressive than this "average" perception
would indicate, since their mean level of educational
attainment in that year was 10.1 years, a figure about
equal to the 10.3 years of the Republicans, but above
the 9*0 years for the Democrats.il
^10.^^ of the 8^1 Democrats in the sample and 17.0^;^
of the ^86 Republicans occupied such positions.
^7^»Q/o of the Independents were members of non-
union families, compared to 69,lfo of the Democrats and
77 .0:^ of Republicans.
^^On this question, 3^ of the Independents called
themselves 'middle class' as did 26.3;^ of the Democrats
and 55*2;^ of the Republicans.
llThe Independent-Republican difference in this case
is not statistically significant. That between Independents
and Democrats is significant at the .01 level.
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It appears, on balance, as if Independents were
indeed the 'middle* voter in 1952. Their support of
Eisenhower was greater than the Democrats, but less than
the Republicans. Their political attitudes seemed to
cluster near the center of the Democratic-Republican
split. And their demographic and socioeconomic profiles
showed them to be slightly less 'well-to-do' than the
Republicans, but generally better off than the Democrats.
Perhaps the most interesting observation is that
—
especially on several socioeconomic indices—the
Independents of 1952 seemed to be "crowding" the
Republican end of the continuum. That, coupled with
their fairly heavy (app. 65%) support of Eisenhower,
gives their appearance a faintly Republican caste in
that year, and should be remembered as we examine their
characteristics in subsequent elections.
1956
Eisenhower V. Stevenson
In many ways (including the most obvious) the 195^
presidential election was a virtual 're-play' of the 1952
contest. Perhaps more than anything, the election was an
affirmation that the nation's voters still "liked Ike."
There is no doubt more to that now-famous phrase than a
71
Simple campaign slogan. Eisenhower's personality, and
the voters, favorable perception of his congenial
-father
image, were unquestionably major factors in his re-election.
Samuel Elliot Morison has written that "his genial
character and transparent honesty inspired loyalty to
himself and confidence in his administration. "12 This
loyalty and confidence were expressed by the voters in
the landslide victory which they awarded him in I956.
Among the relevant issues in the I956 campaign
were the state of President Eisenhower's health, the
newly emergent civil rights issue precipitated by the
Supreme Court's decision in Brown V. Bo.rd of Edun.ti.n
^^ ^^^^^^ 195^. and the afterwash of McCarthyism
and its attendant focus on the perils of the so-called
"communist menace."
The relative success of the Eisenhower admin-
istration in ending the Korean conflict, extending
unemployment benefits, launching a massive Interstate
Highway program, and convincing the populace that its
•dynamic conservatism* was the perfect vehicle in the
war of "liberty against socialism," all enabled the
Republican party, with the revered Ike at the head of
12Samuel E. Morison, The Oxford History of theAmerican People (New Yorki Oxford University Press,
1953;, p. 1079.
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the ticket, to capture k57 electoral votes and 57% of
the popular total. All was not bright for the GOP,
however, since the I956 election returned to Congress
the Democratic majority in both houses which had been
elected in the off-year contest of I954. This
Democratic majority, in the face of Eisenhower's
landslide, resulted in 'divided government '-at that
time a most unusual occurrence-and suggested that the
electorate of 1956 was not conforming to patterns of
the past.
In 1956, 23,1^% of the electorate thought of
themselves as Independents, while ^3-5/^ were Democrats
and 29.1^ were Republicans. More specifically, when
asked,
-do you usually think of yourself as a Republican,
a Democrat, an Independent, or what?" the voters responded
as demonstrated in Table II - 1. The categories "weak"
and "strong" positions were determined by asking partisan
respondents the strength of their affiliation, and the
categories of 'leaning* Independents were determined
by asking the Independent respondents if they considered
themselves "closer" to one party or the other.
In the 1956 election, the Republicans (both
'strong* and 'weak' Republicans, are now here included
as they will be in the future, unless otherwise stated)
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supported President Eisenhower solidly, as might be
expected. Of those voting, 96.3/. went for Eisenhower,
compared with 25.5/. of the Democrats (both strong and
weak) and 73-6/. of the Independents (included here are
all three categories of Independents, as they will be
in the future unless otherwise specified.) in short.
Eisenhower was able, in I956. to command the almost
'
unanimous support of Republicans, win a large majority
of Independents, and earn the votes of many Democrats.
If we turn these figures around a bit. we see that
Eisenhower got 29.5% of his votes in I956 from
Independent voters (while Stevenson got only I5.7/,
of his total from the Independents.) It is clear that
the Independents of 1956 were very important in
Eisenhower's victory, but some other elements of that
Independent vote are not so obvious and merit further
examination.
To begin, it may be the Independent voter of I956
who was responsible for the ••surge"13 election and the
"divided government" it produced, since 31,9> of the
13The term "surge" election-connoting an electionm which a party's victory in a presidential electiongoes unaccompanied by a victory in the House of Representa-tives—was coined by Charles Sellers, "The Equilibrisra
Cycle m Two-Party Politics," Public Opinion Quarterly .
Vol. 29 (Spring 1965), pp. 16-3^^: ^
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independents in that year claimed to have "splif. their
tickets on the presidential and congressional races, as
opposed to 16.5/. Of the Republicans and 12.9% of the
Democrats. While ticket-splitting
.ight ,uite logically
occur more frequently among Independents, this disparity
is still rather startling and suggests that the" Independents
of twenty years ago may have been the pioneers of the
"ticket-splitting'' phenomenon which is so widespread
today, 1^
In addition to being "ticket-splitters," the
Independents of 1956 also seemed more likely to be
"floating voters" than did partisans of either stripe.
When asked if their votes in previous presidential
elections had been cast for only one or for different
parties, over half the Independents claimed a history
of having voted for different parties, while such a
mixed past was observed among about one-fourth of the
party identifiers. These figures seem to confirm the
common sense assumption that Independents have a more
flexible vote than do partisans—both with respect to
different contests in the same election year, and between
the elections of different years.
•^^For a discussion of the 'ticket-splitter* see
DeVries and Tarrance, The Ticket-Splitter i New Force in
American Politics (197277 ~
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Among the questions asked in the I956 survey
designed to measure the respondents' political attitudes
were those dealing with civil rights, "big" government,
and how to deal with internal and external 'threats'
from communism.
The Independents of I956 took a generally con-
servative position on the question of the government's
involvement with the economy and welfare of the citizens-
about as 'conservative' as Republicans (who generally
favored the government's non-interference) and considerably
less 'liberal' than the Democrats (who tended to favor
government involvement) . 15 in contrast, on questions
dealing with civil rights issues, the 1956 Independents
were the group most favorable to the cause of school
de-segregation, outstripping both Republicans and
Democrats in support of government intervention to ensure
the integration of public education, (though their
expressed support of federal efforts to aid in securing
jobs and housing for negroes was no higher than that of
the party identifiers of either party).
^^For example, 50^ of the Independents agreed
that the government should aid in seeing to it that
"...everyone has a job and a good standard of living,..,"
as did 70^ of the Democrats and ^6.2;^ of the Republicans
o
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Another issue area of high salience in I956
was that area of concerns that can generally be labeled
the
-communist problem." m their attitudes on this
"problem." the Independents seemed to be somewhat more
••open-minded" than either Democrats or Republicans. For
example, when asked if the government ought to "fire
any government worker who is accused of being a communist."
63.1^ of the Independents disagreed, as compared to 53.2^
of the Republicans and SI *H of the Democrats. On the
question of foreign aid. however, the differences were
insubstantial, with 32.8,^ of the Independents agreeing
that foreign aid was right, "...even if they (the
recipients) are not as much against communism as we
are,..." Similar agreement was forthcoming from 30.5^
and 27.6?5 of the Republicans and Democrats, respectively.
These few items do not purport to describe the
"ideology" of the 1956 Independents. For one thing, the
range of opinions touched by these questions is limited
and results are far too sketchy. It is possible to say.
however, there appear to be few large gaps between the
attitudes of Independents and those of the partisans in
1956. at least on the issues examined. In fact, except
on measures of approval of government's involvement in
the economic lives of the people, there appears very
78
little difference between the attitudinal patterns of
the Democrats and Republicans. Later in the chapter
our examination of the electorates of I968 and I972
will show that the broad-based 'consensus' here
described appeared to erode somewhat when pressured by
issues relating to war, poverty, and ra-^e relations.
This erosion causes one to wonder if th.> consensus so
often described to exist during the 1950's (from which
many notions about the consensual nature of 'normal
polities' in America are drawn) was by itself something
of an abberation, produced more by 'short term' forces
than by any overriding consensus with or in the political
system itself.!^
In 1956, most Independents in the United States
were concentrated in the Northeast and Midwestern areas
of the country. Table II - 2 shows the 1956 pattern of
party identification by region in the four geographical
1^1 t is interesting that the consensual nature
of the 1950 's politics was used by some analysts as a
model for what they perceived to bo the 'end of
ideology' as a potent force in political struggles.
The fact that this consensus may have been due more to
a number of short-term forces rather than the 'end of
ideology' v/as apparently overlooked by these observers.
An excellent collection of essays devoted to the 'end
of ideology' thesis (both pro and con) is available in
Chain Waxman, ed. The End of Ideolo>":v Debate (New Yorki
Simon and Schuster, I968)
.
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areas of the country
. In the table
* the area Northeast
includes New England and the Middle Atlantic states;
the South includes the traditional •border' states as
well as the 'deep* South; and the West includes the
Mountain and Coastal states.
TABLE II - 2
PARTY IDENTIFICATION BY REGION OF RESIDENCE IN I956
Northeast Midwest kjuuoii wesu
Republican ^1.0 33.7 18.0 22.8
Democrat 30.
3
36.9 58.9 ^2.7
Independent 26.6 27.8 18.0 22.8
Other 2.1 1.6 5.1 11.7
100.0
(N=402)
100.0
(N=536)
100.0 100.0
(N=555) (N=2i|'l)
As is shown in the table, the highest incidence
of Independence occurred in the Northeast and Midwest
whereas the South had the smallest percentage of
Independents. The Independents hailed disproportion-
ately from cities—both small and large—and relatively
few of their numbers were from rural areas. Also as
tended to be the case in 1952, there was a higher
proportion of Independents among the young in 1956 than
80
among their elders. Figure II - 2 illustrates the
party identification patterns of voters by age
group.
While this figure yields no 'straight line*
relationship, it certainly presents us with a few
general trends worthy of discussion. The incidence of
Republican identification is more frequent among older
voters, and that of Independence is most common among
the young. There are a number of fluctuations in the
pattern of Democratic identification, but it seems to
be less affected (in any consistent pattern) by age
than either of the other two categories. As we look
at the graphical representations of Republican and
Independent identification, the figures suggest that
many of the young Independents who, with age, choose
to identify with a party most often choose the
Republicans. It might be theorized that, since
Republicanism seems to appeal more to older voters,
the Independents who, by definition, choose a party
later in life (if at all) are more likely to end up
eventually in the Republican camp. If this is true,
tfien it is possible the contemporary (19?^) boom of
xndependent voters—especially young ones—could
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someday work to the eventual advantage of the
GOP. 17
In addition to being "younger" than their partisan
counterparts, the I956 Independents were also more likely
to be found among whites than non-whites. 2l^.l^% of
whites were Independent as were 13^^ of the non-whites.
In the socioeconomic categories, the Independents
seemed to be slightly better off (relative to partisans)
than they were in 1952. Somewhat surprisingly, the
Independent voters had the highest mean educational
level in the electorate, with 10. 3 years of school.
Comparable figures for the Republicans and Democrats
were 9-7 and 9.0 years respectively. 18 There were
relatively fewer college graduates among the
Independents than among Republicans, but there were
fewer Independents (22.1^^ with only a grade school
education than either Democrats {28.5%) or Republicans {31.k'/o).
(^ory^^ ^"^While Screiber's analysis, "Where the Ducks Are,"U97l; argues that the Independent boom will most likelybenefit the GOl
,
the question of aging and conservatizinr(or Republicanizing, as the case may be) is not a simple
'
one, and is the subject of some controversy. For adiscussion of the question. See Nerval Glenn, and Ted Hefner,
Further Evidence on Aging and Party Identification," PublicOpinion Quarterly. 36, (Spring 1972), pp. 31-^7.
~
Both the difference between Independents and
Republicans, and between Republicans and Democrats are
significant at the .05 level.
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On both their perception of their own social
Class and the social class of their family, the
Independents were once again back in the middle-
less
.middle Class, than the Republicans but more so
than the Democrats. 19 Independents were about as
likely to be union members as were Democrats, but more
likely than Republicans (69.9/. of the Independents were
from non-union families as were 68.2^^ of the Democrats
and 80. 2^^ of the Republicans).
The Independents in I956 occupied the "high
status" occupations about as frequently as did the
partisans. Slightly over seventeen percent of the
Independents were either professionals or self-
employed businessmen, as were sixteen percent of the
Republicans and twelve percent of the Democrats. At
the other end of the occupational "scale" there were
proportionately fewer Independents in the unskilled
labor categories than either Democrats or (somewhat
more surprisingly) Republicans.
As we might expect, given these occupational
l^On the question of their social class, 33.7/0
of the Independents claimed a 'middle class' perception,
as did 28, 0/0 of the Democrats and 50.^/^ of the Republicans.
When asked about their family backgrounds, 23.9^ of the
Independents claimed 'middle class' origins, as did 25^3fo
of the Democrats and 42,3^ of the Republicans.
8/+
tendencies the Independents were quite well off
financially in 1956. The Independent's mean income
level (per family) in 1956 was $5220 per year, virtually
the same as the $5200 mean for Republicans and somewhat
higher than the $^750 earned by Democrats. 20
In sum, it can be said that on many important
socioeconomic indices, the Independents of 1956
appeared somewhat closer to the Republicans than they
did to the Democrats. In fact, in three of the most
important areas—education, occupation, and income—
they actually appeared at least as far from the
Democrats as did the Republicans. It could well be
argued that, at least in 1956, the Independents might
have really been—as they were to a lesser degree in
1952— 'Republicans in disguise.' Their overwhelming
support for Eisenhower could be given as evidence in
support of such an argument. But certain other factors
—
notably their 'middle' position on several political opinion
questions and the demonstrated volatility of their vote
suggest that such a classification would be, at best, premature
^^V/hen non-whites (the vast majority of whom were
Democrats in 1956) are removed from the sample, the inter-
party income disparity decreases somewhat, with the mean
income of Democrats rising to approximately $^850/yr.;
the incomes of Independents and Republicans remain
virtually unchanged.
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I960
Kennedy V. Nixon
The presidential election of i960 was certainly
one of the closest and most exciting contests in our
recent history. In its outcome it was a "reins tating«
election, whereby control of the White House was
returned to the normally-more-powerful Democrats after
an eight-year period of Republican "deviation. "21 Probably
more than anything else, the Democratic victory can be
traced to the large Democratic registration majority,
to the voters' favorable reaction to John Kennedy's
political style and to their desire, after eight years
of what they perceived as Republican 'inactivity*
(however pleasant that inactivity may have been) to
-get this country moving again." Crucial factors in
Kennedy's election (though their precise impact on the
voters will probably never be known) were the famed
television debates. Though selective perception
undoubtedly led strong partisans on both sides to
contend, honestly, that 'their man' had 'won' the debates,
21
The terms "reinstating" and "deviating" elections
are discussed and defined by Gerald Pomper, "Classification
of Presidential Elections." Journal of Politics 29
(1967), pp. 535-66. " —
there is a general consensus that Kennedy, by virtue of
his attractive appearance and style, bested Nixon, at
least in the first of these appearances and, in so doing.
«on the support of a large number of previously undecided
voters.
The most talked about issues in the i960
campaign were probably the state of the economy.
Senator Kennedy's religion, (and perceived inexperience)
and a slightly different version of the perennial cold
war problem of the 'communist menace,*
Kennedy's campaign was built around two major
issues, one domestic and one foreign. The Massachusetts
Senator took great pains pointing to the shortcomings
of the American economy in i960, and argued that,
despite our overall high standard of living, a sub-
stantial number of Americans were not receiving their
•fair share.' In a land of affluence, Kennedy found it
inconceivable and unacceptable that, as he claimed,
thirty million Americans went to bed hungry every night.
He supported raising the minimum wage to $1.25 per hour
(in contrast to the $1.10 per hour supported by Vice-
President Nixon) and argued—though not too loudly at the
time—for adoption of a plan to provide medical care
for the aged.
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In a curious reversal of the patterns of previous
elections, Senator Kennedy was able to lay the problem
Of the threat of communist aggression squarely in the
laps Of his Republican opponents, starting most of
his major campaign addresses with the contention that
the world "cannot exist, half slave and half free,"
Kennedy assailed the Republicans for permitting the
existence of what he called a "missile gap"-.a dis-
parity which he claimed existed between the amount and
potency of Soviet and American arms. As Kennedy
recited his list of deficiencies in the American
arsenal, and contrasted these to the massive amount
of weaponry he alleged the Soviets were producing, he
succeeded in convincing the voters that the Republicans-
traditionally the party able to use the 'communist
issue' to its own advantage—had. in this important
area, been lax in protecting the country against
possible Soviet aggression.
While pursuing his hawkish course in arguing
that America was ill-prepared for a possible nuclear
confrontation with the Soviet Union (which, in i960,
was still enough of a threat to warrant the printing of
air raid instructions on the book covers of school
children, and the widespread construction of fallout
88
shelters). Kennedy was able to attract the peace-
oriented voters by his firm pledge of American non-
interference with the Communist Chinese shelling of
the islands of Quemoy and Matsu. Arguing in a
televised debate that American commitments obligated
us to aid only in the defense of Taiwan itself and the
Pescadores Islands, Kennedy was able to cast Nixon in
the role of being willing, once again, to send 'our
boys* to fight on 'foreign soil,*
For his part, Vice-President Nixon gauged his
campaign around what he saw as the successful record of
the Eisenhower administration and his long experience
in high governmental office. Though his claim that
Kennedy lacked experience was somewhat misleading (Nixon
and Kennedy had been freshman Congressmen together
fourteen years earlier), Nixon was able to convince
many voters that his personal experience in dealing
with world leaders (most notably, his *Kitchen Debate*
with Soviet Premier Khruschev) equipped him best to deal
with America *s problems abroad in the decade of the
sixties. "Experience Counts** read the Nixon-Lodge
bumper stickers and campaign buttons, and the Republicans
were undoubtedly successful in persuading many voters
89
that Kennedy's tender age and lack of executive
experience left him unprepared for the Presidency.
An issue of high salience in i960 was Senator
Kennedys Roman Catholicism. Though Vice-President
Nixon maintained throughout the campaign that the
•religious issue' had no place in American politics,
many voters were concerned-inspired no doubt by myths
about the nature of Catholicism and Catholics' relation
to the Papacy—that election of a Catholic might
adversely affect the relationships between church and
state in this country. Agreeing (however unconsciously)
with political theorists such as Hobbes, Rousseau, and
Machiavelli that Catholics, with their 'divided loyalty,'
are poor political "risks," many voters were undoubtedly
driven to avoid voting for Kennedy because of his
Catholicism. On the other hand, it is almost a cer-
tainty that a large number of Catholic voters who might
otherwise have voted for Nixon or stayed at home, went
to the polls and pulled the Democratic lever in 1960.^2
22The impact of the religious issue on the i960
campaign is discussed by Philip Converse, "Religion and
Politics: The I96O Election," Chapter 6 of A. Campbell,
P. Converse, V/. Miller, and D. Stokes, Elections and the
Political Order (New York, John V/iley & Sons, I966),
pp. 96-12^. Converse believes, and claims his data
support the belief, that "...religion played a powerful
role in shaping voting behavior in the i960 election. This
force generated differences quite beyond the customary,
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Whether his religion helped or hurt Kennedy in
the long run is open to question. It probably did
change some votes on both sides, but it is not possible,
on the basis of data available, to speculate on the
precise magnitude and direction of its influence, m
any case, it certainly did not blow the election wide
open in either direction, since the i960 election was
the closest in our history. Out of over sixty-eight
million votes cast. Senator Kennedy was elected President
by a popular plurality of only 112.000.23 y/ith Lyndon
Johnson, then the Senate Majority leader from Texas, on
his ticket, Kennedy was able to capture many of the
Southern states and gained an Electoral College majority
of 303 votes to Nixon's 219. The presence of Henry Cabot
long-standing ones between the major religious groupsin the United States." ^
23
-'While many have marveled over the closeness
of this election, it is possible to view the outcome as
"^^^^ "^^^ 112,000 vote plurality for Kennedy.
If 6/11 of Kennedy's total in Alabama is deleted (since
6 of the 11 Democratic electors from Alabama voted for
Sen. Harry Byrd in the Electoral College) as having been
cast for Democratic electors not pledged to him, the
final total shows Nixon winning a plurality of
approximately 65,000 out of 68 million votes cast.
The questionable vote totals reported in the states
of Illinois and Texas cast further shadow on the precise
total outcome.
Lodge on the GOP slate, while adding to that tiCefs
image of experience and professionalism, probably did
not help the Republicans as much as Johnson helped the
Democrats. Lodge, li.e Kennedy, was from Massachusetts,
and the regional impact which parties like their
vice-presidential candidates to carry was probably
not very strong in his case.
One other factor which contributed to the
Republican defeat in i960 was the reluctance of
President Eisenhower to get involved in the campaign.
Though Eisenhower could undoubtedly have been elected
for a third term had not the twenty-second ammendment
been in effect, his popularity did not seem to rub
off on Richard Nixon, nor does it appear in retrospect,
did he take any pains to ensure that it did. While
the extent of Eisenhower's estrangement from Nixon
(if any) is something we can only guess, we can also
guess that his wholehearted, enthusiastic endorsement
of his Vice-President in I960. and his active campaign-
ing in his behalf, might possibly have been enough to
tip the delicate balance of that election.
In i960, the percentage of Independents in the
electorate held steady from 1956 at 22, k%. The
Democrats and Republicans showed little change as well.
92
capturing the loyalty of kk.yf. and 28.8/. of the electorate,
respectively, m the election itself, the majority of
Independents in the sample continued to display the
Republican tendencies they exhibited in 1952 and I956 and
voted for Richard Nixon-the only time in recent memory
when they have given majority support to the losing
candidate. Only 1,5.7% of the Independents cast their
votes for Senator Kennedy, compared to 80. 8/. of the
Democrats and only 6.8;^ of the Republicans. Despite their
support of Nixon, however, comparative analysis of the I956
and I960 elections demonstrates the Independents* important
role in Kennedy's election. As we look at the three groups
(Democrats. Republicans, and Independents) relative support
for the Republican candidates of I956 and i960, we can see
that, once again, the Independent vote was the most 'volatile.*
with nearly twenty percent fewer Independents supporting
Nixon than had backed Eisenhower in 1956.^^ At the same
2^The problem arises again, here, of determininghow much consistency the Independent category had between
1930 and I960. In terms of raw percentages it remained
virtually unchanged {2k/o in 1956. 2y/o in i960). When the
retrospective 1956 votes of I96O Independents are recalled,
there is some disparity with the actual I956 Independent
vote. 18. 8/^ of the i960 Independents recalled a I956
Stevenson vote, when 26.^'% of the 1956 Independents actually
voted for Stevenson. This disparity, however, can probably
be attributed to selective recall rather than to a dramatic
shift in the composition of the Independent category, since
the recalled 1956 vote for Stevenson of the entire elector-
ate was only 36.5%—6.5^ less than the he actually
received.
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t.-. only S.X percent o. t.e Eisenhower Be^oorats appeared
to defect (or return) to Kennedy, while Republican support
Of Nixon was virtually as solid as it had been for
Eisenhower.
Since Kennedys religion is considered by so^e to
have been a salient issue in i960. Figure 11 - 3 displays
a representation of his support fro», both Catholic and
Protestant voters, of all partisan persuasions, in that
election. This figure confronts us with a picture that
makes difficult to defend any argument claiming that the
candidates, religions were not an important factor in the
I960 campaign. 25 As mentioned above, whether his religion
•hurt- or 'helped' Senator Kennedy is an open question.
But Figure II
- 3 strongly suggests that religion was
indeed a variable of some importance in voter choice in
i960.
3iOTificfn??o^^^^r?K <^i"«^«"«s are statisticallys gnificant f r all three groups of voters in this case
to note ;h»iVv>^ °^ comparison, it is interestiSt at there were no statistically significantdifferences between the Democratic vote^ of Democrats and
P^otesian?) i°n l^tu'^'^f °' (Cathoncr t t n 1964. Among Independents, Catholics were
TafS P^?^ :?te Democratic than were Protes?antI
dfd ^5%h^*P°^f Independents voted for Johnson, as
ttt 1 Protestant Independents). For the threegroups, the mean difference (Catholic over Protestant)in support for Kennedy was 33.V/; in i960, in 196^ themean difference in support for Johnson was lO.lji.
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The Roman Catholicism of John Kennedy was
certainly not the only (or even the most important)
issue in the i960 campaign. Also on the voters' minds
were the problems associated with civil rights, how
much the government should be involved in helping people
solve their problems, and Senator Kennedy's often-heard
contention that in international circles, "...the
prestige of this country has reached an all-time low."
If Kennedy was perceived as a 'liberal' on
civil rights in I960, it probably did not hurt him as
much as similar perceptions were to hurt other
Democratic candidates in the late sixties and seventies.
The voters of that year were evenly split on whether the
government ought to step in to ensure that schools were
de-segregated with due haste. Most strongly in support
of government action were the Independents, over forty-
five percent of whom favored an active federal involvement,
The Democrats and Republicans were somewhat less enthusi-
astic, and equal percentages (about forty percent) of
both groups indicated support for government intervention.
It is interesting to note, however, that when race is
controlled and only white respondents are questioned,
the Democrats show up as the group least supportive of
goveiTunental civil rights intervention in i960. Among
.the White respondents k7
.2% of the Democrats argued in
I960 that the federal government should "stay out of
the question of whether white and colored children go
to the same school." Expressing similar feelings were
^O.Sfo of the Republicans and 35.3% of the Independents.
When only non-Southern whites are considered, however,
the inter-party distinctions tend to disappear somewhat
with approximately 35% of both Democrats and Republicans
opining that the federal government should "stay out"
of the question, compared to 29% of the Independents.
When asked to express their support for another
type of government activity, however-namely. government
action to ensure every person a good job- the Independents
retreated a bit from their activist stance on civil
rights, and took a position in between the Democrats
and Republicans. 56.7% of the Independents expressed
approval of government action in this area, compared
to 65.8^ of the Democrats and only 48.8^ of the
Republicans. Even when social class is controlled,
middle class Independents were more likely than middle
class Republicans to favor government action, and
working class Independents were less likely than
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working class Democrats to support such a policy.26
Also at issue in i960 were the questions of
America's international power and prestige, and the
fear of international holocaust, added to by Senator
Kennedy's frequent allusions to the "missile gap" which,
he claimed, existed between the U.S. and the Soviet
Union. Agreement with Senator Kennedy's claims on the
decline in U.S. prestige seemed to be distributed along
partisan lines, with 39.0f. of the Democrats in agreement
with the idea that the U.S. had become "weaker" within
the past several years. Only 17.3^. of the Republicans
were willing to agree to such a contention. Signif-
icantly, the Independents seemed almost as convinced
as the Democrats that the Massachusetts Senator's claims
were on the mark, and 37.3?^ of them saw America as
"weaker" in i960 than it had been in the past.
On the other hand, about the same number of
Independents as Republicans admitted to being "pretty
worried" about the possibility of America's becoming
involved in another war—a worry which might have made
the voters responsive to Kennedy's allegations of a
26
"The percentages of working class Republicans,
Democrats, and Independents supporting government involve-
ment in this area were 58.0^, 71. ly^, and 53.6/0 respectively.
Among the middle class the percentages were 38.6^
(Republicans), 52. (Democrats) and 51.6^ (Independents).
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"missile gap." The group most concerned about the
possibility Of a war was the Democrats, but even in
their ranks, over three times as many voters claimed
to be only "slightly worried" or "not at all worried,"
as Claimed to be seriously concerned about the probll.
Much like their counterparts in earlier elector-
ates, the Independents of i960 were somewhat younger,
and more often of the white race than were party
identifiers as a whole (though, of all the three groups,
the Republicans had the smallest percentage of non-white
members-approximately 5?^). The i960 Independents were
more likely to have been brought up in a central city
than either Republicans or Democrats. They were less
likely than either group of partisans to have hailed
from a farm or small town.
The educational level of Independents in I96O
was virtually on a par with that of Republicans, and
substantially higher than that of the Democrats.
Independents had a mean level of educational attainment
of 10.2 years, compared to the 10.0 years for Republicans
and 9.0 years for Democrats. 27 Even when race is controlled,
Republicans and Independents had educational levels higher
^'^The Independent-Republican difference in this
case is not statistically significant. The Independent-
Democrat difference is significant at the .01 level.
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than the Democrats in i960. Por example, of the white
respondents,
^8.5f. of the Democrats had a high school-
or-better education, compared to 5^M^ of the Independents
and 60.7% of the Republicans, m that year, eight percent
of the Independents were college graduates, as were
approximately ten percent of the Republicans and six
percent of the Democrats. 28
Though the computation of mean income levels was
not possible with the data available, it is possible to
assess the Independent's financial position in i960
by observing their distribution over the survey's income
scale. There seemed, according to the data, to be
relatively few "poor" Independents in that year, with
only 22.7^ of their number earning less than $^000.
In a similar income category were 3^.8^ of the Democrats
and 33.2?$ of the Republicans. At the other end of the
scale, an equal proportion of Independents and Republicans
were financially
-well-to-do, " and 16. 0/. of the Independents
claimed incomes above $10,000, compared with 15.9% of the
Republicans and 10.3;^. of the Democrats. This relatively
high income level for Independents can partially be
explained by the fact that they occupied, in i960—as they
28None of these observed differences is statis-
tically significant.
had in the past-Jobs and professions fairly high on
the status and presumed-income scale, seemingly as
high as those occupied by Republicans. 17. V. of all
Independents were professional people or managers, as
were 16.6% of the Republicans and 11. of. of the
Democrats.
The high level of income and occupational
status of the Independents in i960 apparently were not
accompanied by inflated perceptions of their own social
class. Though they seemed to equal the Republicans in
income and occupation status, Independents were
decidedly less likely than Republicans to think of
themselves as 'middle class.' Only 32.2/. of the Independents
so described themselves, compared to ^6.6/. of the
Republicans and 26.8^ of the Democrats. When race is
controlled, no major changes occur. Among white respon-
dents the percentages of those in the middle class are
3k.2%, k7.9fo, and 28.1/. of the Independents, Republicans,
and Democrats respectively. These figures may reflect
the rather low volatility of the social class variable,
since, when asked what they would consider the social
class of their family background, about the same
percentage of Independents and Democrats—a percentage
higher than that of the Republicans—claimed a working
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Class background. Over three fourths of all Independents
recalled a working class heritage, along with a similar
percentage of Democrats and 6l% of the Republicans.
The demographic, socioeconomic, and 'ideological*
picture of the i960 Independents yields no clear patterns.
Perhaps these will become clearer as they are compared
with the images of Independents in other years. But a
measure of the mixed nature of the Independent vote in
I960 is that it, like the country as a whole, split
virtually down the middle in trying to decide who would
become the country's 35th President. Four years later,
the Independents were to be much more united in their
choice for President and, perhaps, more easily
describable in terms of their political attitudes and
demographic characteristics.
1964
Johnson V. Goldwater
In 1964, the voters gave Lyndon B. Johnson the
greatest numerical landslide in American electoral
history. President Johnson asked for, and received, in
1964, the popular mandate to carry out the work begun in
the Kennedy administration and to embark on programs of
his own, designed to bring to America the "Great Society."
Running a.ainst a candidate whose conservative politics
aa^penea the ardor o. even so.e RepuUicans. Johnson
captured 486 Electoral College votes compared to the
52 won by Senator Barry Ooldwater and amassed a popular
plurality of sixteen million votes.
The 1964 campaign offered the voters, i„ senator
Goldwater-s words, "a choice, not an echo." The voters
made that choice, and it was a choice that cost the
Bepublicans dearly i„ races for both the Presidency
and seats in the Congress. In a real sense. Goldwater
was the first Republican presidential candidate since
the thirties who constituted a serious threat to the
general direction American government had taken since
the New Deal. Unlike Eisenhower and Nixon, who appeared
to the voters as candidates interested only in slowing
down the pace which government had been taking since the
1930's. Goldwater represented the possibility of a
fundamental change in direction and a rollback of many
Of the New Deal innovations. In 1964. the American
voters were not ready to sanction such a reversal.
One of the more talked about issues of the 1964
campaign was Goldwater 's perceived "ideology." While
"extremism in defense of liberty" may not have been a
vice in 1964. to be identified as an extremist—of any
.tripe-has traditionally been a capital cri^e for
American presidential candidates. One study has
shown29 that the
.ideological content- of the 196^
election was abnor^nally high. (i.e.. the question of
political ideology £e^ „as of high salience in the
campaign) and that voters perceived Goldwater to be
the
-ideological- candidate. Goldwater-s characteri-
zation as the
-ideological- candidate in the election
cost him votes, since the majority of voters who per-
ceived him in such a light voted for President Johnson.
Among the more
-normal- political issues of
importance in that election were civil rights, the
social activism of the federal government, and
continued American involvement in Viet Nam. If
Senator Goldwater had any base of support among black
voters, it vanished with his vote against the 196^^
Civil Rights Act on the grounds that its public
accommodations provision was unconstitutional. By
this controversial political act. the Arizona Senator
set himself up as an opponent to the general thrust of
civil rights sentiment that had been building in the
4.U ^^i??? °' ^"<^ '^'E- Anderson, "Ideolorvand the Public's Conception of the 1964 Election," in
n^'-i"®?"^"' ^""^ Gatlen. eds.. Political Partiesand Political Behavi^, 2nd edition,' (BostonT Allyn andBacon, 1971). pp. 400-419.
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country for nearly a decade. At thp .e e same time, however.he endeared himself to a great rrnr...many white voters in the
aeep south. (Hxcep. ror the five votes he receive.
fro. his native state of Arizona, all of Goldwater's
electoral votes ca„e rro. the aeep South-an. he won
nearly 87 percent of the popular vote in the state of
"ississippi.) The extent to which Hepuhlioan sentiment
has endured in the South since 1964, and the effects of
that sentiment on political realignment and Independent
voters, are discussed at so^e length in Chapter IV.
Also at issue in 196^ were the general thrust
Of federal government activism and the Viet Nam war.
Lyndon Johnson appealed to the voters as a candidate
who saw serious inequalities in the economic conditions
of American life, and who felt the federal government
Should bear a hand in the redress of those inequalities.
Barry Goldwater argued for more restraint on the part of
government, believing that our problems could best be
worked out by the individuals experiencing them, or by
governments and institutions "closer" to the people than
the one in Washington, D.C.
On the question of American involvement in
Viet Nam, the roles were reversed, with Johnson arguing
(however ineffectively, since he was apparently unable
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-
convince even M.se..)
.o. restrain..
„HiXe OoX.wa.er
^
orea escalatea
.^erican invoXve.ent (in te^s o.
j " not in ™en) an. oonsiaere. Me^oiiaUon.Of Vxetna^ese jungles by use of nuclear weapons.
Throughout the campaign. Johnson and his running-
»ate. Hubert Horatio Humphrey, hammered hard at the
theme that Goldwater was something of a political
reactionary intent on returning America to the political
past by government retrenchment and escalating the
Viet Nam conflict by the use of nuclear weapons, m
Cleverly designed television commercials, the Democrats
successfully portrayed Goldwater as a man with an
-itchy" finger on the nuclear trigger.
For their part, Goldwater and his running-mate.
William Miller, attempted to convince Americans that
the
-Great- Society envisioned by the Democrats was
simply one more step on the way to the managed society
Of "1984." What the country needed, the Republicans
argued, was a return to government "by the people," and
less interference in local affairs by the bureaucrats in
Washington. In foreign affairs, Goldwater
-s campaign
suggested that a firm American presence was necessary
to stem the increase of Communism around the globe.
Goldwater was somewhat unclear as to the form this
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involvement in international or^aniz^t^g a ions, while
toying with the idea of "wars of lih» h-liberation" to free
countries under the yoke of co«unis..30)
posture was decidedly
.ore
.ilitaristio than
.ohnson-s.
There are probably a number of reasons why
Ooldwater was beaten so decisively in 196.. » ™ay
have been that Johnson was unbeatable in that year
carrying, as he was, the
.antle of the slain John
'
Kennedy. Possibly the deep split in the Republican
party-a party which saw George Ro^ey. Nelson Rockefeller
ana Willia. Scranton all fall by the wayside in attempts
'
to "save- it fro. disaster-was the ultimate cause of
Goldwater.s failure. But in looking at that election
there is one factor which I feel weighed heaviest, and
It is illustrated well by something that happened in
Atlantic City, New Jersey, at the time of the Democratic
National Convention there. Knowing that a large number
of prominent Democrats would be frequenting the Atlantic
City Boardwalk near the Convention Hall, and wanting to
arouse their ire, the Republicans placed a huge billboard
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across tro. the hall which feature, a very complimentary
photograph Of senator Goldwater, and the phrase, "in
your heart, you know he's right." The billboard caused
some stir in Atlantic City until some enterprising
Democrats purchased a billboard of their own. and had
it constructed immediately beneath the one erected by
the Republicans. The Democratic billboard simply said,
-Yes.... extreme right!" Perhaps those words, and the
'
voters perception of their essential accuracy, were
most responsible for sending Barry Goldwater into
temporary retirement in 1964.
Like most Americans. Independents voted for
Lyndon Johnson in record numbers in 1964.31 Table II - 3
presents the vote breakdown, by party self-identification,
in the Johnson landslide.
As the Table indicates, Johnson won the majority
(of votes cast) of all groups except the Republicans and
the Independents-leaning Republican. The completely
unaligned Independents (who often provide a barometer
31a look at the Table reveals a rather hip.h
rate of non-votmg among Independents in 196^, partic-
'}\^''ly.^''''^S^]}^^Vendents who leaned toward the DemocratsU/.^/O and Independents with absolutely no partisanpreference (^9.5/0. Chapter III assesses the partici-pation and political involvement of Independents in an
effort to determine the character of what I have
termed their 'political responsibility.'
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TABLE II - 3
VOTE, BY PARTY SELF-IDENTIFICATION. IN 196^^
T . Did NotJohnson Goldwater Vote Total
Strong
Democrats
Weak
Democrats
Independents
(closer to D's)
Independents
(no preference)
Independents
(closer to R*s)
Weak
Republicans
Strong
Republicans
72.9^
55.8^
38. Qfo
19.3^
33. 3?^
8.2fo
3.6
12.2
6.3
11.6
58.0
43.8
76.0
23.5 100.0
(N=^17)
32.0 100.0
(N=385)
37.^ 100.0
(N=l/|4)
^9.5 100.0
(N=121)
22.7 100.0
(N=88)
21.9 100.0
(N=210)
15.8 100.0
(N=171)
of which direction the 'swing vote* is moving) went
for LBJ over three to one, though only half their
number voted. Johnson's victory was ensured by his
huge majorities among Democrats and Independents and
the inroads he made among the GOP—especially among
"weak** Republicans, where he won k^fo of the vote cast.
That the Independents, who as a group had supported
Eisenhower in 1952 and I956 and Nixon in i960, would
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-sert t.e COP i„
^^^^^^^^^
exa™.nation o. t.ei. preferences
.or
..e KepuUiean
no^xnation in that ,ear. or aU the In.epenaents.
only 13^ preferred Ooldwater for the nomination.
wMie 30.3. Of them preferred one of the
.ore
..oderate-
HepubUoan contenders-Scranton. Roc.efeXier. or Lodge.
Though the Democratic majority which Johnson
brought with him into Congress ai^hi- i ^- .^-uiisres m ght indicate that
the incidence of
"tic.et-spUtting" was less prevalent
than it had been in the past year, on the contrary
the voters in 196^ seemed to be splitting their
ballots more frequently than ever. Only 13.3,5 of
the Independents in 196^ stated they had voted a
-straight" party ticket, compared to 32-5/. of the
Democrats and 31.5. of the Republicans.
The Independents contributed in no small way
to President Johnson's victory in 196/.. m that year
they comprised 22.5. of the electorate (while Republicans
and Democrats represented 2^.2% and 5I.5. respectively)
and their support gave Johnson I9.V. of his total votes
received. Behind this electoral contribution was a
fairly clear picture of Independents in apparent
agreement with the President in most important issue
areas
110
AS mentioned above, the
.est widely discussed
issues in the 196. campaign were civil rights, the role
of government, and the Viet Nam War. On the area of
civil rights respondents were asked a number of
questions designed to measure their attitudes on
the progress of the civil rights movement and how
much the federal government should be involved in
the implementation of the movement's goals. Table
II
- ^ reports the responses of Republicans. Democrats,
and Independents to five civil rights-related questions
in 196't.
C.
D.
£.
Integration
School de-segregation
Pair employment
practices
5Sfo 53fo 59/^
32 38 ^0
33 31 36
37 39
36 ^3
N=38l) (N=802) i^=353)
Note I On question A., respondents listed agreed
with the statement! "Negroes have a right
to live wherever they can aford to, just
like white people."
Ill
V'xvxx xj.gnxs leaders are trvinn-
speed?"
On question C, respondents listed
"ShaHh "^^^^Sregation" when Lked,What about you? Are you in favor of
tllf^'^^'''''''l ^^^^^'^ segregation orsomething m between?"
On question D., respondents listed
^^^^ ^sl^ed. "Do you
^hon^H
^"^^ eovernment in Washingtons uld see to it that white and negrochildren go to the same schools?"
On Question E., respondents listed
agreed that "the government inWashington should see to it that
negroes get fair treatment in jobs."
As the table indicates, the Independents emerge
as the most pro-civil rights (on the basis of responses
to these questions) of the three groups. Though the .
difference between the Independents and the 'runner-up'
group is so small in each case as to be statistically
insignificant, their consistently higher showing seems
to suggest that they were indeed in 196^ the group most
sympathetic to the civil rights movement's goals.
In fact, though it appears on first glance as if the
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Democrats are crowding the Independents for the pro
civil rights position on a number of questions, when
we control for race and question only white respondents,
the Independent-Democrat differences widen. Observing
only white respondents, the percentage expressing satis-
faction with the pace of civil rights progress is 36/.
among Independents and ^0% among Democrats, on the
subject Of government intervention into equal employ-
ment opportunity the percentage of white Independents
favoring involvement was compared to 3k% of the
white Democrats.
If the Independents were the group most
•liberal' on the civil rights question in 196/f. they
returned to a position between the parties when asked
their opinions on some of the 'bread and butter*
economic issues of the day. Proportionately fewer
Independents than Democrats favored the government's
seeing to it that "...every person has a job and a
good standard of living. "32 federal aid to education
(y. -^f?^®" ^^^^ ^^^^^ controlled. Independents(both middle and working class) were in between theparties and felt less strongly than the Democrats,though more strongly than Republicans (of both classes)tnat^ the federal government should aid people in
obtaining "...a job and a good standard of living.'
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was supported by a smaller share of Independents than
Democrats (though both groups voiced substantially
stronger support for the idea than did the Republicans) .33
On the subject of 'Medicare,' a very topical issue in
196/f. /17.3/. of the Independents agreed that the federal
government should "...help people get doctors and
hospital care at low cost." compared to 60.5f. of the
Democrats and 29.2^ of the Republicans.
While these "role of government" questions
neatly place the Independents between the Democrats
and Republicans on the political 'spectrum,' the results
in other issue areas are quite mixed. Independents
and Democrats were virtually indistinguishable in
their early support of the Viet Nam War, while both
groups were somewhat less 'hawkish' on the subject than
were Republicans (approximately one-fourth of the Democrats
and Independents favored a "stronger stand" in that area,
compared to over one third of the Republicans). In the
general area of international relations. Independents
were more in favor of trying to work out our differences
with the communists at the conference table than were
33
-^^31.8:^ of the Independents agreed that the
federal government should aid public schools, as did
37 •6?^ of the Democrats and 16.5% of the Republicans.
epuMioans. ana about the sa^e as De^oc.ats.3'. on
2j:'T " """^ - -etart eaon aa. with a pra.er. (a.ain. a ve., saUent
--e the poXUios o.
"
.-up
.east supportive o. school p.a.e.s. though aXlgroups haa a majority or thei. number who beXievea
that sohoox p.a.e.s were appropriate. percentage
Of inaepenaents opposed to school prayer was twenty-
one percent-substantially higher than that of the
Republicans (n.o%). and Democrats (11^.2%).
AS in the earlier electorates, the highest
percentages of Independents in 196^ were located in
the Midwest and Northeast. Table II - 5 is a repre
sentation which can be read two ways, and shows the
distribution Of voters, by party identification and
region, in I964. This table provides us with the
infonnation necessary to view both the partisan make-
up of each region and the regional distributions of
party strength. As mentioned above, the Northeast
(with 30.9^) and the Midwest (with 27.8/.) are the most
heavily Independent areas. They are also the areas
Where most of the Independents are located-together
belief as^did^7A^.?^^72^^^S''^^''"^^ expressed such a
Republicans! ^ Democrats and 65. 1/. of the
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totalling 6^.8^ of the total tv,^«j.ne Independent strength.
Fitting in with the patterns we observed in
earlier electorates, the Independents of 196^^ were
more likely to be young (3/^.6^. of the voters under
29 were Independents), and more likely to be white
than party members as a whole, though there were more
non-White Independents (7^) than non-white Republicans
Independents were less likely to be union
members than Democrats, but more likely than Republicans,
and they occupied a position between the parties on the
question of their perception of social class. 35 Even
when race was controlled, white Independents {l^2fo)
were more 'middle class* than white Democrats (36^)
but less 'middle class' than white Republicans (55/.).
In the important area of education, Independents also
occupied the middle position with a mean educational
level 9,55 years, compared to 8.7 and 9.9 for the
Democrats and Republicans respectively. 36 trying
to isolate voters at both ends of the educational 'scale'
00 • '^^^ Independents perceived themselves
?./^^f J^'-^t^^
class,' as 52.9/0 of the Republicans and33*1% of the Democrats.
The observed difference between the Independents
and Republicans m this case is not statistically
significant.
we
-
t.a. no. 0. ..e Xnaepenaen. we.e ooUe^egraduates, while 17 "-LJ-ege
graaes 0/ H ' ^'^^^d of school or less a v.- u
Re.nhT
^ ^^gher percentage ofpublicans finished college fi^
+ .
"J-J-ege (16.8>S) while propor-tionately more Democrats (30 -^^W .
eip-hf .
"-^^^ "^^^ completeght grades.
The income level of rr,ri^i O Independent voters in 1964appearea.
.00. U .est so^ew.ere between t.ose o.
.
respective party ^e^.ers. maepenaents were lessl^^ely than Democrats (.ut
.ore so than RepuUicans)
to have earnea between two ana rive thousana aollars
-
that year, ana less li.ely than Republicans (though
so than Democrats) to have haa an inco.e in
excess or $15,000.
.he aata on the occupational
categories of the various voters are
.ixea ana yieia
no conclusive results, but it is interesting to note
that, as in the past. Indepenaents tend to be engagea
in professional occupations in proportions similar to
their Republican contemporaries.
If there is an overall pattern which emerges
from observing the Independents in 1964 it is one
Which once again places them near the political ana
socioeconomic
"midaie." Even more than in the preceaing
elections, it seems when aescribing the Independents of
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196^ we have referred to them as " m.v,on
...more so than...
but less so than. t^:* t.^.n ... If political scientists contend
that independent voters represent the social and
political middle ground of the American electorate
the sample of 196^ provides some sound data in support
Of that contention. The extent to which that middle
position was affected by the turbulent politics of
late sixties can be observed as we examine the
Independents in the I968 electorate.
1968
Nixon V. Hnmphr>o y y, yj^^^r.^
Richard Scammon and Ben Wattenberg have described
the 1968 election as one in which the "social issue" (law
and order, political protest, societal permissiveness,
etc.) replaced the
-bread and butter' economic issues as
the most important concern of the voting public. 37 a
shift in traditional issue focus was not, however, the
only unusual aspect to the politics of I968. The
37
u 1 .
Richard Scammon and Ben Wattenberr, TheKeal IVIa.ioritY (I970). The '3RC data do not quitf bi^out ocammon and V/attenberg's hypotheses. Actually, thebread and butter' issues and concern over the Viet NamWar were most often referred to by voters when asked
TvJ^ioS''^ t^^'^Jl^? "^^^ country's most pressing problemin 1968. Nonetheless, the 'social issue' was muchdiscussedm 1968 and it is fair to say itH^d a higher
^ d^l964 "^^^"^ ^^^^
"^^^^ ^"^
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Challenge to the incumbent President by fellow-De.oorat
Eugene McCarthy, and that incu.hent President's subse-
quent decision not to see. re-election were also highly
unexpected and they, coupled with the tragic assassin-
ation of Robert Kennedy, the holocaust at the Democratic
Convention, and the most successful third party candidacy
in forty years made I968 a
-year to remember- in
American politics.
Vice-President Hubert Humphrey, who emerged from
the much-discussed Democratic Convention as his party's
nominee, chose as his running mate Senator Edmund S.
Muskie of Maine. Richard Nixon, who had become the
Republican nominee after defeating challenges from
Governors Nelson Rockefeller of New York and Ronald
Reagan of California, chose Governor Spiro "Ted" Agnew
of Maryland to run with him, and the American Independent
Party nominated its founder. George C. Wallace of
Alabama, and General Curtis LeMay as its standard
bearers
•
In the campaign itself, Nixon-Agnew took an
early lead over Humphrey and his much-divided Democrats,
but as the voting approached, Humphrey made great progress
and closed the gap almost completely. By election day,
it must have been apparent to Richard Nixon that he was
to be involved in his second razor-thin presidential
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election in less than a decade. This ti.e. however,
Nixon came out on top with 302 electoral votes to I91
for Humphrey and (all from the 'deep- South) for
Wallace. Nixon's popular margin over Humphrey was
approximately one-half million votes, out of more than
70 million cast.
The 1968 campaign is a difficult one to
analyze for two reasons. First, though most of Wallace's
popular votes and all of his electoral votes came from
the nominally Democratic South, his support was largely
conservative (especially on civil rights matters) and
his presence in the campaign probably hurt Nixon more
that it did Humphrey. Had Wallace not been a factor.
Nixon's margin of victory in I968 would have been
substantially larger. A look back at the 196if returns
reminds us that the Republicans made significant inroads
in the South in that year, and while Nixon was certainly
not perceived to be as conservative on civil rights as
Goldwater (a perception which would probably have made
him attractive to white Southern voters), Hubert
Humphrey was, by reputation at least, more of a 'liberal*
on civil rights than Lyndon Johnson, himself a Southerner,
had appeared in 196^. Analysis of the 1972 returns shows
this to be the case. Of the I972 voters who recalled
a 1968 vote for Wallace, 79;^ .oted for Nixon in 1972
When the Kixon ana Wallace votes in
.968 are co^Mnel
-
the seven states of the deep South, the results arere™iy similar to the totals polled Nixon
alone in 1972 when Wallace was out of the race. 38
The second factor which complicates ar^alysis
Of the Nixon-Hu„,phrey contest is that one of its »ost
important issues, the Viet Na. War, was never really
addressed in a systematic way by either of the candi-
dates. Since neither a representative of the "peace"
movement nor an avowed
-hawk- had a place on either
party's ticket, the concerns of many Americans for a
speedy termination of the Viet Nam War (one way or
another) were never voiced by the candidates during
the campaign. Holding constant to his belief that
totals wlth''?>,2°Mp'''"^^2".°f Nixon-Wallace I968i h the Nixon totals in 1972 is striking.
(Nixon pluf Wallace) (Ni^xon) 68!72"^''
iw.LbbioSippi 77«l/o 78 9, '. A.O n
N. Carolina 70.9^5 ll'l
3. Carolina 70.72 l^jA +0*7
Arkansas 69.8^. ^^^^
+0-7
Louisiana 72^ 69.%
-I'.j
Source! World Almanac, 1973,
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foreign policy should be entitled to bi-partisan support.
Richard Nixon refused to be specific in his statements
on Viet Nam, stating only that he had a 'secret plan*
to end the war. which he promised to implement when and
if elected. Humphrey, on the other hand, was in a
difficult position. While the Democrats were per-
ceived by many to be slightly more Movish' on the
war than Republicans, (22.^,^ of the voters in I968
felt the Democrats were likely to take a "stronger
stand" on the war, ^'3.5fo felt the Republicans were,
and—significantly—3^.1^ saw no difference in the
parties* positions on the war), Humphrey was bound—
if by nothing more than convention and respect—to avoid
criticizing President Johnson's war policy. Such
criticism would probably have fallen on deaf ears anyway,
since the voters largely believed that Humphrey had
been a part of Johnson's war-planning brain trust, 39 and
members of the "peace" movement—v/ith the memory of
Chicago fresh in their minds—simply could not reconcile
themselves to supporting any one who had played so promi-
nent a role in the Johnson administration.
^^The very limited role played by Humphrey in
decisions leading to Viet Nam escalation is chronicled
by David Halbertsam, The Best and the Brightest (New York*
Random House, 1972).
If "divide and conauer"
+V, V
^ q is a sound tactic inthe battles of politics, both sides in 1968been badly shaken by the extent t
"
apparent in their JS "''^^thex ranks. Republicans found that ™any
conservatives, especially in the ^v,
the GOP . . ' desertingO
,0 vote for Wallace,
.e^ocrats observed theirleft flan, alienated fro™ the Hu«phrey-MusUe ticket
and deciding, for the ™ost part, to "sit it out" (atleast in tern,s of active campaign activity) in 1968.
Gxven these «ide rifts in both ca^ps. it is not
surprising that the outcome of the election was very
much in doubt until well intoJ. the morning hours of
the day after the election.
The "social issue" alluded to by Scammon and
IVattenberg was. as mentioned above, a vague amalgam
Of concerns on the questions of law and order, student
protests, and the all-around
-permissiveness- which
many voters felt characterized American society i„
the late sixties. Throughout the campaign, the
Republicans made an issue of the apparently high crime
rate, and made much political hay be characterizing
Johnson-s Attorney General Ramsey Clark (as well as
the Supreme Court) as being "soft" on criminals. The
massive anti-war demonstrations, as well as numerous
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•civil rights, riots in the Wao. neighborhoods of „any
A-nerican cities (both covered widely and vividly by the
»edia) seemed to persuade voters that lawlessness and
•violence, were rampant in the land, and the incumbent
Democratic administration was made to bear the brunt of
political blame.
Led by Humphrey, the Democrats countered
Republican claims by pointing to the enormous progress
made during the Johnson years in the areas of housing,
civil rights, and the "war on poverty." m the final
analysis, though, these claims were not enough to stem
the Republican tide riding on a general disaffection
with the Viet Nam War and adverse popular reaction to
the perceived side effects of many of Johnson.s social
programs. '^0 four years. Americans had been exposed
to the problems and pitfalls of a Democratic adminis-
tration trying to build, in a limited time span, its
version of the .Great Society.' m I968 the voters were
„<•
research, "An Analysis of the Resultsof the 1972 Presidential Election," (1974) givel us someindication of the extent to which the "Great SocieL's"
ripn?r?2?+ • ?^ • y^^^' 59.8/. of the respon-
f^^J''/^" "^^^ ''^'^^'^^ progress was being made "too
i^lh 2^® respondents who felt that way. 72.2%voted either for Nixon or Wallace. Of the voters who
K,!;\^r^frn./'*^5 91 -if. voted for Humphrey,
-too Slow
-^^ electorate felt that progress was
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asked to appraise the
.Great Society. and they found
it wanting.
In 1968, we begin to see the first stages of
the increase in Independents which is so prevalent
today. By that year. Independents had caught up with
Republicans in number, and comprised 26.5^ of the
electorate, compared to 2^.1f. of the voters who called
themselves Republicans. Democrats were still in a
commanding position with the loyalty of l,5.y/o of the
voters. In their I968 vote, most Independents returned
to the Republican "fold" which they had left in 196^,
and Richard Nixon received nearly 60% of the Independent
votes cast. Table II-6 presents the vote for President
by party identification in the 1968 election.
TABLE II - 6
.
PRESIDENTIAL VOTE BY PARTY IDENTIFICATION IN I968
VOTE REPUBLICAN DEMOCRAT INDEPENDENT
Nixon
Humphrey
Wallace
88.1^^
Total 100.0^
(N=r375)
19.5^^
69.3/^
11.2^
100.0?^
(N=705)
25,2%
17.3/-
100. 0^;^
(N=M2)
Note I In this table, the 'Independent' category
includes all voters who initially
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preference tor onZ/artylllnt other.
Besides demonstrating the Independents- whole-
hearted support for Nixon, the figures in the Table
also Show that George Wallace seeded to appeal Much
'
more to Independents than to either Republicans or
Democrats in 1968. it is of course possible that a
number of voters 'dropped in- to the Independent
category in I968 specifically to vote for Wallace-
a possibility enhanced by the fact that his party
organization was known as the American Independent
Party. There is no precise way to determine exactly
how widespread this phenomenon was, but Table i - 2
contains figures which shed some light on the question.
The recalled 196^^ Democratic vote of 1968 Independents
was 61.655, a figure slightly lower than the 66.2?5 of
Independents who actually voted Democratic in 196k.
Though this difference is not a substantial one, it is
made more noteworthy when we recall that voters have a
tendency to "over-recall" votes for winners (66fo of all
1968 voters recalled a 196'^ Johnson vote, when 605? had
actually cast one). Since the I968 recall of Independents
was lower than their actual 196k Democratic vote, it would
indicate that there was some shift in the membership
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composition of the Independent category between 1964
and 1968, although the s»all difference suggests that
the change was probably not precipitous, since many
Wallace voters were no doubt attracted by the Alaba^^a
Governor's stance on civil rights, we will examine
Shortly whether the Independents' attitudes (con-
sistently most
-liberal' in previous elections) had
become as conservative in I968 as their support of
Wallace would indicate. But. I would suggest that
another factor-really quite unconnected to civil rights
attitudes-might have been responsible for Wallace's
higher support among Independents than partisans in 1968.
If we accept political science's general contention that
party identification plays a major role in the voting
decision, it is entirely possible that Wallace's decision
to run outside the two party framework cost him the votes
of many members of both major parties. This is not to
day that party members were disenchanted with a third
party candidacy per se
. but that many voters who might
otherwise have supported VJallace were unable to break
the ties of their traditional party allegiance, and
consequently voted for Humphrey or Nixon. It is likely
that some voters who may have agreed with Wallace's
issue positions may have been held back from voting for
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him because of their party allegiance. No such con-
straint existed to prevent Independents from voting
their
.•Mind." and Wallace consequently did much better
among the Independent voters. One implication of this
hypotheses is that Wallace's "real" strength in 1968
lay closer to the I7/. of the vote he received from
Independents than the 7.8^ he received of the combined
partisan vote, though, as noted above, it is possible
that some conservative voters may have been attracted
into the Independent category in 1968 by the Wallace
candidacy. This contention can be partially and tenta-
tively supported by recalling the 1972 primaries in which
Wallace, running as a Democrat, surprised most observers
by his startlingly strong showings in Ohio, Michigan, and
Indiana.
Lest this description lead us to the false
notion that Independents were unanimous in their con-
servative bent in I968, we should also note that, when
asked who had been their preference for the Democratic
presidential nomination prior to the decision of the
convention, over fifty percent of the Independents
claimed to have preferred one of the 'liberal'
Democratic contenders (Eugene McCarthy, Robert and
Edward Kennedy, and George McGovern). Their preference
129
^or these
'liberal. Democrats was as M.h as that
expressed by
.embers of either political party.^
Though the above-mentioned
'social issue- was
much discussed in the media in 1968 th.-Ld b. e survey questions
available which measured politica] ^x x i attitudes m that year
aid not address themselves to that area, but concentrated
on the more traditional issues of civil rights an. the
role Of government. Also examined were the voters'
opinions of the propriety of American involvement i„
Viet Nam and the course the country ought best pursue
in extricating itself from the dilemma.
As they had been in earlier surveys, voters were
asked if they felt progress in the civil rights area
was being made "too fast. •• "too slow. " or "about
right." Table 11 - 7 shows how the different identifiers
responded to that question. These figures indicate that
the Independents of 1968 were at least as convinced
as Republicans, and more so than Democrats, that civil
rights progress was being made too fast. When we control
for race, little is changed as regards the Independents
(69.9/.) and Republicans (65. Of.) who felt progress was too
.
53'2i^ of the Independents expressed a Dreferpnro
cZ.lt'^M'r
McCarthy, Robert or Edward Kennedy^ orGeorge McGovern, as did 51.9fo of the Democrats and ky.Sfoof the Republicans. '^(•^/<'
^•ast. but it is interesting that tho .^ ^n e
'progressive'
appearance of Democrats on thi. •s issue disappears
v^hen only white respondents are included
.
+K u.
, since 67vS ofthe white Democrats arp-ued th«tgu a progress was too fast.
TABLE II - 7
"too fast"
"about right"
"too slow"
other answer
Total
REPUBLICAN DEMOCRAT INDEPENDENT
56.0^
25.1% 31. 2l.k/o
S,9fo
5.1/.
100.0;:$
(N=375) 100.0^(N=705) 100,0:^(N=M2)
The pattern established by Independents in 196^ of
being Slightly, but consistently ™ore progressive on
civil rights issues was not evidenced in I968. (m
fact, where observable differences exist between
Independents and partisans on this issue in I968. the
Independents appear more conservative, though none of
the differences are statistically significant). Whether
the change was due to a conservatizing trend among them.
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WaXXaoeites is aimcuXt to aeter^Xne preoiseXy. rUe
-St Xikexy answer is that both these phenomena were
responsihXe. m any case, since the WaXXace vote in
1968 consisted heaviiv (8S h^^ ^-p^•^y 05.4,0 of persons feeXing that
oxviX rights progress was "too fast." it is fair to
-ay that the Independents of 1968 contributed more to
his strength than they probably would have in 196^. or
at least more than the 1964 group of Independents
would have contributed at that time.
On those issues which dealt with the question
Of government activism. Independents were much closer
in their attitudes to Republicans than to Democrats.
Nearly half of all Independents felt the federal
government was becoming "too powerful" (as did more than
half of the Republicans, but only 28% of the Democrats)
and 24.5 percent of the Independents felt that the
government should involve itself in aiding citizens in
obtaining a job and a "good standard of living."
Giving a similar response were 22.1^ of the Republicans,
and 40.3:^ of the Democrats.
One issue area in which Independents seemed to
differ almost equally from both groups of partisans was
the question of American involvement in the Viet Nam War.
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™03t pertinent inaices. maependents we.e consistently
-re
-hawkish" than either Kepuhlicans or Democrats.
More Independents (33^) than Republicans {27.7^)
and about the sa.e as Democrats (30.6^,, felt Africa
"dxd the right thing" in getting involved i„ viet Nan..
They (40.5^) were also
.ore supportive of taking
-...a stronger stand, even if it means invading North
Viet Nam- than were the Republicans (32.3?0 or
Democrats (30.9^). And. while there is no statis-
tically significant difference between the X6.5% of
Independents favoring the immediate Viet Nam puliout
in 1968 and 19.2^ of Republicans and 21. 3/, of
Democrats favoring such a move, the pattern observed
is consistent with the
-hawkish" image the Independents
painted for themselves by their answers to the earlier
questions.
As in past years, the Independents of 1968
resembled Republicans more closely than Democrats on
a number of demographic and socioeconomic variables.
One area, though, in which the Independents differed
markedly from both groups of partisans was in their
relative youthfulness
.
As in earlier years. Independence
was a characteristic of younger voters, and party
allegiance, especially to the GOP, seemed to increase
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among the middle-aged and older voters. Figure II ^
presents the age distribution of Republicans. Democrats,
and independents, as well as that of "party identifiers"
(the total Of Democrats and Republicans) i„ 1968. The
figure shows us that after an initial burst among the
voters in the youngest categories. Independence seems
to fall to around 22/. of the electorate and remain
thereabouts through the rest of the age groups.
Similarly, after a slow start, party identification
rises to 705; among those voters over thirty and remains
fairly constant thereafter. From these observations
we might suggest that the perceptible increase in
percentage of Independents between 196/^ and 1968 may
have been due more to the greater likelihood of the
young voters in 1968 to be Independent than an overall
upsurge affecting voters of all ages. A quick look
back at Figure II - 1 shows us that the incidence of
Independence among voters over thirty in 1956 was not
substantially less than that of the over-thirty voters
in 1968. The significant difference seems to have been
among the very young voters-of whom Z7% were Independents
in 1956 compared to hS.r/., in I968. Though analysis of
the reasons for the currently high percentage of
Independents is reserved until later in the study.
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these data suggest that young voters (so many of whom
have recently entered the electorate due to the
18-year old vote and the post-war 'baby boom*) may
provide us with a part of the answer.
The socioeconomic profiles of Independent
voters in I968 were, once again, relatively high.
Over one third of their number had attended or were
attending college in that year, similar to the of
the Republicans and higher than the Wo of the Democrats.
Also, proportionately fewer Independents had failed to
complete a grade school education than members of either
party. When race is controlled, Independents still
appear the most educated group. 72.7^ of the white
Independents were high school graduates in I968, compared
to 68. 2?^ of the white Republicans and 51. 9;;^ of the white
Democrats. Independents had the highest apparent mean
educational level, with 12.0 years, followed by the
Republicans with 11,5 and the Democrats with 9.8.^2
This high level of educational attainment was reflected
in the occupational patterns of the Independents, where
nearly one quarter of them were employed as professionals
or managerial personnel, compared to 17^ of the partisans.
^'^Both the difference between Independents and
Republicans and the difference between Independents and
Democrats are significant at the .05 level.
136
Simultaneously,
.ewer Inaependents than party
.e.bers
were service workers or unskilled laborers. More
Independents than partisans considered themselves
middle Class (48.8^ to 4l.5f,), but about equal pro-
portions Of both groups Claimed to be members of a
union household. ^3
A look at the overall income figures for I968
demonstrates that, at lPnQ+ ^ -p «iwidu -c east if class perception is
tied to family income, the higher proportion of
Independents who considered themselves middle class
in that year were not inaccurate. Figure II - 5
displays the income distribution of Independents and
partisans in I968. The figure shows that proportion-
ately more partisans than Independents listed them-
selves in the lower income categories. Slightly higher
percentages of Independents than partisans placed them-
selves in the middle range brackets ($^000-$15,000)
and more (11.9^ to 6,y/o) claimed incomes of between
fifteen and twenty-five thousand dollars. While most
of these observed differences are quite small, the
^^^^ ^® might expect, the Republicans were
^o%^^'^ll^^'^ ^""^^'^ ^^^^'^ likely to be union members in196a. V/hen combined with Democrats, however, the parti-san voters as a whole were from union families 2l^.Q% oftne time. Independents were from union families 25.5^
of the time.
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pattern's consistency is obvious and indicates to us
that the Independents were better off financially in
1968 than were the party identifiers.
If the Independents of 196/f represented the
middle Of the socioeconomic spectrum, by 1968 they had
moved decidedly upward and begun to crowd the
Republicans for the top position. The question of
how long they were likely to stay there, and what
effects their new social and economic pre-eminence
would have on their political outlook and behavior is
best answered by an analysis of the Independents in
the 1972 election.
1972
Nixon V. Mcr.nvPTn.
The 1972 presidential campaign is so fresh in
our memories (and kept so by daily media coverage of
•Watergate') that a detailed re-hash of its issues in
these pages would serve no useful purpose. The main
reasons for McGovern's calamitous defeat have been
chronicled fully elsewhere. Nonetheless, a Republican
landslide— in a time of huge Democratic majorities in
^^See Theodore H. White, The Making of thePresident, 1972 (New York* Atheneum Publishers, I973).
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registration an. identification-merits
examination,
especially when we oonsiaer that Nixon's overwhelming
victory was accompanied by only minimal GOP gains in
the House and the net loss of two Senate seats. If
"ost Americans are Democrats (or Democratic sympath-
"ers) and continue to vote Democratic in congressional
elections, how can President Nixon's 1972 landslide
be explained
In the 1972 survey, voters calling themselves
Independents constituted over one-third of the
electorate-quite a remarkable jump from the 22.5jS
they represented only eight years earlier. And. as
they had in I968. they gave Mr. Nixon heavy electoral
support. Figure II - 6 reflects the upward surge in
Independent support of Republican presidential candi-
dates between 1964 and 1972. The figures show that
the upsurge of Independent support for Repuglicans
was accompanied by similar upsurges among other groups
Of voters. While the Independent vote appears the most
volatile, th e 3>i7i by which it varied from 196'+ to 1972
Dieaffection with McGovern himself was of
s?ated't?atVr T^T^' ""^'"'^ the respondents
^Pr^on.i^+
McGovern did not have "...the kind of a
5" ^
president ought to have." 28.?% expressedsuch an opinion about Nixon.
i^^ct'S'wu
1^0
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was almost matched by the 2q^ .r.^- ^•y xn ^97^ variation in the
Democratic vote durinn- +i g that period. Even the always-
whUe they appear to con.ir. that the Independents
constitute something or a
-swing vote-.-reveal that
the Shifts Of independents between elections are as
™oh associated with shifts in the vote of the general
populace as they are causal variables in determining
the outcomes of elections. Were this not the case
and were support of the partisans for their candidates
constant in every elec+inr, tv,tion, the year-to-year variance
«ould appear as it does in Figure II -
,,,3,„,^
a hypothetical situation in which the partisans are
always loyal and Independents the only "swing" voters.
The contrast between Figures II - 6 and II - 7 „akes
it clear that, while Independents obviously do con-
stitute something of a "swing" vote, they are by no
means alone in the way they are effected by 'short-
term' political forces.
In addition to their demonstrated propensity to
vote Republican more frequently in 1972 than in the recent
past there is other evidence to suggest that Independents
today are more inclined toward the GOP than they once were.
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in 196^, over forty percent of all Independents claimed
to consider themselves
"closer" to the Democratic party.
Approximately one fourth claimed Republican leanings, and
34^ were totally uncommitted. By 1972. however, only
31.95^ Of the independents felt closer to the Democrats.
While 30.2^ were closer to the GOP and 37-9^. were with-
out any preference.
If the independents made a substantial contri-
bution to Nixon's overwhelming presidential victory,
they also may have played a role in the Democrats
fairly strong showing in the congressional races, since
they were the group in the electorate most likely to
have sput their tickets in 1972. v,Mle Xess than
half Of either group of partisans claimed to have
voted for candidates from different parties, over
two-thirds Of all Independents did so. When these
-ticket-splitters" are examined in regional patterns,
the results are so.ewhat surprising. Given the South's
massive defection to Nixon in 1972, one ™ight antici-
pate that the highest incidence of split-tioket voting
would have occurred in that area. Actually,
.ost of
the 1972 • ticket-splitters, (proportionately speaking)
were in the West and Midwest, where over 6o;i of the
voters split their ballots. Though Southerners split
more frequently than did voters in the Northeast,
there were still many "solid Democrats" in the South,
and that area was the home of nearly forty percent of
all voters who voted the straight Democratic ticket
in 1972. It would seem, in retrospect, that while
the South went strongly for Nixon in I972, there is
still a strong "bed rock" of solid Democratic support
in that part of the country.
It has been said that the 1972 election offered
voters as clear-out an ideological choice as they had
had in nearly half a century-clearer even than the
"choice" offered them in 1964. If that is true, then
much Of the outcome should be explainable i„ terms
Of the voters, political attitudes and stands on the
issues. Since the Independents gave Mr. Wixon such
solid electoral support. „e might expect to find them
solidly behind the President on the more important
political issues. Besides the traditional issues
dealing with the role of government, the voters in
1972 were asked to choose between candidates and
philosophies with differing views on tax reform, the
Viet Nam War, America's role in world affairs, the
place Of protest movements in American politics, the
dimensions of the movement for women's equality, civil
rights (with its newest problem-busing children to
achieve racial balance), and, somewhat unfairly, (and
to the chagrin ,of the McGovern forces), a group of
issues called the three "A's--"acid. amnesty, and
abortion.
When the voters were asked if the government
in Washington was, in their opinion, becoming too
powerful, three out of every five respondents said
that it was. The interesting thing is that, when we
break this figure down by party identification, we
observe that the Independents were the group most
convinced that government had become too powerful
(65^ Of their number agreed), and that there appeared
to be no substantial difference between the way
Democrats and Republicans viewed the situation (58.5^
and 57.1^ of those groups, respectively, felt govern-
ment was too powerful). The similarity between the
Republican and Democratic figures is rather startling
especially when we consider the wide disparities
between those groups- positions on this question in
1964 and 1968. By way of partial explanation, it is
possible that any question dealing with whether or
not government is becoming "too powerful" is likely
to elicit positive responses from two groups of voters.
The first group (many of whom would, philosophically
at least, be Republicans) responds to the question on
the basis of principle rather than partisanship, and
by answering affirmatively, makes clear that "the
government" (in a rather abstract sense) is too much
involved in the daily lives of the people. The second
group answers positively for partisan reasons, and
their responses indicate the belief that "this govern-
ment" (read, administration) is becoming too powerful.
In 196t and 1968, the first and second groups were
combined under the Republican banner, while in 1972
the objectors to strong government were split—those
Objecting. phiZosophioally in the Republican oa.p. and
those objecting for partisan reasons among the
De.ocrats-thus balancing off the picture ™ore than
in previous years. (Another possibility, of course.
IS that government reallv was P-Pt+ir.o- +ge ting too powerful in
1972. and this fact was realized in near equal measure
by Republicans and Democrats, or perhaps that Democrats-
long supporters of a
-big. federal government-were
themselves becoming more conservative on this question
in 1972).
When the voters were asked if they felt govern-
ment Should assist people in obtaining and maintaining
a good standard of living, the distribution seemed a
bit more familiar, with 29. 1/, of the Independents in
agreement, compared to kO% of the Democrats and 20j5 of
the Republicans. Even when class was controlled,
working class Independents were less enthusiastic
than working class Democrats, but more than working
class Republicans in their support of government
involvement. Independents again came up in the middle
when asked if they felt government should "do everything
possible" to control inflation. They were slightly less
enthusiastic than Democrats in their support of
government anti-inflation measures, but more so than
voters were
.ue.tionea on ,neir recepu.eness to a
gover^ent-sponsorea health insurance Mil. 12
°' ^"^^P-^'ents strongly supported such a plaj
=o»parea to 0. the Hepu.llcans ana o. tLDemocrats,^?
on the question of tax reform, Inaepenaents
rese.hlea Kepublicans ™ore than Democrats in their
perception 0. a neea
.or
.unaa.e„tal re-structurin, 0.the system, ana less than
.orty percent 0. their nu..er
expressea the belief that i->,„ • vi r the rich shouia pay substan-
tially more than they ao now. tm, .ji uu This comparea with
slightly more than forty t)ercf»i+ ^-e +v, r,per ent of the Republicans
ana nearly half the Democrats.
With George McGovern, iaentified from the
beginning as a
-peace" canaiaate. in the race. America's
future course in that war was an issue of high salience.
It IS probably Significant that, while most Americans by
1972 had given up the iaea of a military victory in
^6
government^aA?i-infl*a?ion'^2«o^^"*" strongly favorea
Republicans ana 2572^0? thfn^^f' ^^'^'^ °^ the
1^8
Viet Nam, only twenty percent favored
"immediate
withdrawal".-the position exclusively associated with
George McGovern. The remaining eighty percent of the
voters took positions ranging from pursuing a full
military victory to total withdrawal of forces once
the necessary arrangements had been made for the
return of our prisoners of war. Herein lay McGovern's
problem. It seems reasonable to suggest that the
four-fifths of the voters who favored courses other
than immediate withdrawal could all have found a
comfortable "home" under the umbrella of Nixon's
Viet Nam policy: he was withdrawing troops; he was
ensuring that the POWs would be returned as part of
any cease-fire agreement; and he was, as Cambodia and
the Haiphong mining displayed, unafraid to use the
"get tough" policy which appealed to some voters. In
short. Nixon's policy on the war had an eclectic
character to it which made many voters feel comfortable
supporting it. On the other hand, McGovern's position
was more clearly and narrowly defined, and probably
appealed only to those who, like himself, favored
immediate (or nearly immediate) withdrawal of forces.
As we just mentioned, this group amounted to less than
a quarter of the electorate. Another of McGovern 's
problems-one particularly damaging since he built
so much Of his candidacy around the Viet Nam War
issue-was that many voters perceived that his election
would not bring peace to Viet Nam. I„ fact, only 38.3;^
Of the voters agreed that his election would result in
peace, compared to the ky.Of. who felt Nixon
-s election
would. McGovern-s apparent inability to convince a
majority of the voters that his election would result
in a solution to the problem which his campaign argued
was the most important must have been instrumental in
his defeat.
McGovern and Nixon also were identified with
different stances on the more general question of
American involvement in world affairs. The voters
were asked if they felt we would be "...better off if
we just stayed home and did not concern ourselves
with the problems in other parts of the world." There
was enormous sentiment against America's taking such
a stance, and over three fourths of the voters in all
categories rejected this "isolationist" position. 75.6/$
of the Independents supported an active American role in
world affairs, as did 77.1:^ of the Democrats and 80.9^
of the traditionally isolationist Republicans. These
findings suggest two things. The first is that
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isolationism—a position linked «+ ^ ^j-inKe , at least tangentially,
to the policies of George McGovern-was highly
unacceptable to all groups of voters in I972. The
second is that, as mentioned earlier, partisan consid-
orations often influence what we might otherwise assume
to be positions of principle, since, in I972. it was
President Nixon (accompanied by Henry Kissinger) who
was directing our overseas involvements. Republicans-
who might have objected to similar actions by a
Democratic President-were forced, however, reluctantly,
to "go along" in support of those involvements if their
support of Nixon was to be consistent.
Another issue of some import in I972 was the
"politics of protest." During the late 1960»s the
political protest march or demonstration (generally
directed against American war policies) had become a
common feature on the American scene. Many voters
perceived McGovern's candidacy to be associated with
the American anti-war movement and the political
protests that movement generated. Unfortunately for
McGovern, the large majority of Americans seemed to
consider such demonstrations improper or somehow "out
of place." When asked, for example, whether they
approved of "...sit-ins. mass meetings, demonstrations,
and things like that," only 7.6^ of the voters gave
their unqualified approval. ,hen the voters made
connections between Senator MoGovern and the American
protest movement, those connections hurt the McGovern
campaign, since 75.6% of the people expressing dis-
approval with protests of this sort voted for
President Nixon in 1972.
One other comparatively
"new" issue in the
1972 campaign was the area of women's equality and.
on this issue, most Americans seemed to be in sympathy
with MoGovern's positions, without implying that
Richard Nixon is a male chauvinist, it is fair to say
that MoGovern's campaign was more active in its support
of women's causes than was the President's. And the
voters in 1972 were of the opinion that the time for
women's equality had arrived. There were no
significant relationships between attitudes on the
women's issue and party identification or political
independence. A majority of the voters in all
categories expressed support for increased women's
equality. 32.7J5 of the Independents expressed the
belief (the 'strongest' possible answer to the survey
question) that "women should have an equal role with men
in running business, industry, and government" as did
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30.5% of the Democrats and 29.0^ of the Republicans.
Simultaneously, only IS.H of the Independents would
agree that a "woman's place is in the home," 20.2/.
of the Democrats and IQ.lvf. of the Republicans.
In the area of civil rights the Independents
continued to display the conservative orientation they
had shown in I968 though they were at least matched in
their conservatism by Republican identifiers. This is
apparent when we observe their attitudes on the question
of 'busing.
•
Opposition to busing was overwhelming
among all three groups of voters in 1972, with 80. 6f.,
Qe.l^fo, and 73. of the Independents, Republicans, and
Democrats, respectively, agreeing that children should
be kept in neighborhood schools, rather than be bused
to achieve racial balance. The busing issue, despite
McGovern's claim to the contrary, was of high salience
in 1972 (98.8^ of the respondents claimed to be con-
cerned enough about the federal government's role in
integrating schools to have formed an opinion favoring
one side of the other) and the opposition of many
Americans to busing helped President Nixon whose
position on the subject was, and is, well known. A
measure of that help is seen in the fact that 71. 9^4;
of the anti-busing respondents who voted reported a
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Nixon vote in 1972 compared to 17.7^ of the pro-busing
forces. Conversely. Senator MoGovern won the vote of
only 28.155 of those opposed to busing and 82.7f„ of
those who supported it. Sadly for MoGovern, however,
only 233 of the sample's respondents had pro-busing
attitudes, 2133 of the respondents were opposed to
busing.
In addition to the more traditional issues,
the 1972 campaign raised (in the voters* minds if not
the politicians* speeches) what is termed, for lack of
a better phrase, the •'social change issue." Whatever
else it accomplished, McGovern's 1972 campaign revealed
that there are a great many Americans interested in
some fairly fundamental changes in the styles and
values of life in this country. And, while Nixon's
landslide victory may indicate that there are even
more Americans who admire the "old values," 1972
may be remembered as the year in which some of those
"old values" were first seriously challenged. Whether
because of his own positions, or because of the
positions and life styles of some of his most vocal
(and visible) supporters, McGovern became, in 1972,
the candidate allegedly sympathetic to an amalgam of
issues generally characterized as, "acid, amnesty, and
abortion.- and these issues probably cost George
MoGovern votes in 1972. While McGovern was by no
means an ardent supporter of abortion-on-de.and (he
felt the question was best left to the states and had
no place in national politics) he was generally
regarded as more pro-abortion than President Nixon.
This was not a position likely to endear him to the
electorate. 59.1^ of whom felt abortion should not
be allowed at all. or only if "...the life and health
of the woman is in danger." At the same time. Zk.yA
Of the electorate favored
'abortion-on-demand., feeling
that it "...should never be forbidden, since one should
not require a woman to have a child she doesn-t want."
On the subject of amnesty for draft resisters. McGovern-
position (Which, though somewhat unclear, was certainly
inclined more toward amnesty than the President's) ran
contrary to that of the majority of Americans. 71.7/.
of whom felt the government should not "...declare an
amnesty after the war." Also in 1972. the respondents
were asked if they felt the use of marijuana should be
legalized (or at least "decriminalized," as McGovern
had argued) or whether penalties for its use should
actually be increased. Over sixty percent of the voters
favored stiffer penalties—a position which, while not
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specificaUy associated with President Nixon, certainly
was antithetical to that taken by Senator McGovern. On
the marijuana issue, the Independents were the groups
most 'sympathetic., with over one fourth of them in
favor of some relaxation of the anti-marijuana laws.
Approximately eighteen and fifteen percent of the
Democrats and Republicans respectively, favored such
a relaxation. Perhaps most important here is the
fact that only eighteen percent of the Democrats agreed
with the position that was taken, at least implicitly,
by their own presidential nominee. It is doubtful that
many Democrats (or any voters) deserted McGovern solely
because of his position on marijuana, but the above
figures are symptomatic of the extent to which the
McGovern candidacy was not in harmony with the expressed
opinions of a great many Democratic voters. And. it
is interesting to note that, among those respondents
favoring stricter mauijuana laws, McGovern won only 30,1?S
of the vote, while his percentage among persons favoring
de-criminalization was 53. 8;^.
As in the past, the percentage of non-white
Independents (7.?^) was greater than that of fiepublica
(3.8%) but smaller than that of the Democrats (18.6;2).
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Tlie Independent identificati n„ ,i-i ioation was most popular am^v,„younger voters-in fact = ^
ei^hte. .
''^^ "^^''y enfranchised
eighteen-to-twenty ase cro.m +v, •J' "g g up, the incidence of
independence was 50.3^. When we consider the T .
under twenty-five (and th, •
^dependents
Of that o "
"'"'^ '"'^ °^ ^^-^
-ters
. age,) we see that the Southern states are homet the largest group. 3I.5. of the young Independents,
-e M,,„,,,.
^^^^^ ^^^^
^^^^^^35.x. and i6.3, of this group, respectively,
.he high
«c.dence of Independence among the young voters in
the south is ,uite interesting, especially i„ n,,,
ot the generally low number of Independents which that
region has had in thp r,o = + te past, m a later chapter, this
Phenomenon will he examined as we try to explain the
large increase in the number of Independents which has
occurred in recent years.
Figure II
- 8 shows party identification, by
age. for voters in the 1972 electorate. One inter-
esting aspect of this representation is the fairly
constant level of Independence among voters aged
la to 29. In past years, the percentage of Independents
has dropped sharply once the "youngest group" has been
passed. While this may suggest that political
Independence had more durability in 1972 than it had
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xn the past, another plausible explanation is that the
1972 electorate really contains two "youngest groups",
if those groups are effectively defined as voters
coming into the electorate for the first time. The
elections of 1952 through 1968. which we have examined
all showed a high rate of Independence among "first-
time" voters. The 1972 data show the sa»e thing but
the impact is doubled since, in addition to those
voters aged 21 to 21, who were voting for the first
time, there were a large number of eighteen-to-twenty-
one-year-old voters also coming into the electorate.
This does not, however, explain the persistently high
rate of Independence among voters in the 2it to 29 age
group--second time" voters who normally show a sharp
drop in their self-identification as Independents.
If subsequent election studies show the
-straight line-
of Independence (which approaches fifty percent for
1972 voters under thirty) stretching ever to the right,
the current "boom" in the number of Independents may
eventually result in as many as half the voters being
without a partisan identification.
The Northeast seemed to have the highest rate
of Independence (though the difference between it and
the Midwest is not statistically significant)—/J-O.O/.
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of the Northeasterners were Tnr^. . .^ Independents, followed by
the Midwest (36.6/.). the West (33.I/.) and the South
The picture of Independents which results from
examination of their socioeconomic characteristics is
a ™ixed one. While in some areas Independents appeared,
as they did in 1968, to
"out-Republicanize" the
Republicans, in other ways they seemed to fit more into
the middle of the socioeconomic scale. Educationally,
the 1972 Independents continued their upward swing,
showing a mean educational level of 12.2 years, compared
to 11.8 for the Republicans and 10.7 for the Democrats.
W
As they had in the past, more Independents than either
group of partisans clustered near the upper end of the
occupational status scale, (the professional and mana-
gerial categories) while fewer of them were employed as
service workers and unskilled laborers.
When it came to actual income, however. Independents
were not so prosperous, earning less than the Republicans
but still somewhat more than the Democrats—a fact
j-^^ Observed differences in this case aresignificant at the .05 level. When race is controlled.Independents still come out on top educationally, with71. Oy. of the white Independents high school graduates
compared to 67.^/0 of the white Republicans and 55.9%of the white Democrats.
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partially explained by the relative youth of the
independent category i„ 1972.
.6.3^ of the Independents
xn 1972 considered themselves middle or upper class-a
perception shared by 37-6^ of the Democrats and 51.5^
Of the Republicans, with race controlled. Independents
remain in the middle, with of the white Independents
considering themselves middle class, compared to ^0.8^
Of the White Democrats and 52.0^ of the white Republicans.
Virtually the same percentage of Independents as Democrats
(approximately 30f.) were members of union households, and
both those groups were more than twice as likely as
Republicans to be union members.
It appears, on balance, as if 1972 Independents
exhibited a mixed socioeconomic profile-surpassing
even the Republicans in some areas while conforming
more to their traditional "middle" image in others.
(If Independents are disheartened by their backslide
in some of the socioeconomic categories in I972. they
can take heart from the news that they are still-as
they do doubt expected— the country's "beautiful
people." In a question probably designed as a check
on the survey interviewers' objectivity, more Independents
than either group of partisans were classified by the
interviewers as "beautiful" or "extremely handsome").
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In 1972. the Independents solidly backed Richard
Nixon's re-election campaign. They supported him, too,
on most Of the campaign's major issues. And in many
ways they exhibited a socioeconomic profile extremely
similar to that shown by members of the Republican
party. The extent to which this
'Republicanization'
of the Independent vote may or may not be more than a
temporary phenomenon (and its possible consequences and
implications for the future) can best be examined from
a broader time perspective, viewing 1972 as but one
example of the Independent vote as it has evolved
during the past twenty-five years. To do this, we
must examine the charges and trends which have
occurred in the Independent vote since 1952.
Directions I
1953 to 1972, and Beyond
Talking about shifts and trends among the
Independent voters over a period of twenty years is,
at best, a tricky business. The growth and changes
which have affected the country's population during
that time play havoc with attempts to discuss the
Independents as an isolated group and make fairly
meaningless any efforts to depict them as a solid,
•closed,
.ody Which has undergone changes over ti»e.
Because short-term forces, such as a particular
presidential candidacy or a political scandal involving
one or both of the parties, „ay cause large numbers of
voters to enter or leave the Independent category-
thus changing the very composition of the group's
membership-the Independent vote acquires an added
volatility that makes inter-election comparisons
extremely difficult. (On the basis of Table i - 1 and
the related discussion, however, it would seem that
precipitous shifts of this nature are-with the possible
exception of 1968 Independents who may have been
attracted to the category by the Wallace oandidacy-
not common). Consequently, this section will simply
discuss the differences among the groups of Independent
voters as they appeared in each of the six electorates
under study. Thus, while it may be misleading to
conceive of Independents as a 'constant' and say that
they were more likely to vote Republican in 1972 than
they did, say, in i960, it is proper and defensible to
argue that the Independents of 1972 were more likely to
vote Republican than were the Independents of I960.
(In fact, it is also true that the Republicans of I972
were more likely to vote Republican than the i960
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Republicans voted Republican in that year. All
electoral categories experience shifts in
.e^bership
over ti»e. Unless these shifts are shown to affect
the category wildly-and our data suggest that they do
not-analysis of the categories over time can be a
useful enterprise). Hereafter, when the
'Independent
vote' is referred to and compared from one year to
another, it will be understood that the reference is
to two different groups of voters (though the same
people may constitute a large part of the membership
Of both groups). That said, it is possible to refer
to the Independent vote as a vote which does, for
practical purposes, undergo changes over time (much as
the 'Republican vote' or-Democratic vote' does), and
analysis of those changes is a viable method for dis-
cussing the independent vote's history and speculating
on its future course.
It is no secret, as the preceding descriptions
of Independents have made clear, that there are many more
Independents today than there have been in past years.
The data indicate that the recent increase in their
numbers occurred rather abruptly-probably, as Walter
Dean Bumham argues, sometime between 196^ and 1968.^9
.
/^^V/alter Dean Bumham, CriticalElections and theMainsprings of American Pm 1 ti n .. Muyn / ^ o^'-^'^'' ^"^^
After holding steady at ZZt
1952 to 1964 the
^^^^
the d- •
" " - 9 Showdimensions of that increase.
^-^1- and Figure indicate, the risehas been a sharp one and 1+P , it appears to have hurt theDemocrats somewhat more than „
.
" ^^^"^ Republicans. Prom 1964to 1972, Republican identifip=+- .
.
^a cation dropped from 24.3/. to33.6^ with the Slight drop (30, to Z^) outside the
south Virtually nullified by a slight increase (18^to 22^) in the Southern States, during that time the
ejocrats also lost strength outside the South (W. to
33^) but that loss was increased, not balanced, by the
south Where democratic identification dropped from 63/.
to resulting in a nationwide drop i„ democratic
identification from 50/. to ^n during the period.
Chapter IV offers some explanations for the especially
rapid increase of Independence among Southerners from
1964 to 1972.
The surveys indicate that, while Independence
increased during the period among all groups of voters,
the increase was most pronounced among the young. It
'
has long been an assumption in voting research that
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TABLE II - 8
PARTY IDENTIFICATION, 1952-1972
1952 1956 i960 1 Qf^L lyoo 1972
Strong Democrat
V7eak Democrat
Independent
(leanine: Democrat^
21.6
10.1
20. <^
00 rr
. 7
6.3
2^.8
6.3
26.5
24.5
9.2
20.3
25.1
10.0
14.3
24.7
10.6
Independent
(no preference)
6.14' 8.8 9.3 7.7 10.6 12.8
Independent
(leaning Republican
7.6 8.3 6.7 5.6 8.8 10.0
Weak Republican 13.8 1^.2 13.7 13.^ 14.1 12.8
Strong Republican 13.9 1^.8 15.1 10.9 9.7 9.8
Other 2.0 ^.3 3.8 2.2 1.4 5.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total Number of
Cases I6O8 1606 2917 1383 1382 2730
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TABLE II - 9
PARTY IDENTIFICATION, I952 to 10-70BY REGION (WHITES ONLY)
1952 1956 I960 196^1 1968 1972
Non-Southern Whitet
Democrat
Independent
Republican
Other
Total
N
Southern Whites
Democrat
Independent
Republican
Other
Total
N
26
30
26 27
3^ 35
—
100 100 100 100
1220 1178 1995 100/f
39
25
3^
2
38
29
32
1
69
13
1^
100
388
63
16
17
4
100
428
60
18
19
3
100
922
63
18
18
1
100
379
48
36
15
1
100
398
Note
33
39
27
1
100 100
984 1911
46
30
22
2
100
819
er
16?
168
young people are .ore Independent than their elders
This fact is confirmed by our analysis. Figure II - lodisplays the
'Independence profile- of the voters in
various age groups for each of the electorates examined,
one of the observations we can glean fro. these graphs
IS that the
.gap. (m ter.s of percentage of Independents)
l>etween the young and the old voters see.s widest in the
-St recent years. The figures for the electorates of
1952. 1956. I960, and 196^ see» to reveal a more gradual
decline in Independence with age (the decline is
Virtually negligible in the 1952 sample). This gradual
decline is caused, not by the higher levels of
independence among older voters in those electorates,
but by the fact that the youngest voters in those griups
were not as highly Independent as the younger voters of
later years, m effect, the decline in those years is
gradual since the level of Independence among the older
voters has a
-shorter- distance to
-fall.-
Another point which these graphs demonstrate
(if only suggestively) is that political Independence
seems to
-persist- more today than it did in earlier
times. In the figures which represent the 1956, i960
and 196k electorates, an initial flirtation by young
voters with Independence is followed by a return to
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5(
^0
FIGURE II - 10
PERCENT INDEPENDENT BY
AGE GROUP, 1952-1972
1952
li- II- r u- 2- s- ;r g- r g- - «- §•
1956
^0
21- 25- 29- 33- 37- /n- /w- 53, ^1 . -24 28 32 36 40 4/. 4^ 5I II II 11:11'%'
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I960
li- II- It II- II- 1\- II- 1 II- II- II- II- ^i-
50.
30
20
1964
10-
21- 25- 29- 33- 37- M- ^5- ^9- 53- 57- 6l- 65- 69-
24 28 32 36 40 44 48 52 56 60 64 68 72
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50.
4o
1968
30
20
10. J L
21- 25- 30- 33- 37- 41- ^4-5- ^9- 53- 57- 61- 65- 69-
24 29 32 36 40 44 48 52 56 60 64 68 72
1972
10 L
18- 21- 25- 29- 33- 37- 4l- 45-49- 53- 57- 61- 65-69-
20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48 52 56 60 64 68 72
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"normal" levels as soon as we leave th.v»B a.eav e youngest
category of voters. The 2-; ?H ,
,
^ ^^2^ gr°"Ps in all those
electorates show levels of Inaepenaence of less than
25^. in 1968 and 1972. however. IndepenCence see»s
to hold its attraction even after voters have left
the youngest age group, m 1972 in fact. i. the 25
to 28 age group (that electorate's first group of
potentially
-seccnd time- voters) the level of
Independence decreased not a whit. More data from
subsequent elections are necessary, but the
-straight
Une. of independence (at nearly 50%) which represents
three age groups of voters could indicate, conceivably
that the propensity to give up Independence after
exposure to one or two elections
.ay no longer be
operative. That such a tendency is not automatic is
Obvious in Table II
- 10. a cohort analysis of Independents
in SIX presidential elections from 1952 to 1972.
Though the graphs in Figure II - 10 show drops
in the levels of Independence with aging, the cohort
analysis does not confirm that assessment at all.
In fact, the cohort analysis provides almost no evidence
that Independence declines as voters advance in age.
The contradictions evident in these two measures boggle
the mind (especially since the same data sets were used
173
TABLE II - 10
Election Year
Voters Born
in I
188^-8?
1888-91
1892-95
1896-1899
1900-03
190^-07
1908-11
1912-15
1916-19
1920-23
192^-27
1928-31
1932-35
1936-39
19^0-^3
19^8-51
1952-55
Total Number
Cases
1952 1956 I960 1964 1968 1972
of
15
18
17
18
21
17
27
23
28
26
11%
13
26
21
25
15
19
21
22
26
23
30
35
NOT
IN
ELECTORATE
NOT
26:^
10
23
18
16
30
22
23
28
23
28
26
29
IN ELECTORATE
IN
10^
17
18
13
18
20
21
28
23
29
2k
32
32
391 ^12
^37 353
18
Zli
22
23
27
26
29
28
21
^1
50
kl2
LARGE
21;^ NUMBERS
19 16;^
2^
25
24
2k
27
32
33
37
37
39
51
49
50
935
17^
to construct both Figure 11 - lo and Table II - lo)
l^ut can partially be explained
„hen the 1968 and 19,2
electoratec are deleted fro. Table II - lo. if this
" done, a decrease of Independence with increasing
age can be perceived (though barely, and not for all
year groups) between I952 and 1964. The overall
increase in Independence (for all ages) in 1968 and
1972 throws the progression awry, but reading down
the columns, we can see that even in those years
independence is most prevalent a^ong the younger voters
in sum. it can be stated that while, in a given year,
independence is more prevalent among the young, the
overall jump in Independence in 1968 and 1972 makes it
impossible to prove definitively (at least by cohort
analysis) that Independence tends to drop as people
advance in age.
One possible compromise solution to this
complex question is suggested by E. M. Schreiber.50
Schreiber's analysis suggests that the increase of
Independence (1964 to I968) was confined, outside the
South, to voters under thirty but that among Southerners
(1971). "Where the Ducks Are."
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the increases occurred in all age groups. Some or
Schreiber-s nnai„gs.51
^^^^ ^^^^^^^^
are reproduced here as Table II - n.
TABLE II - 11
PERCENT INDEPENDENT BY AGE AND REGION.196^ and I968
(V/HITES ONLY)
1964 Percent Independent 1968
South (over 30)
Non-South (over 30)
South (21-30)
Non-South (21-30)
16
23
29
32
30
25
60
There is. in short, in Schreiber-s analysis the
suggestion that while Independence may still be tied
to age (and decrease as age increases), the increase of
Independence in recent years is by no means solely
attributable to young voters. Independence increased
from 196>, to 1968 (according to Schreiber's analysis)
and from to 1972 (according to our own analysis)
among nearly all age groups and all voters. Though
the increase was most marked among the young and—
because there were a great many more young voters than
Tables it^^dl!
^^^''^^ ^""^ reproduced from Ibid. .
suax the 1972 eleotorate-.a. an e«eot aispropor-
tionate to what „e ™ight have expected had the young
not been so numerous, there is still indisputable
evidence that the overall level of Independence,
regardless of age, has risen sharply i„ recent years.
Chapter V assesses the livelihood that Independence
wxll continue at its present level, but it can be
said now that the currently high rate of Independence
-
not solely attributable to the young voters, and
(even if it were) we have no guarantees that young
voters will discard their Independence as they
advance in age.
If Independents (who tend to be young) differ
greatly in age from Republicans (who tend to be older),
their respective socioeconomic profiles are much closer
together. The Independents we observed in the past
six presidential electorates bore a striking resem-
blance to Republicans when it came to occupational
patterns and levels of income and education, m each
Of the years we studied, the Independents consistently
Clustered near the "upper end" of the occupational
status scale at least as frequently as Republicans,
and more than the Democrats, m some years, nearly
one fourth of all Independents held professional or
managerial positions.
WhUe date on the income levels o. Indepenaents
are less impressive, they still present a
-.iaaie class'P-ture Of that group, m fact, though Republicans
Often outnumbered Independents in the very highest
income categories through the years, the Independents
consistently had fewer of their number in what could
be termed the
-poor" income categories (categories
Whose upper limits shifted upward during the period)
than did either group of partisans. If. on balance,
independents are said to occupy a middle income position
between Democrats and Republicans, it should be stated
emphatically that they are. in this area. much, much
Closer to the members of the GOP.
In the area of education, the Independents also
display rather high levels of achievement. With the
exceptions of 1952 and 196^ the Independents displayed
the highest mean educational level in every election
year. Though in some cases the differences between
Republicans and Independents were not statistically
significant, the pattern is clear enough to allow us
to say that the Independents, over the years, have been
at least as well educated as Republicans, and better
educated (at least in so far as that can be measured
by number of school years completed) than Democrats.
Hgure II
-
u presents the
.ean educational level.
year, for Republicans. Democrats, ana Independents.
FIGURE 11-11
ELECTION YEAR
Mean 12.
educational
level
(in years) 12,0
8.5 L
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DEMOCRATS
_
independents'
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In addition to these mean figures, a closer
look at the educational data shows us that the
independents' educational attainments were rather
'evenly, balanced. Fewer Independents than Republicans
were college graduates, but fewer also had failed to
complete a grade school education.
In sum it can be said that in the election
years we examined the Independents resembled Republicans
far more closely than Democrats on the demographic and
socioeconomic characteristics. The only anomaly, in
fact, was age, where Independents appeared considerably
younger than either group of partisans. As noted
earlier in this chapter,52 there is some controversary
surrounding the hypothesis that Republicanism increases
with age, and, as Table II - 10 makes clear, there is no
definitive proof that Independents discard their
Independence as they ret older. Nonetheless, there is
some evidence to suggest that these two phenomena do
Occur53 (though to a degree that is not determinable
very precisely), and—given tJie socioeconomic and
'52See Glenn and Hefner, "PYirther Evidence onAging and Party Identification" (1972).
^3see Figures II - 2 and II - 11. Though thegeneral thrust of Figure II - 11 is called into questionby the cohort analysis (Table II - 10), the graphs do
show a decline of Independence with age in almost every
electorate. *^
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demographic similarities between Independents and
Republicans-it is possible to suggest, tentatively,
that many of the Independents who do select a party
later in life select the GOP. This suggestion must
be only tentative, however, since definitive data
confirming it are lacking. The case can be
strengthened a bit if it can be shown that, in addition
to their socioeconomic similarities. Independents
resemble Republicans in their political attitudes.
Between 1952 and 1972. a wide range of political
issues were discussed in American presidential campaigns.
From the controversial Taft-Hartley Act of the 19/fO's
and 1950 's to American involvement in Korea and Viet
Nam to the 'social issue' to 'acid, amnesty, and
abortion. • Americans have been faced with a myriad of
political questions on which to take sides. Over those
years, however, there have been two political issues
of such persistence as to have been examined by each
of the SRC surveys, thus enabling us to assess the
shifts in attitude which may have occurred during the
period. These issues have been the proper role of
the federal government in the lives of its citizens,
and the question of civil rights. By examining their
opinions over time on these two issues, we can perhaps
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gain the clearest perspective on where the Independents
stand (relative to partisans) on the issues of
American politics.
By looking first at their views on the proper
size and role of government, and how those views have
changed over the years, we see a definite and clear
movement by the Independents away from enthusiasm for
federal government intervention in the daily lives of
the citizenry, m I952, we observed the Independents
as the group most supportive of the federal government's
••doing more" to make pleasant the living conditions of
the people. In I956 and i960, the Independents were
the group in the middle on this question—giving 'big*
government more support than it got from the Republicans,
but less than the Democrats. By 196^, the Independents
had moved closer to the Republican position, feeling,
almost as strongly as did members of the GOP, that
government was becoming "too powerful." This Republican
leaning continued in I968 and, by I972, Independents
had actually outstripped the Republicans in their distaste
for government intervention in the everyday affairs of
the people. The trend, on this issue, is unmistakable 1
over the years we have examined, the Independents have
moved in a 'conservative' direction—relative to partisans—
in their view of the proper size and role for the
federal government, (v/hile the entire eleotorate
became more convinced that the government was becom-
ing too powerful during the period-43.655. 55.2^ and
of the respondents voiced such as opinion in
196^.. 1968. and I972 respectively-the important point
here is the Independent- relative movement away from
the Democrats and toward the Republicans.)
A similar trend is apparent when we examine the
Independents, attitudes on civil rights questions.
Though they were less enthusiastic in their support of
civil rights progress in 1952 than were the Democrats,
by 1956 they had taken the 'lead- in that area, and
supported civil rights goals more frequently than did
either Republicans or Democrats. They maintained their
•progressive- civil rights stance through i960 and ^^^k.
By 1968. however. Independents had shifted and-only
four years after exhibiting the most progressive
attitudes on civil rights-became the group most con-
vinced that civil rights progress in the country was
moving "too fast." This shift occurred during a period
when the overall population's attitudes on civil rights
progress remained essentially unchanged—in V^dk, 67.
of all respondents said they felt civil rights progress
was being made "too fac,+ » \c st, compared to the 65.1%
expressing that opinion in I968. This fact .in l suggests
that, as „e noted earlier, the 1968 Independents
„ay
have included a nu.ber of conservatives on the race
issue Who entered the Independent category in that
year to vote for Wallace (or to escape the Democratic
party). As Schreiber (1971) and Sundquist (1973)
remind us, a large part of the 196^^-1968 increase
occurred in the South, and. as Sundquist states,
"...the growth Of independent political attitudes.
. .is
entirely among those opposed to government action to
enforce school integration. "S'^ If this is so. the influx
Of civil rights conservatives into the group may have
had more of an affect on the category's civil rights
posture than did changes in the attitudes of the
Independents between 1964 and I968. As if to show that
their retrenchment on civil rights in I968 was not
simply a temporal abberation. (or that the conservatives
who entered the category in that year had not departed)
the Independents of 1972 showed themselves to be in. solid
opposition (80^) to the forced busing of school children
to achieve racial balance. Though this percentage is
(1973), p^571?''^^'^'
"^^^^^^^ "^^^ American Party System?"
not appreciably higher than that of either of the parties,
it does not place the Independents in the forefront of
civil rights
-progressivism* they held in 196if.
These figures certainly do not answer all our
questions on the political beliefs of Independent
voters. They do, after all, represent the Independents'
views on only two general political issues, and, as we
discussed above, the period 1952-1972 has been alive
with many other important questions. Nonetheless, there
have certainly been no political questions with greater
enduring significance than the two just discussed, and
the Independents* responses to them cannot go unnoticed.
On the basis of the data we have available, it appears
beyond question that, at least on these two issues, the
Independents have become more 'conservative' (relative
to their partisan counterparts) during the past twenty
years, and now are very close to being the most
conservative group in the electorate.
There is apparent, then, in two of the three
areas we are examining, a 'Republicanizing' trend among
Independent voters during the past twenty years. In
terms of their socioeconomic traits and their positions
on a number of important issues, the Independents have
become ever more similar to the voters who call themselves
Republicans. The trn*> ^r.-> - ^-
•Renubli •
Significance of this
Kepublicanization' can ha ™„be measured by examining the
way the Independents have voted in recent years.
There are. depending on the perspective one
sazd about the Independents- voting patterns during thepast twenty years. To begin, we can say that in the
3XX elections between 1952 and I972, the Independents
supported the Republican candidate five ti.es. The
only exception, of course, was in 196/. when 69,^ of the
Independents voted for President Johnson. Over that
period, the Independent vote averaged 38.5^ Democratic.
6U2f, Republican. At the same time, though, it can bo
argued and shown that in five inter-election periods.
Independent support of the Democrats has been on an
'
upward swing on three occasions. Figure II - 12 shows
the Democratic vote of the Independents in the
presidential election years from 1952 to 1972. However
one wishes to interpret it. this chart demonstrates one
thing definitively, the Independent vote is capable of
fluctuating wildly from year to year. The fluctuation
is all the more impressive when we recall that Table
i
- 2 seemed to indicate that—except for I968—the
membership of the Independent category does not appear
to vary wildly from election year to election year.
Though some changes in membership do occur, (as they
do with the parties) the volatility of the Independent
vote can not be attributed solely, or even largely,
to those changes. Though the 1964 to 1968 drop was
no doubt accentuated by the fairly large number of
Independents who. having recently deserted the Democrati
party, were not about to vote for its candidate, a
decline of 43/. in Democratic support in four short years
is still rather mind-boggling.
FIGURE II - 12
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We must remember, nonetheless, that the Independent
vote does not exist in a political or historical vacuum,
the percentages of Republicans and Democrats supporting
the Democratic nominee also dropped quite a bit from
196^ to 1968. One way in which these temporary fluctu-
ations in overall popular sentiment can be controlled
for—thus giving us a better relative picture of the
Independents* vote—is to use the measure of 'political
contribution- developed by Robert Axelrod. 55 Axelrod's
formula is designed to measure the political "contri-
butions" of various groups to each of the major parties,
independent of how well the parties are faring in any
given election. This 'contribution' (which has no
inherent meaning other than its definition) is deter-
mined by calculating the group's size, turnout, and
loyalty to a party, and comparing it to the turnout
and loyalty of the entire electorate. Thus, all things
being equal, a large group will make a greater contri-
bution than a small one, and a highly loyal group will
contribute more than will a 'lukewarm' one. Also,
a group's contribution will be increased in proportion
to the amount by which its loyalty exceeds that of the
^5Robert Axelrod, "Where the Votes Gome From: An
Analysis of Electoral Coalitions, I952-I968," American
Political Science Review
. 66, March 1972, pp. 11-20.
national electorate. Using Axelrod's formula the
•contributions' of the Independents to the
Democratic party during the past six presidential
elections are presented in Table 11-12. As the
Table shows, the Independents made their largest
•contributions' to the Democrats in 196/^ and I972.
In 196k, the Independents were actually more loyal
to the Democrats than was the national electorate
as a whole (196^ was the onlx year of the six we
studied in which that was the case). In I972 the
contribution was relatively large because the size of
the Independent 'group' had increased so much over its
size in the fifties and early sixties. One other fact
the tables make clear is that in most of the elections
the Independents have been less 'loyal' to the Democrats
than has been the electorate as a whole. In fact, the
percent deviation away from the Democrats (i.e., the
percent of Independent support for Democrats subtracted
from the support given Democrats by the entire electorate)
for the six election years has been 13%, 17^, l^o,
-Qfo
(in 196^), 19^;^, and 7fo. The mean deviation has been
8.6fo, In short. Independents have been 8,6fo less
Democratic than has the national electorate in the
six presidential elections from 1952 to 1972.
.22 X .60 V ZtA
r64 X .50 = 18.
9
_.23 X .61 V .^Q
_
.62 X .61 " ^-^'^
,.27 X .60 y .p<
- 1/. /,
.56 X .39 ^'-^
Part of our effort in describing the Independent
vote has been directed toward demonstrating its
volatility-in an effort to suggest that, while the
Independents often resemble the Republicans in terms
of their socioeconomic profiles and positions on certain
political issues, they are by no means always certain
Republican voters, while their loyalties of the past
twenty years have a definite Republican flavor, the
case of 1964 (and, to a lesser extent, i960) shows
that the Independent vote is a highly mobile vote.
While it seems Republican in general disposition, and
while Independents resemble Republicans in some very
important ways, it seems likely that Independents
will continue to remain politically flexible so long
as they remain Independent. In order for the GOP to
take more than temporary advantage of the current
Republican flavor of the Independent voter, it will
be necessary for the Republican party, as a party, to
become more attractive to the conservatively disposed
Independent voters. The extent to which this may or
may not be happening can be gauged by looking at the
various 'types' of Independent voters in the national
electorate. If it is true that the GOP itself is not
attracting many of the Independents, despite their
apparent Republican 'flavor' (and this must be true
since the GOP's ranks are currently at an all-time
low), it may be possible that many voters calling them
selves Independents are, when pressed, expressing a
preference for the Republican Party. Since the survey
questionnaires ask Independents the partisan direction
if any, in which they 'lean* we have been able to con-
struct a chart which graphically presents the growth
of the various 'types' of Independents during the
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past twenty years. That chart is presented as Figure
II - 13.
15-
FIGURE 11-13
GROWTH OF TYPES OF INDEPENDENT VOTERS. I952-I972
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While it does appear from the chart as if the
percentage of Independent-Republicans has risen somewhat
since 196^ (the year, if we can point to any single
'
instance, that marked the beginning of the conserva-
tizing trend among Independents) the percentage of
completely unaligned Independents has risen even faster.
Even the percentage of Independents with Democratic
leanings has increased somewhat. The chart simply does
not suggest that the Independents are becoming * closet
Republicans.
-if by that tern, we Mean that Independents
are retaining only the Independent label, but express-
ing a strong preference for the Republican party £e^
For that to be the case, we would need to see evidence
of a much sharper increase in the percentage of
Independent-Republicans in these times when the overall
percentage of Independents is rising so rapidly.
It may be that Independents are nearly as well-
to-do as Republicans, and that they are quite conser-
vative on some issues, but the data do not suggest
that they have any special allegiance to the Republican
party itself. Consequently, while the Independent vote
may in future years continue to exhibit the Republican
orientation it has in the past, it is by no means in
the Republican party's pocket. As far as the Republican
party is concerned the Independent vote will continue
to remain a tentative ally. It is probably a vote which,
under normal circumstances, with traditional issues at
stake, will lean in a Republican direction. But its
demonstrated volatility, and the fact that the
Republicans cannot call on the Independents' 'party
loyalty to stand with them in difficult times, indicate
that a massive defection of Independents from the GOP
is still quite possible in times of Republican crisis.
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When the Independents' vote in the 197^ election is avail-
able for analysis, the data should show us the extent to
which the Watergate scandal represented such a crisis.
By way of summation, it can be said that,
since 1952, the Independents have exhibited an increas-
ing tendency toward conservativism on political issues—
at least they have moved closer to the Republicans and away
from the Democrats. On some issues, especially in the
more recent years, they actually appear more conserva-
tive than their Republican contemporaries. If political
conservatism can be tied to the relative comfort of one's
social and economic position in life, the Independents'
conservatism should come as no surprise. Since I952,
we have seen the Independent climb to a position, in
terms of occupation and education, near the top of the
American success scale.
The actual voting patterns of the Independents
do not yield us a picture quite so clear as to their
attitudes and socioeconomic characteristics. Nonethe-
less, some general tendencies are observable. The
Independent vote is generally a Republican one, and it
is isually more loyal to the GOP than is the electorate
as a whole. But there persists a lingering doubt as
to how much confidence the Republicans can place in
their ability to retain the Independents' loyalty.
Regardless of the Independents' socioeconomic and
ideological Characteristics, it must be very difficult
for the GOP to have to count for election on the support
of a group which gave President Johnson W of its
electoral support in 196^. And, while Independents
today seem even more conservative than ever, there
is no assurance that their conservatism will continue
to translate itself into electoral support of the
Republican party.
With the GOP in its contemporary state of
shambles, and with the number of Independents rising
so rapidly, the continued support of Independent voters
may very well be the Republican party's best hope for
survival as a viable major party. And, by virtue of
their political beliefs and socioeconomic character,
the Independents appear logically to be 'attainable'
Republican votes. But the demonstrated volatility of
the Independents' voting patterns must give the
Republicans cause to shudder. It is perhaps the best
testimony to the contemporary importance of Independent
voters to say that, with their support, the Republican
party is still very capable of winning important elections-
even by landslide margins; without that support, the
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current state of the Republican party is such that it
could conceivably cease to exist as a major force in
national politics. (Frankly, the same can be said of
the Democratic party, though perhaps not so defini-
tively as it can be said of the Republicans.)
It is unlikely that the Republican party will
disappear. On too many occasions in the past have
pundits and prophets talked about the impending death
of political parties only to be embarrassed by that
party's resurgence of power four years later. My
observation of the Independents leads me to believe
that the support they have given the Republicans
during the past twenty years will probably continue
to be forthcoming—but to a precise degree that is
still unpredictable pending their reaction to the
Watergate affair, and the affect of that reaction
on their voting habits.
CHAPTER III
POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY
In political science, and in American political
lore in general, there are two different and conflicting
assessments of the 'political responsibility- of
Independent voters. Political responsibility, in
this sense, refers to a host of attitudinal and
behavioral traits generally considered consistent
with what we might term 'ideal democratic citizenship.'
It includes political interest and awareness, a
knowledge of (and. generally, an opinion about) the
important political issues of the times, and a concern
for the general interest. In behavioral terms it means
the desire and ability to participate actively in the
political process—through voting, involvement in
political campaigns, membership in politically-
oriented citizen groups, or some other participation
mechanism appropriate to the interests and goals of
the person in question. Whether—and to what extent-
Independent voters are 'politically responsible' (at
least when compared with partisans) is the subject of
this chapter.
196
197
Accorain. to traaitional wisao„. independent
voters are regaraea as a»o„, our ™ost responsive
political Citizens. Hi,.x, interestea ana involvea
'
-
politics, they are picturea as
.ein. untaintea by
e M..
^^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^
^^^^^^^^^amxrs a oalculatea, dispassionate assessment of the
-sues ana a fair, objective estimate of the public
interest. Implicit in this position is th» »^ ^-^o" e assumption
that only the Independent can approach politics and
political decisions with the detachment necessary to
ensure fair consideration of each issue on its
-merits,
ana avoia the narrow pettiness of partisan prejuaice.
Thus the Inaepenaent is heia in the role of arbiter-
judging each case and each candidate carefully and
seriously on the basis of merit and tipping the
political scales (hopefully) in the direction of just
cause. (That such a laudatory view of Independents
would spring from the American popular culture is not
surprising when we consider that culture's general
and traditional aisaain for political partisanship.
Whether they are Inaepenaents or not, many Americans
believe that a vote cast for. "the man. not the party-
is a vote in the best traaitions of democratic
politics).
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The second image of Independents-the more
recent one-began to arise once political scientists
had an opportunity to examine the results of survey
research, and to explore the nature of political
participation in our society on an empirical basis.
Almost as if its main thrust were solely to refute
the laudatory traditional image of Independents, this
more recent assessment of their character has been
drawn in very critical terms. Generally, the social •
scientists have argued that their data cast the
Independents in a far less favorable light, and
indicate that strong partisans, not Independents,
most closely approach our conception of the 'responsible
citizen.' Numerous researchers have contributed to
this 'revisionist' view of the Independents, but the
most influential presentation is given by Angus Campbell
and his associates in The American Vnt.^-r . citing
relatively low political interest and concern among
Independents, the authors of The American Voter claim
that)
if the usual image of the Independent voter isintended as more than a normative ideal, itfits poorly the characteristics of the Independentsin our samples. Far from being more, attentive,
interested, and informed, Independents tend as
a group to be somewhat less involved in politics.
They have somewhat poorer knowledge of the
issues, their image of the candidates is fainter.
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,
coL'ern"o':?r^he"ou?:o:^'"I'^tS"i^ 1-^. their
and their ohoici be^w^^ ^^l^t^yely slight,
although it i^Lde^T^ad °K"fn*=r"^^^^'campaign, seems much lesH +i » • ^"discoverable evaluationfol ^-^^''^^'^ ^^"^
national politics"! ^ elements of
The image of the Independents presented in this
passage (and argued by most survey research oriented
social scientists) seems to be in serious tension
with the traditional image discussed above. It is
the goal Of this chapter to see which of these images
is the more accurate, or if there is any way in which
these two apparently contradictory assessments can be
reconciled.
2
In the surveys we have available there are a
number of ways in which the political concerns and
activities of Independents can be observed. A good
p. 83.
^^^"'P^®^^' et_al.. The American Vnt.p>^
, (1964),
To attempt a reconciliation of these twoviews IS not to ignore the possibility tha? bo^h the
^hev'undoubt^^? describing^some Independents.T y edly are, since the research so far has
S°^terf ^tI J^^^P^'-^^^ are a highly varied categoryof vot rs. It is not enough, however, to simplv statethat there are different kinds of Ind^penden^sf ?ha^statement should be true on its face. Our purpose hereIS to try and describe the Independent vote-a vote which,while not monolithic, may be shown to exhibit somegeneral characteristics that students of politics shouldfind more helpful than a simple declaration that allIndependents are not alike.
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Place to begin is with a look at the voting turnout
rates of Independents (compared with party identifiers)
in the six presidential elections from I952 to I972.
While a number of factors other than political
responsibility can be cited to explain differing rates
of voter turnout (these will be discussed below), it
remains a solid and easily measurable index of political
participation. The turnout rates for Democrats,
Republicans, and Independents in each of those six
elections are presented in Figure III - l.
From the figure, it is clear that, on this
important measure of political involvement. Independents
appear to lag rather badly behind their partisan counter-
parts. 3 Though in 1952 and I956 the Independents voted
a bit more frequently than Democrats, in the four most
recent elections they brought up the rear and in none
^
^The figure confirms one element of 'traditionalwisdom'—namely that Republicans tend to vote more oftenthan Democrats. The figures are based, however, on voterecall m post election interviews. As might be
expected, more voters in all categories claimed to have
voted m those elections than actually voted. (The
Sn^^-'-JfS
turnout rates of the total electorate were 71%,
70J0,
66%, and 62% in i960, 6k, 68, and 72 respectively/
when the actual turnout rates were 6k%, 63%, 63%, and
5070)
'
For practical purposes, however, we can assume
that the rate of "over-recall" was about equal for allgroups of voters.
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Of the Six cases were Independents as likely to vote
as were partisans as a whole. Even when class is
controlled, middle class Independents voted less
frequently than middle class Democrats or RepuUioans,
though-as expected-the middle class members of all
three groups voted more often than their working class
counterparts, m the six elections observed,
participation by the middle class averaged about
twelve percentage points higher than that of the
working class. (This difference was observed among
Republicans. Democrats, and Independents and the inter-
class participation differential was unrelated to party
identification)
.
Besides voting turnout, the surveys also examine
several other indices of political participation, and
in these areas too the Independents seem less involved
than either Republicans or Democrats. When asked
about the likelihood of their donating time or money
to a political campaign, or wearing a political
lapel button, or attending political meetings.
Independents appeared slightly but consistently less
1
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are aeviations witMn su.,roups-an In.epenaent
„noleans toward the Republicans is slightly
„ore
-active.
than a "weak" Democrat, for exan^nio v,^. I ample—when the groups
are considered in their entirety. Independents are the
.roup least likely to be involved in these aspects of
the two-party electoral process.
It is premature, however tn r.^>.^n ^
,
luw . o conclude solely on
the basis Of electoral turnout that Independents possess
less political responsibility than do party identifiers.
Even if one is willing to concede that participation in
the two-party electoral process can be equated with a
developed sense of political responsibility (an assu.p-
tion Which is open to question)5 it is possible that
stated tl!ey TtttS^l'oAUirrJ;^'' °' '"^^ Independents
of the Democrats and 10 ol o? th» "^^^ 6.5^
Independents, said thev wmnJ 1^ Republicans, 9.5>5 of the
did 12.0% of the Demoorate ind 1 f,? campaign button, as
6.6%. of the Independents Ltd °L'^'^f Republicans,
campaigning candidate as ttd ^ ^^""^ """^y *° a
12.7JS of the Republicans! °^ Democrats and
their°pollt!ca^'so:L'r''^ '°
20^
certain interveni.,
.ariaUes can
.e seen to e.p.ainpart 0. t.e ai..erentiax in turnout. One sue. potential
var.a.xe is t.e part, support-.usterin, e„ort lieH
precedes elections.
..ese e«orts are aireote.
„ore
at party identifiers (31, of who™ were
..contaoted..
,ythe parties in 1972. for example, than at Independents
(Zo,% contacted in 1Q7?1 _m 1972) and appear to have some impact
on turnout. 6 Even thm.o-hi^ve oug the percentage of contacted
Independents voting in 1972 (76,) was lower than the
percentage of contacted partisans who voted (86?0. the
disparity was smaller than that which existed between
the turnout rates of those groups as a whole (68;J for
the partisans, 52?? for the Independents). Though the
aata do not indicate that this variable substantially
redresses the partisan-Independent turnout disparity,
they do suggest' that some external forces may be at
work in causing the observed turnout differences.
Since it is possible that certain external
variables may be affecting the Independents' low rate
of participation, we must explore other areas if we
^ ^z^-:^ :^re-n:r::st*-t£-
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are to gain an accurate assessment of the Independents'
political responsibility, m each of the election year
surveys, respondents were asked to describe their
general level of interest in the events of the
campaign. The percentage of the voters expressing
a
-great deal- of interest are reflected in Figure
III
- 2. and those reflecting
-hardly any- interest
are presented in Figure III - 2 (a).
Though there are a few variations, both figures
show that the Independents exhibited less campaign
interest than either Republicans or Democrats. In
almost every case, the Independents had proportionately
fewer of their number in the 'high interest' category
than did the partisans, but more expressing 'low
interest.' When social class was controlled, little
changed as regards the relationship between partisan-
ship and interest. However, as we observed earlier
regarding turnout and participation, there were wide
disparities in the interest levels of the middle and
working classes. On the average, the number of
-highly
interested" working class respondents was thirteen
percentage points less than the number of -highly
interested" working class respondents in the six
election years examined.
35
25
15-
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FIGURE III - 2
ELECTION YEAR
L-
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A similar picture emerges when we examine the
extent to which the voters professed to be concerned
about the possiMe outcomes or the presidential elections
question, m each of the six electorates, the
Independents were consistent! v +hotly the group which professed
to care least about how the races m\^hi- +x-ace ight turn out. Over
the six election years, a mean of 39. 55^ of th. t .ux jjyo/- e Independets
Claimed to care only "a little." or "not at all" about
the outcome, while similar rates of indifference a.ong
the Democrats and Republicans were Z8.6f, and Zk.Zf.
respectively, m no election did the Independents
equal the members of either party in their demonstrated
concern about the outcome, and when class was controlled
and only middle class respondents were considered the
Independent-partisan differences actually increased
slightly.
The Independents' low level of campaign con-
sciousness is demonstrated in other ways. If interest
in elections can be gauged by expressed attention to
.nedia coverage of the candidates and issues, Independents
again rank as the group least involved in the electoral
process. Though the amount of attention varied greatly
over time for all groups (due, no doubt, to the medium's
growing popularity with the public). Independents were
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consistently less li.ely than either
.roup of partisans
to have been regular watchers of television programs
dealing with the campaigns. They were also least
attentive to radio and magazine political coverage and.
though somewhat more likely than Democrats to have
followed the campaign closely in the newspapers, they
were, overall, the group least concerned with the
political events unfolding around them.
On at least two counts, then, the Independents
seem to resemble the 'revisionist' image of them
painted so darkly by the social scientists. They
appear to be the group least likely to participate in
the electoral process or to be interested in and
concerned about the candidates and elections of the
times. It is still possible, though, to keep the
question of the Independents' political responsibility
an open one if we choose to view both participation
and interest as dependent variables, stimulated more
by partisan sentiments and attachments than by any
inherent political awareness or sense of citizen duty.
In short, other factors may be at work affecting the
differences we observe in these areas between
Independents and party identifiers.
one such variable ™ay be the relative extent
to Which the respondents believe there is a great deal
at stake in the outcomes of two-party elections. If
one perceives nothing crucial in the outcomes of these
contests, one's interest and participation therein
will probably be not as high as it would be if one
believed the outcome of the election would make a
great deal of substantive political difference. We
can attempt to explore this possibility and get some
impression of the voters' estimates of the stakes
involved in two-party elections by looking at how
much difference they perceive between the two major
political parties, if a voter perceives little or no
difference between the principals in an electoral
contest, it is difficult to see why he should perceive
the outcome (in this limited context) as especially
crucial. If the Independents are less likely than
partisans to perceive important inter-party differences
this fact may partially explain their lower levels of
turnout and involvement. We can test this hypothesis
by examining the respondents' perceptions of important
inter-party differences, and the effects of those
perceptions on electoral turnout, in the presidential
elections we have been looking at. For example, in
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every survey since I960 the voters were asked if they
saw a noticeable difference in the extent to which the
two parties believed that government,
"...should see to
it that every person has a job and a good standard of
living." The percentages of Democrats. Republicans,
and Independents who stated they saw "no difference
-
in the stances of the parties on this issue are
reflected in Figure in - 3. ^s the figure shows,
Independents on the whole tend to be the group least
persuaded that there exists a fundamental difference
in the parties, positions on this issue. Only in i960,
when proportionately more Republicans than Independents
held the parties indistinguishable, were members of the
latter group exceeded in their perception of the sameness
of the parties.
This perception of sameness, however, was
probably not, by itself, responsible for very much of
the partisan-Independent turnout differential since
even among respondents who perceived "a great deal-
er
-some" difference between the parties, the turnout
rate of Independents was lower than that of party
identifiers. Between i960 and 1972, the turnout rate
of Independents who perceived inter-party differences
in this area was averaged twelve percentage points
211
•
w
w
o
OS
(in (S-M OnQ T-»
1
w o
OQ ON
CO tHM
>H ^
1 6^ O
« MM <^M PL,M 1 o
a; MW W Ph
EH MS EhM SM
r
PtH QO M
2: JHO EhM OS
^ <i
wO JH
« pqW
Ph
«W
EHO
>
oM
EH
o
w
O o o o
CM
0\
00
VO
OS
ON
EH
EH Q
-< S
OS W
PQ O
t3 O WS PW W S
« Q M
C/3
oM
O
-rH
212
lower than that of the partisans who perceived such
dx«erences-a difference only slightly smaller than
the average difference in turnout between Independents
and partisans in general, while the assumption that
their tendency to perceive inter-party differences
less frequently than partisans might be responsible
for the Independents, generally low turnout rates has
much to recommend it on common sense grounds, it is
not supported by the data available.
Besides their inability to perceive major
differences between the parties (or. phrased another
way. their insight into the essential sameness of
those parties) there may be other variables which go
toward explaining the Independents' low interest and
participation levels without forcing us to subscribe
to the theory that they are inferior political citizens.
It may be that Independents spurn participation in the
two-party system because they feel that electoral
involvement in our system is little more than an
exercise in futility. In short, their sense of political
efficacy may be so low as to make political participation
a worthless enterprise in their estimation. If one
perceives (however correctly) that the political system
is so unresponsive to one's concerns as to make
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participation in that system useless, one is entirely
sensible not to participate.
Though political efficacy—and the lack of it-
will be examined in a later chapter as a possible
explanation of political Independence—a brief look
at it here will help us decide if its absence can be
seen as a partial explanation for the Independents*
low political involvement. To gauge the relative
efficacy of the different groups of voters, we can
examine a question presented to respondents in each
of the six samples—a question which asked them to
register their agreement or disagreement with the
statement, "I don't think public officials care much
what people like me think." Though this question does
not specifically measure the respondents' views on
the efficacy of their participation in the electoral
process (a low score on which could conceivably be used
to explain the Independents' low participation) it is
a question which was asked of all six electorates, and
the respondents' answers reveal an interesting chrono-
logical pattern.
As Figure III - ^ shows, the Independents have
the lowest sense of self-efficacy in only two of the
six electorates, with their feelings on this question
2U
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usually somewhere between the Democrats and Republicans.
The figures are mixed and appear to demonstrate no
definitive relationship between efficacy and party
identification, but they clearly do not suggest that
Independents perceive themselves to be the least
efficacious group in the electorate—a fact which
would have to be shown conclusively if we were to
ascribe the Independents' low participation levels to
their demonstrated sense of political powerlessness.
Perhaps the single most interesting aspect of the
-^SU.e is the almost
.eteoric rise in
..ine„ioac,..
whxch see^s to have occurred between ana 1968
and continued at ^uXi
.peea into 1972. WMie-as
'
th- n.ure Shows-there is no definitive relationship
•^etween poXitioal Independence and this one measure o.
political inemcacy. it is interesting that the
electorate's perception that officials do not care
about them should rise so rapidlv ir. = +ii axy m a time when the
rate of Independence is also rising sharply. As
mentioned above, a later chapter win discuss the
possible relationship between efficacy and Independence
in greater detail.
Besides gauging their perceptions of the
extent to which public officials care about them,
the SHC surveys have attempted to measure the electorate-
emcacy in other ways. i„ several cases, the voters
were asked to record their agreement or disagreement
with the statement. "People like me don't have any
say about what the government does." The responses
of the Democrats, Republicans, and Independents to
that question for the election years I952. I956. and
1972 are recorded in Table III - 1.
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TABLIi III - 1
-- * ^yj'^t iy3o, AND 1972
1952 1955 1972
Democrats
Republicans 27.2 22.4 r
^^=^32) (N=ll^) ?^.:J96)
Independents 27.3
^
21.3 Lo o
(1^4) (n:383)
Besides showing us that the overall level of discontent
rose sharply between I956 and I972, the Table offers no
evidence that the Independents are the group most
convinced they have no say in government action.
Over the three years, a mean of 30.2/. of the Independents
expressed such an opinion, compared to 27. 1/^ of the
Republicans and 35.2;^ of the Democrats.
In the 1956 and 1964 studies, the sample surveys
included groups of questions? which were combined into
inr^ J'^]^^,f^ indices of political efficacy, both in19j6 and 1964, were developed from the respondents'
answers (indicating agreement or disagreement) to fourquestions. The four statements to which the respondents
were asked to agree or disagree were 1 a) People like
me don't have any say about what the government does;b; Voting IS the only way that people like me can have
a say about how the government runs things; c) Sometimes
•efficacy indices, for the voters of those years. On
these indices, respondents were rated 'high.,
'low.,
etc.. on the basis of the number of 'effacacious •
'
responses they gave to the battery of questions, m
1956. k5.e% of the Independents were rated 'high* or
•very high' on this efficacy index, as were ^6.0/.
of the Republicans and 37-9/. of the Democrats, m
196/f. comparable figures for the Independents.
Republicans, and Democrats were 35.6/.. and
-30.6%,
respectively, if political efficacy is tied to rates
'
of participation (a seemingly sensible connection) its
absence apparently cannot explain the low levels of
Independent involvement, since Independents—who
appear no less efficacious than Democrats—have the
lowest participation rate of all the three groups
under study. Though high efficacy may be an important
factor influencing political involvement, we apparently
cannot ascribe the low involvement of Independents to
any lessened sense of political efficacy on their
part.
politics and government seem so complicated that aperson like me can't really understand what is going
on J d) I don't think public officials care much what
people like me think.
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In this chapter we have developed the following
scenario, Independent voters are considerably less
likely than party members to participate actively in
the electoral process. Part of the reason for this
is that they are less likely than partisans to be
contacted during campaigns by party support-mustering
efforts; part is that they are the group least inter-
ested in and attentive to the campaign, and that
they are the group least concerned about the outcome
of the election. This demonstrated lack of concern
may be attributable to the Independents' perception
(to a greater degree than that of party members)
that there is very little difference between the
parties, and, by implication, that there would not
be much difference should one or the other party win
a given election (though there is little evidence in
the data to support the contention that these beliefs
directly affect the Independent turnout rate). The
lack of Independent interest and participation can not,
however, be directly attributed to their low perceptions
of their political efficacy since Democrats—who exhibit
a lower sense of political efficacy—seem to participate
more frequently than they do.
The conclusion whioh
be-is that T .
^serges-hazy as it may
independents participate less in th /party electoral process h»
^ . ^
''^^^"^e they are relatively
nte ,,,,
^^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^^
relatively unconcerned abontx a u the outcomes of two-party elections n,,>, ^ u.I'J.ons. Our data would suDDort +v.o^'uppo the essential
accuracy o. Willia™ Paanigan-s contention in
.he
...independents are not ™uch interested in politics
an government and are certainly not much concerned
wxth partisan politios-they are not involved in
party clashes. "8 q+fn v .StUl to be investigated, however.
is the question of whether or not Independents possess
the political
-sUlls. necessary
.or viable partici-
pation. When and if they deem the political issues
Of the day to merit their attention. If they do. it'
would vindicate the other half of Pianigan's description
Of Independents, namely that. "On the other hand
independents appear to have the information and the
perspective on political affairs necessary for an evalua-
tion Of issues and candidates as competent as could be
expected of partisans.
-9 examine this, we can look
MericanJSSaS^^if ff^^^Politioal B.h.vlor of rhn
9lbid.
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at the Independents' degree of interest in political
affairs in general (rather than in specific campaigns),
their demonstrated knowledge of their political environ-
ment, their level of political knowledge as perceived
by the SRC's field interviewers, and the general
development of their political issue orientation. To
judge the first of these areas, the survey respondents
were asked in 196k how closely they followed "what's
going on in the government.
. .whether there's an election
going on or not." Table III - 2 presents the responses
of the Democrats. Republicans, and Independents to that
question.
TABLE III - 2
ONGOING INTEREST IN GOVERNMENT,
BY PARTY IDENTIFICATION, 1964
PARTY
IDENTIFICATION INTERESTED
All
the
of
Time
Some of Now
the Time and Then
Hardly
at All Total
Democrat 27.3?^ 4l.l^ 18. 5^;^ 13.1/t 100;^
(N=758)
Republican 39.1^^ k0,2'/o 13.6^ 7.1^ 100^^;
(N=352)
Independent 28.9^ ^3.3^ 16.2;^ 11.6^ 100^^
(N=3l4)
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Though this table yields no startling results.
It IS interesting to compare it with the 196^ observa-
tions Of Figures in - Z and in - 2 (a)
.^ove.
Those Figures, whioh depict in part the levels of
interest in the 196/. campaign itself, show Independents
to be lagging behind both Democrats and Republicans.
While Table III . 2 indicates that the Independents-
overall interest in politics (at least in 196^) was
actually as high as that of the Democrats. The data
are only suggest!ve-especially since they record
observations from a single year-but they do indicate
the possibility that the Independents- low levels of
interest in campaigns do not extend to a lack of
interest about government and politics in general.
Though we have no comparable measures of ongoing
interest from the I968 or 1972 surveys, those studies
do provide us with some questions we can use to explore
this possibility a bit further.
In the 1968 and 1972 surveys, respondents were
classified on the basis of the SSC interviewer's
perception of their general level of knowledge and
awareness about politics.
Theoretically, the interviewer based this
assessment on the respondents' answers to the survey's
222
battery of questions, and, while it is entirely likely
that some interviewers were more 'generous' than others
in their estimates of the respondents' knowledge levels,
we can assume (at least for practical purposes) that
Independents, Republicans, and Democrats were all
exposed equally to this possible survey bias.
In the 1968 electorate sample. 42.9^ of the
Independent voters were considered to have exhibited
•fairly high' or 'very high' levels of political inform-
ation. 42.9/. of the Republicans and 33.1/. of the
Democrats were similarly assessed. On the other end
of the information 'scale' 7.8/. of the Independents
were described as having 'very low' levels of political
information, as were 8.3/. of the Republicans, and
13.2/. of the Democrats. In 1972. 3^-5?^ of the Independents
rated in the 'fairly high' and 'very high' categories,
as did 39. 6?^ of the Republicans and 30.3;^ of the
Democrats. The percentage of Independents exhibiting
•very low' information rose slightly from I968 and ^.rfo
of the Independents were listed in this category, as
were 1 .Vfo of the Democrats and 3.8;^ of the Republicans.
While these figures reveal no neat pattern, and
while the 1972 results are not nearly as 'impressive'
for Independents as those of I968, we can conclude from
them that the Independents' consistent!,ntly poor showings
on the campaign interest questions are not accompaniedby similarly low levels of political knowledge. (The
Phrase political feowled^ ^3. of course, a ris.y one
Since it is based on an interviewer's subjective assess-
".ent. but it is noteworthy that when asked in the post-
election interviews in 1972 which party had won the
most House of Representatives Seats in the recent
election, more Independents than either Republicans
or Democrats gave the correct answer). Of course, it
may be that Independents-who occupy higher status
occupations and possess higher educational levels than
Democrats-are better able to impress the SRC inter-
viewers than are the less articulate Democrats, thus
inflating the interviewers' perception of their
political awareness. i„ this instance, we can simply
hope that the SRC's interviewers were properly forwarned
of such a possibility, and that their findings reflect
their awareness of this potential difficulty.
Other measures—such as the question dealing
with the House of Representatives-fortunately indicate
to us that the interviewers' assessments were at least
moderately accurate. In the development of their
issue orientation (if 'development' in this case can
22^
be said to mean the ability tn
on the i.. positionsssues and the tendency not to .1 •ii2:t be classifiedin the 'don't know category)10 t,.,
,Independents seem tooe at least the eauaiq l of party members as a whole.On selected questionq in +v,
^" *he SIX surveys from 1952 to
1972 independents claimed as often as partisans to
agree or disagree
"strongly., to statements which
outlined a possible stance on a political issue.
Also on questions dealing with both domestic and
foreign affairs. Independents as a group were no more ,
likely than partisans to state they Midn't
.now- what
thexr position was, and on many questions they were
actually less likely than partisans to be without an
development, of Independents
with here?Snf"^L'? a^:ays'\^°„"ar*^^r?^e"S are dealingattitude"— the resDon<!P rr^„^^ + ^ "manufactured
to avoid classi?ic^?i
, fnlSe*°don?rkn ^Pr'^-^^^^^we must assume that manufactured a?ti+,^? category. Againabout equally in the resDon^e? ./ 1 1 "''^^ ^'^^ present
For a thorough discussion on ?h5 °i voters,
encounter wifh manS^cCed"^^!tSdes'^^L^^M?f'f."^
y «B was, xo say the least, hazy. The possibility
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is not conclusive by itself, but when coupled with the
high levels of political information ascribed to them
by the SRC interviewers, it leaves us with the
impression that Independent voters are, after all,
not so politically unaware as their low levels of
participation and interest might suggest. 12
At the beginning of this chapter, we spoke of
two conflicting images of the Independent voter. Our
hope at that point was that the current research might
enlighten us as to which of the two descriptions was
the more appropriate, or tell us approximately what
proportion of the Independent vote was accurately
described by each. Looking at the data, it has gradually
become clear—as it has in so many areas of our investi-
gation of the Independent—that the question of the
Independent voter's political interest and involvement
is not simply an 'either-or' proposition. This is not
exists that well-knovm party positions on issues may aidpartisans in the formulation of their own ideas a good
deal more than they aid Independents. If this is true,
the demonstrated issue development of Independents is
all the more impressive.
12Robert Agger, "Independents and Party
Identifiers! Characteristics and Behavior in 1952" (1959)
also observed a strong issue orientation among
Independents, even when education was controlled, as
discussed in Chapter I.
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simply to say that some Independents conform to each
image-i.e., some Independents are highly involved,
while others are not. In dealing with. a group so
large and heterogeneous as Independents such a revel-
ation is obviously a truism and contributes little to
our knowledge of the Independent vote. Rather, our
research has shown that, even when considered as a
group. Independents tend to conform to parts of both
the images which have been painted of them through the
years
•
In terms of their participation in, concern
about, and interest concerning two-party political
struggles in America, Independents tend, as a group,
to conform to the 'revisionist' image in that, as
The American Voter states, "...their interest in the
campaign is less, their concern over the outcome
relatively slight. -13 in almost every case examined.
Independents were less likely to vote, or to partici-
pate in the electoral process in other ways, than were
party identifiers of either stripe. They exhibited
less interest in the campaign (and paid it less
attention in their media habits) and considerably
less concern about its possible outcome. This lack
13Campbell et al . , The American Voter (1964)
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of interest and involvement was not attributable to
lower perceptions of political self
-efficacy among
Independents, since they were no less efficacious
than Democratic partisan voters.
On the other hand, when queried on the extent
of their interest in the affairs of government other
than two-party campaigns. Independents appeared no
less interested than partisans as a whole and somewhat
more interested than Democrats in particular. Their
demonstrated levels of political awareness and informa-
tion were in no way inferior to those of partisans
and in the I968 survey their information level the
highest in the electorate. Additionally, their issue
orientation seemed as well-developed as that of the
party members.
If there seems to be a bit of contradiction
here, we should not be overly surprised. Social
research—especially when it is directed at a 'target*
as large as the Independent vote—rarely yields neat,
compact solutions.
Though they exhibit a distinct lack of concern
for and involvement with the two-party electoral process,
the Independents appear to be a group solidly grounded
in political knowledge with well-developed positions on
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the important issues of the day. They seem to possess,
in fact, a very solid intellectual foundation-as solid
as the party-identifiers '-for eventual political
participation, should the mainstream two-party system
begin to excite their fancy. There is little evidence
to suggest, however, that the contemporary state of
partisan politics is any more appealing to Independents
than it has been in the past. And, barring any major
changes in that state, we can probably expect to see
Independents remain at their lower-than-average levels
of interest and participation for some time to come.
CHAPTER IV
EXPLAINING INDEPENDENCE
If one chooses to view American electoral politics
from a '•psephological,
" or long range perspective-
focusing on general movements of voters rather than
specific issues and candidates in campaignsl— one of
the most important political 'facts of life' in recent
years has been the presence, in increasingly large
numbers, of self
-identified Independents. By virtue of
the sheer weight of their numbers, their impact on
American politics is quite substantial, and their
influence on the traditional balance of political power
is so great as to make anachronistic any further concep-
tion of that balance solely in terms of Democrats versus
Republicans. According to the most recent survey data
available Independents now constitute forty-one percent
of the national electorate—and their numbers show no
signs of declining.
2
1 The term 'psephology' is borrowed from Richard
Scaramon and Ben Wattenberg, The Real Majority (1970)
Chapter I.
2ln January of 19?^ the Gallup Poll published
results of a group of surveys taken between September 1973
229
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Considering these observations, it becomes
increasingly necessary for political science to gain
a thorough understanding of the Independent vote if we
are to make any claims to understand comprehensively
the realities of electoral behavior in contemporary
times. In the two preceding chapters, we have looked
at the sociological, attitudinal, and political behavior
profiles of Independents between 1952 and 1972, as well
as the question of their general interest in and knowledge
about the affairs of politics. Now we turn our attention
to the question of why it is that people choose to
identify themselves as Independents, and why their
numbers have increased so rapidly in recent times.
3
and January 197^. These surveys showed the rate ofIndependence at 3^/. of the national electorate. On
tn^^ldU IV^-'^^^ University of Michigan's Center forPolitical Studies published the results of its latestpoll. Their surveys showed that 1^1% of voters calledthemselves Independents, 36% Democrats, and 21/.Republicans
.
^
io>.^T -^^^^ y^^'^ Independents 'choose the Independentlabel; IS crucial m this context since it relates to thequestion of voter self-identification. As mentioned inthe introduction to this study the concept of self-identification is an important one since it can indicate
more than simple behavioral traits. To define Independents
solely in terms of behavior assumes that the phenomenon
is strictly a dependent variable and gives little consid-
eration to the possibility that identification itself
may play a role in determining the character of one's
political behavior. Such an assumption neglects the
wisdom of many studies which have shown us the importance
of party identification in political behavior, as well as
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In trying to examine the possible explanations
Of self.identified Independence, the data available
from the SRC surveys have been supplemented with a
number of personal interviews with Independents in
several geographic areas of the country, since political
identification is often a very personal choice, these
interviews can help by showing, in the words of
Independents themselves, what sorts of factors are
operative in a person's decision to identify as an
Independent. Because the interviews are not random,^
their findings are offered only in a supplemental way-
designed more to exemplify, in personal terms, the
phenomena to which the survey data point, rather than
serve as conclusive empirical 'evidence.'
The best place to begin an attempted explanation
of political Independence is with a look at how the
voters—particularly the Independents—view political
the findings of Chapters II and III of this study whichdemonstrate that Independents do act differently polit-ically than Democrats and Republicans. It seems to over-look the fact that self-identification does make adifference, not only in one's political behavior, but inthe way one perceives and relates to the political world.
^An effort has been made not to draw the
respondents from a homogenous group. Interviews were
conducted in six eastern states, among Independents
ranging in age from nineteen to sixty-two
«
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parties in this country. If a certain portion of the
electorate chooses not to align itself with a political
party, it is plausible to suspect that there is some-
thing about our political parties which a number of
those voters find somewhat unattractive.
In Chapter III, we discussed one component
of the Independents' view of the two major parties—
namely, the differences they perceived to exist
between them. We concluded that, by and large.
Independents perceived smaller inter-party differences
than did Democrats or Republicans. In 1952, ^3.3^
of all Independents claimed they saw "no difference"
between the two major parties, and in the presidential
electorates from i960 until 1972, a mean of 37.3^ of
the Independents perceived no inter-party differences
on the issue of how much the federal government should
be involved in providing a good standard of living
for the people. The percentages of Democrats and
Republicans with like perceptions were similar in the first
case but lower in the second.
5
5ln 1952, kl,5fo of the Republicans saw "no
difference" between the parties, as did 39.5^^ of the
Democrats. The mean level of Democrats perceiving "no
difference" in the parties position on government involve-
ment between i960 and 1972 was 2^.8^; among Republicans
it was 28.5^.
233
Besides differences between the parties which
the voters
.ay or „ay not perceive, there are a nunber
Of other party-related voter attitudes which the surveys
have examined, m 1952, for example, the voters were
asked if they approved of nominating conventions
(perhaps the most visible symbols of our parties in
action) as means for selecting presidential and vice-
presidential candidates. The k6.lf. of the Independents
who expressed approval of the conventions was slightly
lower than the 51.7^ of the Republicans or the 55, 1;^
of the Democrats who voiced such approval, 6 Though
the differences are relatively small, these figures
suggest a less favorable reaction among Independents
to the quadrennial party 'happenings • than is present
among party-identifiers. When the voters were asked
in that same year if they believed one should vote a
"straight" party ticket in an election (a belief which
could be interpreted as a tacit recognition of the
importance of parties in the political system)
, less than
one-fourth of the Independents agreed, though straight-
T ^
^The observed difference in this case betweenIndependents and Republicans is not statistically
significant (p. .07) ; that between the Independents andDemocrats is significant at the .01 level.
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ticket voting had the endorsement of of the Democrats
and very nearly half {1,9.2%) of the Republicans.
In a later survey in respondents were asked
if they believed that political parties were generally
helpful in solving the problems of our society. 7 m
their responses. 1,1.3% of the Democrats indicated a
belief that political parties help "...a great deal.-
as did 38. If. of the Republicans. Such an endoresment
of the importance of parties was expressed by 30.3;;^
of the Independents. While the 'admission' by thirty
percent of the Independents that parties help a great
deal is surprising, it is still true that the percentage
of Independents expressing such an opinion is consider-
ably lower than that of the parti sans. ^ Looking at the
figures another way, 27.2^ of the voters who felt that
parties were not helpful were Independents in 1964
(a year when the overall rate of Independence was
22.5:^), while 18.2;^ of the voters who felt parties
7a similar question— one which would have been
especially helpful—was asked in the 1972 survey but, as
yet, the respondents' answers to that question have not
been made available for analysis by the SRC.
o
Young Independents were considerably more
enthusiastic about the worth of parties than were their
elders. Of the Independents who felt parties helped a
great deal, 40.2^ were under thirty years of age. Of those
believing parties to be useless, l^.O;;* were under thirty.
lese
sees
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helped a great deal called themselves Independents, it
is problematical, of course, as to which of th<
phenomena-party identification or the worth one
in parties-is truly the 'dependent' variable in this
case, but the figures suggest a positive relationship
between political Independence and a rather dim view
of the political parties* worth.
If we consider these data9 in connection with
our findings in Chapter III concerning the Independents'
perceptions of inter-party political differences, a
picture of how the Independents view the parties begins
to emerge. It appears that Independents by and large
see relatively smaller differences between the parties
than do party identifiers. They also are less suppor-
tive of party-related concepts and seem to see the
parties as being less useful political agencies, and
somewhat less helpful to the country in the solution
of its problems. In fact, on every measure we examined,
Independents were less supportive of political parties
and their associated trappings than were the members of
^An important consideration here is the con-
sistency, rather than the magnitude, of the differences
between Independents and partisans on these questions.
While the differences in most cases are small, the trend
we observe is consistent.
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the parties. Though in some instances the differences
were small, the pattern was consistent.
While it may seem a bit of a truism to argue
that party members are more supportive of political
parties than non-party members, it is important to
point out that such differences exist, if only to show
that antipathy toward parties can be used to explain
some of the phenomenon of self-identified Independence.
One Independent, a school administrator from
Pennsylvania, explained his Independence as "...the
least of three evils. I'm just fed up with corrupt
and dishonest politics, and corrupt and dishonest
parties."
Many of the Independents whom I interviewed
expressed animosities toward parties which were not
readily apparent in the SRC data. One of the most
common complaints was that party membership tied one
too closely to the platform and philosophy of the
party's leaders, leaving too little room for individual
discretion. This position was best articulated by a
Marine Gunnery Sergeant from North Carolina.. Empha-
sizing the belief that party identification entails
(even requires) voting the "straight ticket"—a belief
which seems somewhat pass^ in contemporary times, but
which was held by nearly all the Independents inter-
viewed-he described his Independence in this way,
I don't know... a person who is registered
IS tied to a party. I don't like to betied... to be tied to such a big organi-'
zation. I like to make up my own mind.
I think If I were in a party, I'd feel an
obligation to vote a party ticket. My
wife is from Minnesota and up there they have
real strong organization. Everybody votes
a party ticket, and I just don't want tohave other people making up my mind for
me •
The notion, as expressed by the Sergeant,
that party membership leads to having one's political
decisions made by others was held by many of the
Independents interviewed. One man, a printer from
Alabama, explained his Independence by describing
himself as "...a free thinker— I don't like to be led
by the crowd or people who would make choices for me.
Both parties are corrupt.... I want to pick only the
best of each." These sentiments were shared by his
wife who emphasized the 'man, not the party' concept
in explaining her Independent identification*
I want the right to choose for myself the man
best suited to the moment's needs... and
hopefully he will do the best job for everyone.
Though the SRC surveys do not afford us the
opportunity to check the impressions gained from these
interviews (that is, support the interviews with
empirical data derived from a random sampling of the
population) two things whioh emerge from them are the
Independents' beliefs that party membership confines
one and reduces decision-making autonomy, and that
an Independent stance best equips one to vote 'the
man, not the party*—a laudable tactic in the
Independents* eyes.
While many Independents may fit none of this
description, and others fit only parts of it. Independents
as a group tend to conform more to this model than do
party identifiers. They conform at least enough to
say that, as a group, their antipathy toward political
parties offers us a partial explanation of their non-
alignment with those parties.
In addition to their apparent distaste for
political parties, another commonly offered explana-
tion for political Independence is the presence in
Independents of attitudinal or sociological "cross-
pressures," Patrick Horan has characterized the dominant
interpretation of the (sociological) "cross-pressure"
thesis as connoting that, ".,. certain combinations of
social background categories may. by virtue of their
associated partisan orientations, exert severe stress
on the individual occupants and that this stress will
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result in attempts to es^^ano i.^ , ,P » x cape m various ways from the
area of politics. "10
If one views the Independent identification
as something of an escape mechanism (or. perhaps, as
a neutral ground sought by persons receiving conflict-
ing messages from their environment)
. such an identi-
fication might-according to Koran's characterization-
be a viable course, say, for a union member (a category
with Democratic orientations) who earns a great deal
Of money (a category with Republican orientations), m
an even more direct sense, the Independent category
might be a comfortable haven for a person whose mother
is a Democrat and whose father is a Republican, or
vice versa. Though Koran's analysis is wisely skeptical
Of efforts to prove the validity of the cross-pressure
thesis in toto,n we can here examine a number of possible
cross-pressures and observe the ways in which they
appear to affect the rate of Independence.
rr.„». t,
Pa*=^ioI^ Horan, "Social Positions and PoliticalCross-Pressures,' A Re-examination," (1971), p. 652.
1 1After a thorough discussion of various crosq-pressure models and their application in social researchHoran concludes that the croL-pressure thesis belongs
'
^...m the same category as the theories of statusinconsistency and mobility effects— that category
h«?^if ^""^ plausible theories whose empirical supportas been cut out from under them." Ibid.
, p. 659.
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Perhaps the 'classic' case of sociological
cross-pressure occurs when, as just described, one's
parents are supporters of different political parties.
Table IV - 1 compares rates of Independence among
voters with 'mixed' partisan backgrounds (those whose
parents were of different parties) and voters with
'consistent' partisan backgrounds (those whose parents
belonged to the same party) in 1952, 1964, I968, and
1972. The table shows that the rate of Independence
is somev/hat higher among these 'cross-pressured'
voters than among the population as a whole, and con-
siderably higher than among the voters with 'consistent'
partisan backgrounds. The mean percentage of Indepen-
dence among the cross-pressured voters is roughly
eight points higher than among voters whose parents
share or shared the same party affiliation. It would
seem that this obviously direct instance of cross-
pressure does exert some influence on the rate of
Independence.
Conflicts in the partisan affiliations of one's
parents are not, however, the only source of potential
political cross-pressure. In 195^, respondents were
asked their perception of their own social class, as
well as the social class of their family background.
TABLE IV - 1
RATES OF INDEPENDENCE AMONG 'MIXED,' 'CONSISTENT •
AND ALL VOTERS IN 1952. 196^^, I968, AND I972'
ELECTION
YEAR RATE OF INDEPENDENCE AMONG 1
•Mixed*
Background
Voters
•Consistent*
Background
Voters
All
Voters
1952 26.1^ (N=^0) 17.1?^ (N=199) 21.1% (N=391)
196^ 22.6^ (N=19) 16.1^ (N=150) 22.5% (N=353)
1968 32.7% (N=3^) 20. 6;!^ (N=188) (N=M2)
1972 (N=77) 28. (N=^56) (N=935)
The rate of Independence among middle class respondents
with working class origins (a possible source of cross-
pressure) was 33'7fo, while among middle class respon-
.
dents with middle class backgrounds it was
Similar tendencies were not observed among Republicans.
While ^1.7% of the middle class with middle class
origins were Republicans in 195^1 the rate of Republi-
canism among middle class people with working class
backgrounds was 30«0/^» It appears that a trans
-
generational shift (upward, in this case) in perceived
social class had a positive impact on the rate of
Independence, at least in 1956. These findings are
supported by Kenneth H. Thompson's 1971 analysis of
social mobility and party identification. Using the
1952 to 1968 presidential election years SRC surveys
as his data source, Thompson reports that "...over
the period for which data are available the hypothesis
that upwardly mobile citizens are more 'Independent'
in political orientation than class stables is
generally supported.
. .in those five samples, the
proportions of respondents identifying themselves as
•Independents' rather than as partisans of the two
major parties, average five percentage points greater
among upward mobiles than among the class stables. "12
When the social class of one's family and the
status of one's occupation are viewed as possible
sources of cross-pressure tensions, the results are
inconclusive, but they point in the same general
direction. In 1956, the rate of Independence among
•professionals and business managers' with working
class origins was 30.1^. Among those employment
categories, people with middle class origins were
Independents 29,6% of the time. When the categories
l^Kenneth H. Thompson, "Upward Social Mobility
and Political Orientation" A Re-evaluation of the
Evidence," American Sociological Review . (April 1971),
pp. 223-23^.
were compared in the 196k survey, the "working class
professionals" had a rate of Independence of 25.0fo,
the "middle class professionals" had a rate of
Independence of 15.0;^,
The concept of attitudinal or ideological
cross-pressures is very similar to the sociological
variety. For example, if a person believes strongly
in federally sponsored programs to aid the jobless
and poor (a position which, like certain sociological
traits, has partisan orientations—this time in the
direction of the Democrats) but also feels strongly
that the federal government should play little or no
role in the de-segregation of state schools (a questic
which is not associated with the national Democratic
party), that person might have difficulty in deciding
on his party affiliation. True, our party system is
loose enough to permit these inconsistencies to be
overlooked or to be (with some justification) ration-
alized away. Nonetheless, the general thrusts and
philosophies of the two major parties are still clear
enough to present possible sources of tension to the
cross-pressured voter.
The suirvey questionnaires give us a number of
opportunities to try to test this assumption on an
ir
empirical level. In I956, respondents were asked the
opinion on whether or not the federal government should
involve itself in the de-segregation of public schools-
a position identified with 'liberal,' if not Democratic,
politics in that year. They were also asked to
register their agreement or disagreement with the
proposition that our government should "give help to
foreign countries, even if they are not as much against
communism as we are." (once again, a suggestion
identified with 'liberal' politics). Considering
only those who opposed aid to such countries, (i.e..
took a conservative position), the rate of Independence
was 26.6^ among the 'liberals' on the school
de-segregation question, and 23.9?S among those who
gave a 'conservative' answer on de-segregation. In
other words, among those expressing possible conflicting
or cross-pressured opinions (at least on this one
dimension) the rate of Independence was slightly
higher than among those with more 'consistent' issue
orientations.
In i960, voters' positions on several
potentially cross-pressured issues were tested by the
survey. In one instance, they v/ere asked whether or
not the government in Washington "...ought to see to
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it that everybody who wants to work can find a job."
They were also asked if the government should
stay out of the question of whether white and
colored children go to the same school." Looking
only at 'conservatives' on the 'job- question (e.g..
people who did not agree that the government should
find everyone a job) the rate of Independence was
25.0^ among those who believed strongly that the
federal government should stay out of school
de-segragation (again a 'conservative* position),
and 30. 9^^ among those who felt the government should
be involved. Again, the cross-pressures appear to
be exerting at least a small influence.
In 1964, respondents were polled on their
attitudes toward federal aid to education and their
opinions on the rate of progress of the civil rights
movement. Among 'liberals' on the education issue
(those who favored federal aid) the rate of Independence
was 9.5% for people who felt civil rights progress was
being made too slowly (also a liberal position in 1964)
and 22,9/0 among those who thought things were moving
too fast. Again where liberal and conservative issue
positions coexisted, the rate of Independence appeared
to be positively affected.
All of these findings point to relatively
minor differences, m many cases the differences
(in terms of rates of Independence) between cross-
pressured and non-cross-pressured voters are so small
as to be statistically insignificant
. What is
impressive about the data, however, is their
consistency. Again, in every case examined, the rate
of Independence was higher, if only slightly, among
the cross-pressured voters than among those who did
not experience the specific cross-pressures examined.
It is impossible, with the almost infinite
number of variables involved, to state that Indepen-
dents exhibit "more" cross-pressures, or, in Robert
Agger's terms, that they are "more cross-pressured"13
than partisans. What we can say, though, is that on
the basis of our analysis of several possible cross-
pressure situations (both sociological and attitudinal)
the presence of cross-pressures seems to be associated
with higher rates of political Independence. In the
cross-pressure situations we observed, the rate of
Independence was higher among the respondents who
were cross-pressured than among those who were not.
13^Robert Agger, "Independents and Party
Identifiersi Characteristics and Behavior" (1959), p. 316,
While it is not possible to say that cross-pressures
"cause" political Independence (especially since, in
the case of attitudinal cross-pressures, it is possible
that they may actually be due to lack of a party
affiliation—and the attendant philosophy it can provide
as well as reflect),!^ it would be unwise to overlook
the relationship between the two.
Other phenomena which appear as plausible
explanations of self-identified Independence are
political ambivalence, or the general lack of concern
about things political, and political indecisiveness.
With regard to the former, findings in Chapter III
make clear that Independents do exhibit much less
concern about the outcomes of two-party elections
than do party identifiers.^^ What is problematical,
hov/ever—and what makes it impossible to decide if
political ambivalence explains Independence—is the
possibility that Independence may explain the political
ambivalence. As Chapter III indicated, it is not at all
It is entirely likely that some partisan
voters develop their issue positions inferrentially
by internalizing the pronouncements of party leaders.
This would be most likely when the position of the
party leadership was well-known, and the issue in question
of rather low personal salience to the voter.
^^See Chapter III.
clear that the Independento • demonstrated lack of
political concern is tied to any inherent lack of
citizen responsibility-especially when we remember
that Independents were just as interested as Democratic
identifiers in governmental affairs other than specific
campaigns. 16 It may well be that non-identification
with a party and the associated belief that the outcomes
of elections are of little consequence, are themselves
the cause of the Independents* apparent ambivalence.
If this is the case—and there is much evidence to
support it— I'^it makes little sense to argue that
political ambivalence be included as one of the major
explanations of political Independence. While it may
be a factor of consequence in some people's decisions
not to affiliate with a party, it is more likely to
reflect the attitudes of non-partisans that the out-
comes of two-party struggles are not particularly
important.
In trying to decide whether or not political
indecisiveness is a major factor in political
l^In 196^, 28. of the Independents claimed
an interest in politics "all of the time," as did 2? ,y/c
of the Democrats and 39. 1^^^ of the Republicans. 11.
professed to be interested "hardly at all," as did i;).l'/o
of the Democrats and 7.1;^ of the Republicans,
^"^See Chapter III.
2k9
Independence, we must first make a distinction between
the indecisiveness of young voters just entering the
electorate, and indecisiveness that refers to people's
inability to come to grips with important political
questions. In many ways, the indecisiveness of the
young is a special case and may reflect the problems
inherent in the unsettled conditions of their lives
as well as the difficulties which many of them face
should they decide to break away from the partisan
tradition to which they have been socialized. It
does not, by itself, reflect an inability on their
part to take definitive stands on important political
questions. Accordingly, the special case of the young
voters—and the way youth affects the rate of
Independence—will be discussed separately in a section
below.
With consideration of the special situation of
the young thus deferred, we can examine whether a more
general political indecision—the inability or unwilling-
ness to take stands on the issues and make political
choices—affects the rate of Independence among voters
as a whole. On the face of it, the choice to identify
oneself as an Independent is by itself evidence that
the voter has opted not to identify with either of the
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major parties. To ascribe that choice to political
indecision would, however, (in addition to being
tautological) effectively exclude the possibility
that the Independent identification is something more
than a rather negative 'non-decision.' Such an exclusion
and the assumptions it implies fail to account for the
very positive value which many voters place on their
Independence. As stated in The American VntPr-
,
"...we do not suppose that every person who describes
himself as an Independent is indicating simply his
lack of attraction to one of the parties... it seems
likely that a portion of those who call themselves
Independents are not merely reporting the absence of
identification with one of the major parties. Though
simple indecisiveness may motivate some Independents
to refrain from choosing a party, we must go further
and examine other areas if we are to cite it as a
major explanation of Independence.
In Chapter III two measures of political
decisiveness—the strengths of the respondents' issue
positions, and their propensity to hold issue opinions-
were examined. In no way did the data suggest that
Independents were any less decisive than party identifiers.
Campbell et al . The American Voter (1964), p. 69.
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In fact, when we consider that Independents had issue
orientations virtually as developed as partisans
without the aid of the general party philosophies on
which some of the partisans may have been relying,
their very decisiveness is quite impressive.
If one defines political decisiveness as the
propensity to take sides on political questions, and
if one further defines those 'sides' as being encompassed
by the two major parties, the demonstrated indecisiveness
of Independents becomes a tautological truth. But if
decisiveness is described as the ability to hold and
express definitive views on the important political
issues of the times, Independents are certainly no
less decisive than are party identifiers.
The concepts of political self-efficacy and
alienation are often discussed in terms of the effects
they appear to have on political attitudes and behavior.
Since Independence represents, by definition, effective
estrangement from one aspect of the American democratic
system—the two-party framework—these two phenomena
suggest themselves as possible explanatory factors
behind self identified Independence. Since both
concepts are effectively defined by the SRC surveys
as being embodied in positive answers to a number of
pre-determined questions-a definition wk- v •a i which is some-What xnaae,uate
.ut. alas. aU we
.ave to wor. with-WUI not awell on their meanings here but si„ply
concepts than meets even thp qpp
.
e SRC's watchful eye.
Nonetheless, the measures of efficacv p.h i •ji y and alienation,
Of these phenomena in a random sample of the national
electorate. As such, they are at least available and
useful, if not especially rich or subtle. Effectively,
the concept of political efficacy has been defined for
us as that phenomenon which is present in a person who
gives
-positive- responses to a number of questions
designed to test the voters' feelings about their
relative importance in the political system. Sim-
ilarly, political alienation is said to be evidenced
by people who give
-negative- responses to a number of
questions designed to measure the way they view the
government and political leaders around them. 19
l^The efficacy questions included the followingi
A. (Agree or Disagree) People like me don-thave any say about what the governmentdoes.
B. Voting is the only way that people like me
can have a say about how the government
runs things.
C. Sometimes politics and government seem so
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In Chapter III we observed that Independents
were no less efficacious than their partisan counter-
parts. This observation is supported by research on
political efficacy and political alienation conducted
by sociologist James Wright.20 bright concluded,
after an extensive examination of the subject that
"...alienation and party identification are
unrelated. "21 Table IV - 2 (which appeared in Wright's
study as Table 3.822) reflects the percentage of white,
non-Southern voters "highly alienated" in I970.
complicated that a person like me can't
really understand whafs going on.
Ltl think public officials care muchwhat people like me think.
The political trust questions included ones
similar to the following!
A. How much of the time do you think you cantrust the government in Washington to do
what IS right— just about always, most ofthe time, or only some of the time?
B. Would you say the government is pretty much
run by a few big interests looking out forthemselves or that it is run for the benefit
of all the people?
C. Do you think that quite a few of the people
running the government are a little crooked,
not very many are, or do you think hardly
any of them are crooked at all?
20
.y.f^^^ Wright, "Political Alienation in the UnitedStates I I956-I97O" (1973).
21lbid., p. 211. 22ibid .. p. 212.
25^
TABLE IV - 2
WHITE. NON-SOUTH OMLY?"97o '
Efficacy Trust N
.Middle CIp^s.c;
Strong Democrat
V/eak Democrat
Independent, leaning
to Democrat
Independent
Independent, leaning
to Republican
V/eak Republican
Strong Republican
V/orkin^ Cla.ci.c;
Strong Democrat
V/eak Democrat
Independent, leaning
to Democrat
Independent
Independent, leaning
to Republican
V/eak Republican
Strong Republican
25.6
22.5
17.2
23.7
28.6
29.5
23.1
^5.3
^7.1
50.0
58.0
51.7
36.8
37.9
41.9
36.6
32.8
31.6
54.3
45.0
40.0
44.2
51.9
41.7
50.0
34.5
41.2
44.8
43
71
58
38
35
88
65
86
104
36
50
29
68
29
Class is determined by occupation of head ofrespondent's household. Middle class includes
"white collar" employees (clerical, salesmanager, etc.); working class includes manualand service workers and farmers.
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In terms of party identification, the only
observable significant difference here is between working
class Republicans and working class Independents on the
efficacy measure. The other differences are so small as
to have led Wright to conclude that "...no important
relationship between alienation and party identification
emerges. "23 j-t appears that efficacy and alienation are
unaffected by party identification and, conversely, that
party identification is relatively unaffected by political
alienation. Thus no case can be made supporting alienation
or inefficacy as major explanations of self-identified
Independence. This revelation undercuts any notions that
the recent rise in Independence (to be discussed fully
below) is attributable to the currently high levels of
inefficacy and political alienation—at least as those
phenomena are defined by survey analysts. 2^ While it
23ibid., p. 211.
^The Louis Harris Poll released in December
1973 (a poll commissioned bv the Senate Subcommittee on
Intergovernmental Relations) indicated that political
alienation has increased in the country during the past
seven years. The absence of any relationship between
alienation and party identification makes it impossible
to cite that alienation is responsible for the rise 'in
Independence which also occurred during that same period.
Wright, "Political Alienation in the United States"
(1973) also observed an increase in alienation—and a
drop in political efficacy—during the period. Relying
on SRC sample data, his research revealed "...sizable
declines in efficacy beliefs for all groups from i960 to
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does appear to be true that these phenomena are quite
widespread in contemporary times, when Independence is
running high, the absence of a relationship between the
two makes it impossible to explain one by reference to
the other.
One other possible explanation of Independence
can be seen in the fairly young ages of many Independent
voters. It is possible that recent exposure to the
electorate, and the desire to 'test the political
waters • slowly cause many young voters not be align
themselves with a party, but to call themselves
Independents. This is the 'indecision' of the young
referred to above, but it is a special kind of indecision
related not to the inability of the young to make
political choices, but their inability to determine-
due to their often rapidly changing lifestyles and their
uncertainty about the future—which party best represents
their philosophical and material interests. This
uncertainty can be especially widespread among
upwardly mobile college students, and it is complicated
by the fact that some younger voters may be in the
process of breaking away, however tentatively, from the
196^," and "...sizable increases in alienation. . .for all
groups... in the 1964-1970 period." (Chapter 4, p. 273).
I257
party to which their past has socialized them-itself
a potentially wrenching political experience .25 m
short, one's first exposure to electoral politics
often occurs in a very turbulent time of life—
a
time when adoption of the Independent label probably
seems a comfortable, if only temporary, haven.
There is much evidence to support this thesis.
In the concluding section of Chapter II, Figure II - 10
included a number of charts depicting the Independence
profile for the various age groups of voters in the
electorates from 1952 to 1972. That Figure demon-
strated that younger voters were more likely than their
elders to be Independents in each of those election
years. In each electorate a drop in the rate of
Independence was observable in either the 25-to-28 or
the 29-to-32 age groups. While the cohort analysis
conducted in Chapter II does not support the notion
that Independents "lose" their Independence as they
^^The influence of parental direction and
childhood experience on the development of political
attitudes and attachments is widely reported in the
literature. See, for example, R. E. Dawson and
K. Prewitt, Political Socialization (Glencoe., Ill.i
The Free Press, 1959) > K. D. Hess and V. Torney,
The Development of Political Attitudes in Children
(Chicago! Aldine, I967.)
'
increase in age, neither does it dispute the fact
that, in each electorate, younger people are more
Independent than their elders. This fact alone
strongly suggests that youth and Independence are
positively related.
While we would not argue that the Independence
is simply a non-decision which reflects no positive
values, the data suggest that it does represent for
some young voters a postponement of the decision they
will make later in life. There are certainly many
young Independents who, for a host of reasons, will
retain their non-alignment throughout their lives.
The data indicate that nearly two-thirds of the young
Independents fall into this category. 26 But there are
also other Independents who do select a party as they
advance in age after exposure to one or two major
political campaigns, and after their life style has
steadied into a pattern which they are able to
favorably associate with the philosophy and goals of
one of the two major parties. Though the increased
^^ReferenQe to Figure II - 10 shows this tobe the case.
overall level of Independence observable in 1964 and
1968 makes it impossible to conclusively demonstrate
this by cohort analysis, the extremely consistent
pattern of the graphs in Figure II - lo indicates
that it is indeed the case.
In many ways young voters are a segment of
the electorate whose lives and political views are
in a state of uncertainty and transition. In such
a highly changeable environment, the Independent
identification affords them the opportunity to stop
and rest, as it were, in a position of relative
neutrality before moving on to their selection of a
partisan affiliation. Young voters, however, are
not the only people whose life experiences leave
them with a sense of uncertainty that is comfortably
accommodated by adoption of the Independent label.
Voters in the process of shifting their allegiance
from one political party to the other are also in a
fom of transitional period.
Knowing what we do about the importance, in
psychological as well as political terras, of party
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identification, 2? it is not difficult to understand
the personal problems that can be associated with an
inter-party shift, and the consequent desire to keep
that shift as painless as possible. If one is reared
and socialized in the traditions of one political
party (and simultaneously indoctrinated about the
odious traits of the other) a change of party
affiliation is not a step taken lightly. Whether
the partisan shift is made as one enters the electorate
or later in life, a temporary 'layover* in the Inde-
pendent category can often serve to soften the
psychological blow and to make more gradual this
fundamental disassociation with an important part of
the roots of one's past. The Independent identifica-
tion can provide a comfortable resting place for the
person who has opted out of the party to which he has
been socialized, but is as yet unable to identify with
the party that socialization has led him to distrust.
One Independent, a young architect from Atlanta,
expressed this feeling when asked why he had chosen
to become an Independents
^''see Campbell etal., The American Voter (196^),
esp. Chapters 3, 5, and 6j and Franz Alexander, "Emotional
Factors in Voting Behavior," in Burdick and Brodbeck,
American Voting Behavior (1959), PP- 300-308.
t ^
^^^^^ ^^'^ j^^-t because I'venad a life-long subliminal aversion toDemocrats. Even though I'm now left ofthe Democratic party politically, it's stillanathema to me, because of my father'sinfluence. I can't call myself a
Republican anymore because I disagree withtheraso much, but I still have this oldfeeling that Democrats are scurrilous and
crooked... That's a laugh this year.
Though the Atlanta architect represents some-
thing of an unusual case (being a Southerner with
Republican roots turning Democrat in a time when many
Southern Democrats are becoming Republicans), his
comment illustrates well the socio-psychological
pressures which can sometimes be involved in shifting
one's party allegiance—pressures which affect both
young people rejecting their parents' party and older
voters turning away from the party of their earlier
years
•
The thesis that political transition
positively affects the rate of Independence gains
credence if we can show that the period from 1964 to
1972—a period when the rate of Independence rose
sharply—was a period of transition for many voters.
This demonstration depends on our ability to portray
the 196^-1972 era as a "realigning" one in American
politics, and its undertaking carries us into the
problem of deciding what factors have been responsible
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for the increase of Independent voters we have witnessed
in the past decade.
Thus far our attempt to explain self-identified
Independence has been drawn in essentially ahistorical
terms. V/e have focused our attention on rather
universalis tic variables and have tried to explain
Independence without reference to specific historical
circumstances. By and large our discussion indicated
that such factors as alienation, lack of political
efficacy, political ambivalence, and political
indecisiveness could not be cited as major causal
factors in the Independent identification. There
appeared, on the whole, to be very few important
relationships between these variables and the rate
of Independence. V/e did determine that youth, certain
sociological and ideological cross-pressures, and
expressed antipathy toward political parties all were
associated with higher rates of Independence. And
we argued (though without empirical verification)
that the transition of allegiance from one party to
the other often leads voters to pause in the Indepen-
dent category.
Now it is necessary to view the political
Independents in a more particular historical context
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and see if there are some temporal factors which may
be affecting the rapid increase of Independents
which we are currently witnessing. A good place to
begin is with a look at voters in transition, and how
that transition may have been affected by events of
the past decade.
In recent years, a number of political
scientists have written books and essays arguing
that the past decade has constituted a period of
fundamental realignment in American electoral
politics. 28 Political realignment, in this sense,
can be defined as the shakeup and resettling of the
political power—as well as the constituencies—of
the two major parties, and the emergence of new
political issues around which partisan loyalties
crystallize in something other than a temporary
manner. There is much evidence to suggest that
realignment is indeed occurring in America at this
2 8See, for example, Walter Dean Durnham,
Critical Elections and the Mainsprinpis of American
Politics (1970); Kevin Phillips, The Emergin,": Republican
Majority (New Hochelle, N.Y. j Arlington House, 19^9);
James Sundquist, "Whither the American Party System*?"
(1973). pp. 559-581.
2Q
«
^A good description of the forces at work
during realignment is available in V. 0. Key, "A Theory
of Critical Elections," Journal of Politics 17
(February 1955)» pp. 3-18.
26^
time. This evidence can be observed by comparing
contemporary events with conditions which are claimed
by political scientists to occur during or preceding
periods of political realignment. 30 sorae of these
conditions (followed by their exemplification in
recent times) are as follows
i
1. Realignment periods tend to occur every
32 to 36 years or roughly every gener-
ation..:'^ (The last period generally
considered to be a realigning one was
1928-32, approximately thirty-six years
from the middle of the time we are
discussing.
)
2. Realignment periods include or are
preceded by strong third party move-
ments..^^ (The American Independent
Party candidacy of George Wallace in
1968 constituted such a third party
movement.
)
3» Realignment brings? to the fore new issues
around which new partisan cleavages are
developed. (The I968 and I972 election
years—elections which highlighted the
"social issue" and "acid, amnesty, and
abortion" may have given us an inkling '
30These indices are a compendium of those
suggested by Key, "A Theory of Critical Elections"
(1955)» Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings
of American Politics (1970). and Sundquist. "Whither
the American Party System?" (1973).
3
^Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings
of American Politics (1970). p. 8.
32 Ibid., p. 10
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4.
of these new issues. 33 Though the iqyL
it w^nid ^h^economy to prominence,I oul be most unwise to neglect th^
vary widely from patterns o? ?he^pasi!
conteS'^"'" the timeliness of^^hi^
o? ^n^^rtK^""^ ""^^"^ ^i^^ the case
Of ?aw vo^p terms01 r te totals and numbers of partvloyalists elected to office, the Sou?htoday IS considerably less ''nemocraUc"than It was prior to 1964. )3^
Parties' internal coalitions, i.e., theirconstituencies shift during periods of
realignment. (Analysis of the 1972
election returns-and the support givenboth parties by selected groups of
voters—shows wide differences from pastpatterns, even when we "control" for thedimensions of the Nixon landslide
.
)35
o A .
.pSoth these issues areas (the 'social issue'and 'acid, amnesty, and abortion' ) are reJaUvely newto American politics. The importance of the 'socialissue' and its impact on the 1968 election is discussedby Scammon and Wattenberg, The Real P/laj or^t.y MQyn^^^^^
+
^^^^"^^^^ Fenton reports the increase of Republicanstrength in "An Analysis of the Results of the I972Presidential Election," (197^), pp. 116-128.
+ .-u 4.-
^^^^^^ ^® determine the extent of their con-tributions to the two parties, as we did in TableII
- 9, page 166
,
a technique which controls for changesin the parties overall strength— the contributions of
oatholics, union-members, and Jewish voters was lowerm 1972 than m any of the three previous elections.
266
6. In times of realignment, presidential
elections often exhibit relatively high
"ideological" content. 3° (The elections
of 1964 and I972 conform to this pattern,
at least in relative terms.) 37
7» In realigning elections voter interest
and participation are relatively high. 38
(This is one phenomenon which does not
seem to be exemplified by the elections
of this period.) 39
The effect of ideology on campaigns and the
way the 'ideological' content can vary from campaign
to campaign, are discussed in Philip Converse, Aage R.
Clausen, and V/arren Miller, "Electoral Myth and Reality
1
The 1964 Election," American Political Science Review
.
59 (June I965), 321-336, and John 0. Field and R. E.
Anderson, "Ideology in the Public's Conception of the
1964 Election" (1971).
37The ideological content of the 1964 election,
and the ways in which the voters 'perceptions of their
ideologies helped or hurt the candidates are discussed
in Converse ejtal
.
, "Electoral Myth and Realityi The
1964 Election" (I965).
3^Burnham, Critical Elections and the
Mainsprings of American Politics (1970) 1 p. 6-7.
3^While turnout levels in 1964 and I968 were
roughly equal to the fairly high rates we have known
since the 1950 's, they in no way constituted a
precipitous rise in turnout. 1972, of course,
witnessed a drop in turnout to approximately 56^ of
the eligible voters, the lowest percentage since 1948.
On the question of respondent interest in the election
there appeared no sharp rise (even a slight decline)
in interest during the period in question. In i960,
36.9:^ of the respondents called themselves "very much
interested" in the presidential campaign, while 24.7:^
claimed to be interested "hardly at all." By 1972, the
percent highly interested had dropped to 31*5/^ and
the percent interested "hardly at all" had risen
slightly to 27.4^. In any case, no precipitous rise
is observable
•
8. When realignment occurs, the nnmir^oi
lGa<!+ eJ-eotoral purposes atie st, the ma.iority party—a uattprnwhich persists, in V. 0. Key's words
fso succeeding elections ! "'tO(S far as presidential politics is
lTsriTl968'l *° have been thet-a e m 196b and 1972. it i <? rii-p-P^^,
a? thL"'
^\-g^L. to\pLu a't '^'''
parses? ?oJ''Lf""^^^^ ^^^^ P^^^ern wille i t f r several succeeding elections.
Though there are exceptions in contemporary
politics to the conditions here described (the
exception of interest and turnout is particularly
puzzling) a strong case can be made that realignment
has occurred or is occurring at this time, it would
seem, in retrospect, that the foundations of the
realignment were laid in 196/f, and that its full
ramifications were evident (at least on the presi-
dential level) with the re-election of President
Nixon in 1972. Whether the underpinnings of the
realignment will be strong enough to withstand the
outpouring of anti-Nixon (hence, anti-Republican)
sentiment precipitated by Watergate and associated
scandals, and whether the 'new' issues around which
the realignment has crystallized will retain their
prominence in voters' minds in light of the nation's
''Key, "A Theory of Critical Elections" (1955),
faltering economy will probably not be evident until
1976.
If it is true that realignment has occurred,
or is occurring, one would expect to find large
numbers of voters in inter-party transition during
the period in question. Since we argued above that
transition positively affects the rate of Independence,
we can thus expect to find more Independents in these
volatile contemporary times than in periods of
political "normalcy." We can partially test this
assumption by examining the particular case of
Southern voters during the past decade.
In terms of electoral realignment, no area in
the country is undergoing so fundamental a political
transition as are our Southern states. Until quite
recently it was common for political analysts to refer
to the "solid South" in terms of that area's propensity
to vote Democratic with amazing regularity. Today
any reference to the "solid South"—if it referred
to presidential elections—would probably be describing
that region's newfound Republican orientation.
Since the South—historically a Democratic
region—seems now to be "going Republican." at least
in presidential elections, we can assume that many
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Southern voters, especially whites,^! are in transition
in terms of their loyalties to the national political
parties. If transition affects the rate of Indepen-
dence, we should expect to find an increase in the
number of Southern Independents during this realign-
ment period. In fact, that is exactly the case,
In i960, only IQfo of the white Southerners called
themselves Independents—eight years later, 3&/0 of
the white Southerners were Independents. During the
same period, the percentage of white Southerners
calling themselves Democrats dropped from 60fo to kQfo
and the percentage of Republicans dropped from 19^
to 15'fo, As E. M. Schreiber has pointed out,^^ -j-^g
increase of Independence among young (under 30) white
Southerners was even more startling, jumping from Z9fo
in 196^ to 60fo in I968. James Sundquist has argued
that the new Southern Independents consisted almost
entirely of people with segregationist attitudes on
Black Southern voters are still quite loyal
to the Democratc. In neven heavily black South Carolina
counties in 1972, Senator McGovern polled a higher pro-
portion of the vote than polled either by Hubert
Humphrey in 1968 or John Kennedy in i960. This
McGovern support reflects the enfranchisement of many
black Southern voters in recent years as well as their
continued loyalty to the Democratic party.
^^Schreiber, "V/here the Ducks Are." (1971 )•
on the race issue.-^3 attitudes which precipitated
the break by .any with the national Democratic party.
Whatever the reasons for Southerners' defection
away from the Democrats, the important thing, in our
context, is that the South during this period was
undergoing realignment and simultaneously experienced
a sharp increase in the number of Independents, it is
extremely interesting to note that by 1972. when
Republican dominance in the South (at the presidential
level) was solidified, the percentage of Independents
dropped Slightly to ^0.^, and. while the percentage
of Democrats continued to decline (to l^S.l^/o) the
percentage of Republicans rose almost seven points
to 21.9^. These data support our contention that
realignment (thus transition) positively affects the
rate of Independence and they further suggest that
the 196^-1972 period was one of Deraocratic-to-
Republican realignment in the South. Other areas of
the country—where realignment was probably also
occurring, but less profoundly than in the South-
also saw their rates of Independence go up during the
nineteen sixties, but not so sharply as it did in the
(^Qn'>\
Sundquist. "Whither the American Party System?"
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South. Between i960 and 1970, the percentage of
Independents among white voters rose from 2V« to
Wo in the Northeast, from 26f. to 29% in the Midwest
and from Z5% to 28/. in the West.^^ Though the 196/^.
1972 rise was not as abrupt outside the South, it
was a substantial one nonetheless and the 38.5^ rate
of Independence in non-Southern states in I972 was
higher than ever before.
While realignment may have been most notice-
able in the South during the nineteen sixties and
early seventies, by no means has it been confined to
that area. Realignment, and the uncertainty and
transition which accompany it, have been responsible
for a not insignificant part of the increase in
Independence which this country had experienced in
recent years.
In Chapter II and in an earlier section of
this chapter, we noted that age appeared to play an
iPJ-q * t p. 572. The huge increase apparent
in the Northeast is of some interest, and may reflect
a different phase of the realignment period in question
since it has been accompanied by an erosion of
Republican as ^ well as Democratic strength. It may be
(though data in support of the contention are tentative]
that as the once-Democratic South drifts ever closer to'
the GOP, once-Republican New England is beginning to
lose its Republican character.
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important role in the Independent identification—
i.e., younger people seemed somewhat more likely to
be Independents than did older people. If this is
true, it may be that part of the increase in Indepen-
dence during the past decade can be attributed to
the relatively higher proportion of young people in
the electorate today than in past years. Table IV - 3
displays the percentage of voters under the age of
thirty in the samples of the presidential electorates
from 1952 to 1972.
TABLE IV - 3
PERCENTAGE OF ELECTORATE
UNDER 30 YEARS OF AGE,
1952-1972
1952 1956 i960 1964 1968 1972
Percentage
16.8^ 17. 0';^of 13.7^^ 18.3^ 18. 4^^^ 27.4^
electorate N=326 N=300 N=270 N=324 N=28l N=738
under 30
It is clear from the table that the percentage of
voters under thirty was considerably higher in 1972
(a year of high Independence) than in any of the other
electorates examined. Even when the 18-to-21 year old
voters are removed from the sample, the percentage of
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the electorate aged 21 through 29 in 1972 was 22.1^,
a figure higher than in the previous years. Given
the demonstrated propensity of the younger voters
to call themselves Independents, this influx of
under-thirty voters certainly explains part of the
high rate of Independence in 1972. Determining what
part it explains is somewhat more problematical.
Since younger voters in recent years have evidenced
rates of Independence close to 50^—as they did in
1972—^5 it follows that half of the general increase
of young voters has consisted of young Independents.
Since the 27.4^ of the electorate under thirty in
1972 is 10.^ higher than the mean level of under-
thirty voters in the five previous electorates, the
contribution of these new young Independents to the
overall rate of Independence is quite considerable.
It would be unwise, though, to over-emphasize
the role played by the young in the rise of Indepen-
dence in recent years. For one thing, Table IV - 3
shows no appreciable rise in the percentage of young
voters between 1964 and I968—a period when the rate
of Independence rose from 22. 5^;^ to 26.5^ of the
^^In 1972, voters aged 18 to 20 had a rate of
Independence of 50.3^; those 21 to 24, 48.8^5 those
25 to 29, 50»7J^.
electorate. For another, the cohort analysis in
Chapter II demonstrated vividly that Independence
rose between 1964 and 1972 among all age groups of
voters, and when we compare the 1964 and I972 samples
we see that even among voters over thirty the rate of
Independence rose sharply from 20.2^ in 1964 to 28.7/.
in 1972. In short we can say that the increase of
younger voters in the electorate~with their attendant
proclivities toward Independence—positively affected
the overall rate of Independence between the nineteen
sixties and 1972. but that they by no means account
for all of the difference.
Besides the transition associated with realign-
ment and the influx of young voters into the electorate
there are a number of other historical circumstances
which can be seen as influencing the rate of Indepen-
dence in recent years. James Sundquist has argued that
the "apartisan" nature of the issues of the 1960's
is partly responsible .^^ Sundquist theorizes that
Viet Nam, civil rights, and the 'social issue'—the
three most salient issues of the sixties—did not
readily lend themselves to absorption into traditional
^^Sundquist, "Whither the American Party
System?" ( 1973) » pp. 564-68.
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partisan frameworks. In short. Sundquist contends
that the parties were viewed by the electorate as
virtually indistinguishable on these extremely
important political issues, and essentially irrelevant
to their most salient political concerns. ^"^ With the
parties on the political sidelines as these three
issues were debated, many voters—especially those
entering the electorate when these issues were 'hot'—
could see relatively little value in the concept of
partisanship and no reason to align themselves with
Sundquist 's argument that the voters' per-
ceptions of inter-party differences on these issues
increased the rate of Independence is only partly
supported by the data. In 196^, the beginning of the
period he describes, ^7-9?^ of the respondents claimed
they saw no difference as to which party was likely to
keep the country out of a bigger war. In I968, the per-
centage seeing no difference on this question had risen
to 57*3%, When asked which party they felt was most
likely to escalate the Viet Nam conflict in I968 ("... take
a stronger stand, even if it means invading North Viet
Nam"), 3^*1/^ of the respondents saw no difference between
the parties. When viewing the parties' positions on
civil rights, the voters' perceptions of differences
were not substantially smaller in I968 than they had
been in 196^. Asked which party was more likely to
press for federal involvement in school desegregation,
39*7% of the electorate saw no difference in I968, as
36.9^ had seen no difference in 1964. When asked which
party favored federal involvement in efforts to see to
it that negroes got equal treatment in obtaining jobs,
3Q,2'/o saw no inter-party difference in I968, compared
to 32.2^ in 196^. In sum, there appeared to be a small
decrease in the voters' perceptions of the party
difference between 196^ and I968, but a large part of
that was probably due to the absence, in 19 68, of Barry
Goldwater at the head of the Republican ticket.
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either of the parties. The Independent category
afforded these voters an acceptable altemative-
perhaps permanently, or perhaps until such time as
the concept of partisanship appeared more relevant
in their eyes.
Though there are flaws in Sundquisfs
analysis (it is difficult, for example, to ascribe
the defection of white Southern Democrats toward the
GOP as being precipitated by anything other than their
perception of a difference in the two parties'
positions on the civil rights issue) it does make
some good points. Even though, as we have noted,
the voters' perceptions of 'no difference- between the
parties on civil rights and war issues increased only
slightly from 1964 to I968, we should recall that
voter perception of inter-party differences on other
•traditional' issues, seems to have declined in
recent years. ^8 Whether the parties' failure to
relate to and present alternative proposals concerning
the voters' most important concerns is due to their
ho
^°In Figure III - 3 of Chapter III we noted
that the perception that no difference existed between
the parties on the issue of the proper role of govern-
ment in people's lives rose between 196*4- and I968
among Democrats and Independents, and among all groups
of voters from 1968 to I972.
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being out of touch with the people, or (as Sundquist
argues their inability to keep up with the pace
of the country's realignment, these failings seem
to have an indisputably adverse effect on the parties'
ability to attract identifiers. It thus appears that
the parties themselves—due to circumstances which
are perhaps beyond their control—may be responsible
for at least part of their current difficulties. A
South Carolina businessman echoed the views of many
of the Independents I interviewed
i
I think the parties have just become too much
alike. Everything is diluted. You never hear
them talking about anything that means anything
to people...not to me, anyway. The problem
is that they don't really care .. .they're not
responding to what people think and care
about. They do what the leaders tell them to
and the people don't get any say.
There are other ways as well in which the
parties have in recent years become the architects
(however unwitting) of their own dilemma. In Critical
Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics .
V/alter Dean Bumham argues that the rise of Independents
during the past decade has been but one more stage of
the "onward march of party decomposition. "•^^ Bumham 's
^^Sundquist, "Whither the American Party System?"
(1973), pp. 579-80.
^Bumham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings
of American Politics (1970). Chapter 5.
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thesis is that for a variety of reasons51 political
parties have been in a state of decline in this
country since the turn of the century. Accordingly
the parties have lost a great deal of their former
usefulness—both in fact and in the perceptions of
many voters. While Burnham, himself a strong supporter
of vigorous parties, laments this tendency, he sees it
as partly responsible for the increase of Independents
during the nineteen sixties and seventies.
Though attributing the increase of Independents
to the decline of parties seems, on one level at least,
to be tautological, there is more to Burnham 's con-
tention than a simple truism. It is unquestionably
true that with the advent of direct primaries, the
Australian ballot, non-partisan elections, city
managers and the like, political parties have lost
power and are less important in the public conscious-
ness than they once were. With parties and the concept
of partisanship so widely derided by some 'reformist*
groups and efficiency-oriented 'good government* types,
^^In his Chapters k and 5» Burnham cites a
number of historical, demographic, and political trends
which have been responsible for the decline in parties.
He claims this 'disaggregation* began in the late
nineteenth century and he uses it to explain what he
sees as the declining rate of voter turnout in recent
history.
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it is easy to see how some voters are dissuaded from
aligning themselves with a political party. Whether
this trend is a healthy one. as some would argue, or
whether its implications spell trouble for the
American system, as Bumham contends, the important
thing, at least in this context, is that the conditions
do exist and that they appear to have an adverse effect
on party strength.
What is not clear, however, and what makes
acceptance of Burnhara's thesis questionable (in terms
of its ability to explain the current increase in the
number of Independents) is the question of whether or
not these forces are more in evidence today than they
were a decade ago. I would argue that they are not.
While the 'institutional' reasons Bumham cites in
explaining party decomposition have obviously weakened
the parties over the years, there is no evidence to
suggest that they are responsible for the recent
increase in the percentage of Independents .52 i agree
^ In states where registration is by party.
Independent registration is often quite low (lower
certainly than Independent identification). One reason
for this is that some states penalize Independents by
prohibiting non-party members from voting in primary
elections. There is no evidence, though, to suggest
that a relaxation of any of these laws has been respon-
sible for the recent increases in Independence. Though
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with Burnham that 'party decomposition' has been
responsible for more and more voters selecting the
Independent label. But I differ somewhat in where
I would place the origin of that decomposition-not.
as Professor Burnham argues, in the external, institu-
tional mechanisms which have sapped party strength in
the past, but in the parties' inability, in contempor-
ary times, to relate to the issues which concern the
voters53 and to avoid the taint of scandal and corrup-
tion which we have gradually come to associate with
them. It is sad commentary on the parties—or at
least on their public relations efforts-when seventy
percent of the respondents to a recent Harris Poll
reveal their belief that •'corrupt politicans" are a
major problem in this country. 5^ In case after case
the SRC samples are not randomized by state, a quick
comparison of voters in states with party registration
and m those without it produces no observable differencem the rate of Independent identification.
^^As noted earlier there has been a decline in
recent years of voters perceiving it would 'make a
difference' which party wins the election—a small
decline when that question is directed toward civil
rights and war/peace issues, and a more noticeable
decline (see Figure III - 3) when directed toward the
size and role of the federal government.
5^Louis Harris Poll, December 1973, reported in
Newsweek Magazine December 10, 1973.
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in the interviews I conducted. Independents revealed
their revulsion at the corrupt nature of our two
political parties. It is attitudes like these which
have helped in driving party identification to its
lowest point in recent history.
In these pages we have attempted to patch
together an explanation of why people call themselves
Independents and why so many more people are doing
so in contemporary times, m dealing with a category
so large and varied as Independents, a definitive
•once-and-for-all* type explanation is obviously not
possible. Nonetheless, political Independence is not
simply a random occurrence totally unrelated to
environmental factors or historical circumstances.
There do appear to be a number of phenomena which
positively affect the rate of Independence. Both
the survey data and interviews revealed a distaste
for political parties (and their associated concepts
and trappings) greater among Independents than among
party-identifiers. Almost all the Independents
interviewed expressed the belief that party membership
had confining implications and would prevent them from
making up their own minds on political questions.
Sociological and attitudinal cross-pressures seemed to
affect (slightly, but consistently) the rate of
Independence. Also, the uncertainty attendant to
entering the electorate for the first time or to
making the transition from one party to the other
seemed to increase Independence among population
groups experiencing those phenomena.
Looking at the dramatic rise in the number
of Independents in recent years, it is possible to
cite a number of historical factors as being partly
responsible. The relatively higher percentage of
young voters in today's electorate seems to have an
impact, as does the transition precipitated by the
political realignment the country—especially the
South—seems to be experiencing. The voters* per-
ceptions that the parties are not very different from
each other and the fact that the time's most important
issues are unrelated, as Sundquist argues, to tradi-
tional party cleavages undoubtedly reduces the
importance of partisanship in the voters' eyes.
The general decline of the parties as viable political
agencies—a decline precipitated, in Bumham's terms,
by institutional 'reform' mechanisms, but fueled by
the voters * perceptions of party corruption—has also
made Independence a more attractive choice.
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As this is written the rate of Independence
stands at forty-one percent of the national elec-
torate-very nearly double the mean rate between mo
and 196if. it is a phenomenon which gives party
strategists-as well as political scientists-cause
to stop and think. The sheer number of Independents
is, after all, not nearly so important as the
implications that they may have for the American
political system.
CHAPTERV
INDEPENDENTS AND FUTURE POLITICS
In the preceding chapters the Survey Research
Center data have afforded us the opportunity to observe
and assess, in some detail, the character of Independent
voters in the American system. Chapter II introduced
us to the socioeconomic, attitudinal, and behavioral
traits of the Independents as they have appeared in the
samples of the presidential electorates from I952 to
1972. One of the chapter's conclusions was that while
their vote is quite volatile. Independents over the
years have shown a rather strong orientation—both
in philosophy and behavior— toward the national
Republican party and its candidates. Chapter III
discussed the 'political responsibility* of the
Independents. It was there suggested that while
Independents are demonstrably less interested and
involved in the two-party electoral process and its
trappings, they are just as well-equipped (in terms
of their knowledge about politics and their interest
in the ongoing affairs of government) for political
participation as are the partisan voters. In
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Chapter IV we looked at some of the reasons why people
Choose to call themselves Independents, and attempted
an explanation of why their numbers have risen so
dramatically in recent years.
Of all the facts we have uncovered to this
point about Independents, undoubtedly the most
important-in terms of its implications for the future
of the parties and the political system-is the
phenomenal growth in their numbers which has occurred
during the past eight to ten years, in 196k, they
constituted 22. kf. of the electorate, now, ten years
later, they are of the electorate. This increase
might not be so startling if the percentage of Inde-
pendents in the electorate had a history of fluctuat-
ing widely from time to time. As a matter of fact,
however, wide fluctuations in this area are not at all
common. Between 19^0 and 1964 the level of Independence
held rather steady in the electorate at around 22^.
never deviating more than three percentage points in
either direction.^ When we compare this rather steady
4
^Rates of Independence as detennined by the
Gallup and SRC surveys between 19^0 and 196-4 were as
follows I
19^0-20^; 1944-20?^; 1947-21^, 1952-22^, 1954-22^,
1956-2^1 1958-19^1 1960-23^2 ; 1962-23^; 1964-22^.
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pattern of the past to the recent trend (2??$ in 1968,
3^ in 1972, and l^lfo today), the difference is sub-
stantial, and it gives us cause to wonder about the
effects these Independents—if only by virtue of their
sheer numbers—will have on the American politics of
the future. If two of every five American voters
now have no party affiliation, that fact alone
necessitates a re-thinking of some of our traditional
ideas about American politics, and an examination of
what effects the phenomenon is likely to have on the
two parties and the political system in general.
If the rate of Independence continues to
escalate or even remains at its currently high level
(the likelihood of which will be discussed below),
one probable consequence could be a further weakening
of the political parties. While it is true that most
Independents still perceive American electoral
politics as a two-party enterprise, 2 and while few
^There is no evidence to suggest, in the data I
examined, that Independents represent a potential core
of support for a new "third party, " or that they respond
very enthusiastically to third party candidacies. V/hile
the 17% of the Independent vote received in 1968 by
Gov. George Wallace was higher than the support he got
from party-identifiers, it is still true that Qy/o of the
.
voting Independents in I968 stayed inside the two-party
framework. Schreiber, "Where the Ducks Are" (1971) argues
that it is especially unlikely that the Independents con-
stitute a potential core of membership for a new party of the
left. Our data support his argument.
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observers would argue that the near future will witness
an end to the parties* traditional functions of recruit-
ing leaders, structuring the vote, etc., the two
parties' inability to win the nominal allegiance of
more than forty percent of the voters is, de facto , a
sign that the parties are not as strong (or at least
as relevant) as they once were. While American
parties have never been dependent on active •member-
ships,* in the classical European sense of the term,
3
they have traditionally represented 'constituencies'
of identifiers—constituencies which they have relied
on both for electoral support and for legitimation
of their role in the political process. With two of
every five voters now opting out of the parties'
constituencies, the parties may soon reacli a point
where their effectiveness is seriously threatened.
One of the most serious threats the Independents
pose for the parties is the extent to which they erode
and undercut their respective margins of 'safety.'
Historically, the viability of the two-party system has
been enhanced by each party's claim to the solid
^The concept of party membership, used in the
context of what he calls 'mass parties, ' is outlined by
Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (New Yorki John
V/iley & Sons, 195^)»pp. 63-70.
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loyalties of certain sections of the country (i.e..
the 'solid* South for Democrats; the Midwest for
Republicans) to get them through even the worst of
political times and ensure a fair representation of
their interests in the national legislature. Such
a representation~and the 'out* party's consequent
ability to keep itself and its programs and alterna-
tives in national view—has prevented the demise of
both the parties on occasions when their fortunes
(nationally) have been at a low ebb. With the
currently high number of Independents (who, by virtue
of their demonstrated electoral fickleness, cannot
be relied upon as 'bedrock* support) it is conceivable
that a huge swing in national sentiment could seriously
damage one of the two political parties. The presence
of so many Independents reduces the viscosity of the
electorate and lays open the possibility of a massive,
perhaps crippling defeat for one of the parties
—
without the probability of having it 'saved* by bedrock
support from one or more geographical areas. The
situation in which the Republican party currently
finds itself is apropos. Though the Southern states
now appear 'solid' for Republicans in national elections,
the GOP cannot count on the South to send Republican
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Senators and Representatives to Washington, and is
currently in a seriously weakened position as a
result of the 197^ elections. Only time will reveal
effects that weakening may have on the political
system.^
There are, no doubt, many who would welcome
such a weakening of the parties. 5 There are also
many—and prominent political scientists are foremost
among them-who look on such a possibility with dismay.
The importance of parties (of one kind or another) ^ in
I 4.
Table II - 8 showed, the percentage of
strong* party identifiers in the electorate dropped
fh«? ?^^>.'? ^^f^ '2 2^-^^ 1972-possible evidencet at the 'bedrock* of support discussed above is dis-
appearing. While most of this drop consisted of a
Democrats, {26.5% in I968 to Ik. 3%in 1972; It IS almost certain that post-Watergate surveys
will reveal a sharp drop in 'strong* Republicans-
creating a situation in which the Republican party couldbe seriously damaged by a severe electoral defeat.
5There was expressed, by many of the Independents
I talked to, the hope that the new rise in Independence
would lead to a dissolution— or at least a severe
weakening--of the present party system. It seems evident
that partisanship is still viewed in many quarters as
being equivalent to bias or close-mindedness , The cry
of many reformist groups for a "nonpartisan" politics
implicitly contains the notion that the end of parties
would be beneficial to the society.
"The reference here is not to the distinction among
parties made by Duverger (*mass,* * cadre, * etc.) but to the
perpetual debate in American politics whether our parties
should remain 'loose* and unstructured or become more
* responsible, * like the parties in many parliamentcury
systems.
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politics has been argued in a long tradition of
theoretical and empirical studies.
In 19^2 E. E. Schattschneider argued that
"...political parties created democracy and...modern
democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties.-?
Schattschneider viewed parties as the essential element
in democratic government and he contended that.
-The
most important distinction in modem political philosophy,
the distinction between democracy and dictatorship, can
be made best in terms of party politics. The parties
are not therefore merely the appendages of modem
government* they are in the center of it and play a
determinative and creative role in it. "8
Eight years later, Professor Schattschneider
chaired a study committee of the American Political
Science Association whose final report urged adoption
of a more vigorous, responsible party system in this
country, contending that, Popular government...
requires political parties which provide the electorate
E. E. Schattschneider, Party Government(New York! Farrar and Rinehart, 19^2}, p. l. :
—
Qlbid.
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with a proper range of choice between alternatives
Of action. "9
In 1966 John Fenton concluded a study of the
effects Of inter-party competition on the outputs
Of the public policy process in six Midwestern states. 10
Fenton argued-and contended it was fairly well
establishedU that two-party competition makes
reDort ^f-^?!!!"','^^^ ^^^^Q^^^^?^ Two-Partv Sy.ctPr., aScan pSitig^^;^r^" r^^^^^"^^ ^^^^^^^American i^o it cal Science Association (New YorkiRmehart and Company, 1950), p. i. ^
10
Hni+ '^^^^^^^ Fenton, Midwest Politics (New YorkiHolt, Rinehart & Wins ton, ^19^6") . "
11
4
"^^^ studies alluded to by Fenton ashaving established the contention that intlr-partv
'?wrPa^trr'^°'?.5^^^ ^ difference' were his'^om'^T o-Party Competition and Government Expenditures
AmeScfn loiltfcfl%' ^^^-^fr 1962 Letinro?'therica P li i a Science Associations Duane LockardNew England State Politics (Princeton, N .j!? Prince^oAuniversity PresSjTWlJhapter 3; and RicAard E? DaSsonand James A. Robinson. "Inter-Party Competition.Economic Variables, and the Welfare Policies in theAmerican States," Journal of Politics . Vo. 25 (I963).Other studies as well have called into question the
assumption that non-partisanship is an automatic boomto a political community. In their studies of urban
renewal and public housing ("Community Structure andInnovation: The Case of Public Housing," American
Political Science Review
. 3. September. I970. pp. 843-864,and "Community Structure and Innovation: The Case ofUrban Renewal." American Socioloff:ical Review
. 35,(August, 1970), pp. 650-664; Michael Aiken and Robert
Alford demonstrate that innovation in these areas is
negatively correlated with nonpartisan elections and
nonpartisan governmental arrangements.
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a difference in the performande of government.
.
.12
In general, Fenton's thesis was that the role
envisioned for parties and party competition by
political theorists seemed to be borne out of
empirical datai
...two party competition, according to itsexponents, is the very heart of democracy!It IS the means by which information and
^''^ discussion of issues(the lifeblood of democracy) are pumped toevery part of society. And after the debate
and discussion of the issues, the people
express a majority will concerning the issuesthrough their votes for or against candidates.After the majority will has been expressed, the
majority party assumes control of the govern-
ment and proceeds to translate into publicpolicy the programs it advocated in the
election campaign. The minority party
serves an equally useful function after the
election through its criticism and surveillance
of the performance of the majority party, thus
assuring honesty, efficiency, and responsi-
bility by the majority party while it is in
control of the government. 13
Reacting in 1973 to what he perceived as a
crisis in the party system—partial evidence of which
he saw in the high level of political Independence-
Walter Dean Burnham pleaded for a return to the party
viability of the past:
l^penton, Midwest Politics (1966),p. 2,
13ibid.
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It seems evident enough that if this long-
term trend toward a politics without parties
continues, the policy consequences must be
profound. One can put the matter with the
utmost simplicity, political parties, with
all their well-known human and structural
shortcomings, are the only devices thus far
invented by the wit of western man that can,
with some effectiveness, generate counter-
vailing collective power on behalf of the
many individually powerless against the
relatively few who are individually or
organizationally powerful. Their dis-
appearance as active intermediaries, if
not as preliminary screening devices,
would only entail the unchallenged
ascendancy of the already powerful, unless
new structures of collective power were
somehov/ developed, and unless conditions
in America's social structure and political
culture came to be such that they could be
effectively used.^*^'
With some dissent, ^5 most political scientists
who study the subject concur that parties do play a
pivotal role in the political process. And, among
American political scientists of the liberal tradition,
there is general agreement that weakened parties would
adversely affect the interests and position of the
1 M, ,
Walter Dean Bumham, "The End of American
Party Politics," in W. D. Bumham, ed.. Politics/
America; The Cutting Edge of Change (1973), P« 132.
15Among those skeptical of the parties*
alleged importance in the political process is
Anthony King, "Political Parties in Western Democracies
i
Some Sceptical Reflections," Polity Vol. 2, No. 2
(Winter 1969)ipp. 111-^1.
now disadvantaged elements of our society. 16
Whether or not the current boo. of Independents
will continue and perhaps increase even further is. as
noted above, still open to question. For the „ost
part, the opinion prevalent among leaders of the two
national parties is that the level of Independence
has
-topped off. and that, while the large numbers
Of Independents present the parties with certain
tactical difficulties, they by no means threaten
their existence. Dr. Paul Lutzger. Director of
Political Research for the Democratic National
Committee, believes that "...perceptual effects-
the symbols-of the political parties are too impor-
tant in people's minds for them to let the parties
die. The parties are always going to be around-
theyil move wherever they have to. and make whatever
changes they need to stay in business. "17 Lutzger's
•fT-om ir.^t-'^^ff^ °^ parties, per se . comes not onlyfrom American liberals. Edward Banfield. a noted con-servative, argues that the American part^ system
...has played an important part... in the productionof a society which, despite all its faults, is as near
nl^f^?! ''.f°°n S"^ ^"<^ far than mos?.-
Rnwt a' r^J^f^^"^t °^ American Party System." inobert A. Goldwin. ed.. political Parties. U.S.A .(Chicago 1 Rand MoNally, 1964). p. 22. "
Impersonal interview with Dr. Lutzger.
January 1974, Washington, D.C.
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counterpart with the Republican National Committee
argues similarly that,
-...the trend won't continue
to that ultimate conclusion (i.e.. the parties'
disappearance). The role of parties in nominating
candidates, crystallizing issues, organizing voters
and encouraging the turnout of the electorate is too
important to allow that to happen.
Party professionals and functionaries, of
course, have a vested interest in seeing that the
parties continue to exist as viable political agencies
and we might expect them to exhibit rather optimistic
views as regard the parties* future. Nonetheless,
the possibility still exists that if the rate of
Independence continues to increase, or even if it
becomes 'institutionalized* at its present level,
the parties may face serious difficulties in the future.
The problem now is to assess how likely it is that the
level of Independence will remain at kofo of the
electorate, or perhaps climb even higher. Will the
number and percentage of Independents continue to
increase to a level where the parties will be
effectively stripped of all but their symbolic
^
^Personal communication from Dick Thaxton,
Director of Political Research for the Republican
National Committee, February 197^.
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mechanical functions? Or will the percentage recede
to a level where the political parties will be able
to retain (or should one say 'regain?') their place
of importance in the political process?
The vicissitudes of politics are such that
long-range predictions of this sort are undertaken
with a great deal of uncertainty, but I would
cautiously argue at this point that the latter is the
more likely possibility. I am not convinced, as the
two parties* Directors of Research seem to be, that
the demise of the parties "can't happen here," but I do
feel that the current high level of Independence is,
in part at least, a temporary phenomenon.
In Chapter IV we noted that, while there are
a number of 'ahistorical • explanations for political
Independence (distaste for parties and the concept of
party membership, the presence of cross-pressures,
etc.), there are also a number of temporal circum-
stances which seem to be inflating the level of
Independence in contemporary times. The fact that
traditional (post-New Deal) partisan cleavages did not
mesh well with the issues of the 1960's and early 1970's
(or phrased another way, that traditional partisan
divisions were somewhat irrelevant to the voters*
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concerns during that period); the fact that the country
currently seems to be undergoing realignment, gener-
ating a degree of uncertainty among voters who may be
in transition from one party affiliation to the other;
the fact that the percentage of young voters (tradi-
tionally more Independent than their elders) in the
electorate is inordinately high at this time; the
fact that politics, politicians, and the parties the
voters associate with them are generally in disrepute
in light of Watergate and the problems associated with
the Viet Nam War—all these historical circumstances
have tended to push upward the rate of voter Indepen-
dence. Because these forces have all converged in a
single historical era, we are now witnessing a rate
of Independence unparalleled in our experience. But
it is also a rate of Independence which will recede
somewhat once one or more of these circumstances has
passed into history.
Because the passage of the Twenty-Sxith
Amendment has enfranchised large numbers of young
voters; and because (due to the transitory and dynamic
pace and style of contemporary American life) a return
to the hardened, class-oriented partisan framework of
the New Deal variety is unlikely; and because, now that
298
Independence is so prevalent, it will to a certain
extent institutionalize itself at a higher level
than in the past, it is unlikely that we will again
return to a rate of Independence as low as the ZZ%
common before I968. At the same time, however, it
is equally unlikely that the rate of Independence
will climb a great deal higher than it already is.
or even remain indefinitely at its current high
level.
The passing of two of the historical circum-
stances responsible for the current inflation of
Independence— the transition associated with realign-
ment and the tendency for party cleavages to be out of
•synch' with the prfessing issues of the day—is almost
a certainty. Historical precedent, voting theory, and
the dynamics of electoral politics all argue that
political realignment is more or less a temporary
phenomenon, followed historically by a re-drawing of
the political battle lines and a re-institution, for
perhaps a generation, of electoral 'politics as usual. '^9
Too, it is unlikely that voters in the future will find
^^The case that realignments are temporary
phenomena is made strongly by Walter Dean Burnham,
Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American
Politics (1970) and Charles Sell f^rs/ "^hft T^gnii i h^i
Cycle in Two-Party Politics,- (1965)»pp, I6-38.
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the differences between the two major parties to be
as meaningless as they appeared in the 1960's. This
is not to say that the parties are growing farther
apart, or that their issue positions are becoming
any more distinct, but it is true that some of the
issues which generated the confusion of the 1960's
(e.g., the Viet Nam V7ar) have disappeared. It is
also true that the parties have accommodated themselves
to some of the newer issues generated in that era
(e.g., busing) and that some of the issues which have
traditionally separated the parties in the past
(e.g., the economy) have been revitalized after a
period of relatively low salience in the 1960's. Also,
while the Twenty-Sixth Amendment assures a larger-
than-before percentage of young voters in the elector-
ate, the passage into maturity of the "postwar baby
boom," and the current low birth rates, will undoubt-
edly combine to redress the disproportionately high
number of under-thirty voters—traditionally the age
group most Independent
—
presently in evidence.
Assessing whether the voters' currently low
opinions of politicians and the parties they command
will improve in the future is somewhat more problem-
atical. It may be that the public's estimate of the
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parties and politicians has "bottomed out" now that
most of the grisly Watergate details have been made
known. While it may be comforting (and probably
accurate) to say philosophically that, "...this, too,
shall pass," no one can know at this point how
seriously public confidence has been eroded by
Watergate and related developments, or-perhaps more
importantly—how long it will take the wounds of
Watergate to heal in the public consciousness.
In sura, it can be argued with some certainty
that a number of historical circumstances are respon-
sible for much of the current increase of Independents,
and that while we can probably not expect the rate of
Independence to drop in the foreseeable future to
pre-1968 levels, neither should we expect to see it
spiral a great deal higher or even remain permanently
at its present heights. The convergence of circum-
stances responsible for the currently large number
of Independents will not last forever, and it may be
some time before we see a similar convergence—with
similar effects—in the future.
To say that the rate of Independence will
shortly stop its upward climb, and even begin to decline.
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is not to say that it is likely to return to its
traditionally lower levels. As mentioned above,
there are a number of circumstances and factors which
make that eventuality very unlikely. Most probably,
the Independents will continue at their present
strength for several years, and then decline to a
level somewhere between the 22% of pre-1968 years and
the hlfo of today. 20 ^hey will then-certainly for
the next several years, and most probably for long
after that—represent something of a 'new force in
American politics. •SI ^s a new force in politics,
they will unquestionably play a role in the develop-
ment which the American political process is likely
to undergo in future years. Perhaps nowhere will that
role be more important, ironically, than in affecting
the nature of the political parties and the political
party process.
20It would be folly to try to estimate the
future rate of Independence any closer than this. It
IS quite likely that future politics will hold a number
of historical circumstances that will have their own
effect—up or down—on the rate of Independence. An
estimate of the likely consequences of these circumstances,
or even what they might be, is obviously beyond our
capability at this time.
^^The phrase is borrowed from Walter De Vries and
V.L. Tarrance, The Ticket-Splitter 1 A New Force in
American Politics (1972). "
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we mentioned above that the large numbers of
Independents, and the decline in party identification
which they represent, constitute a potentially serious
threat to the political parties. At the same time/
however, the Independents represent a serious tactical
challenge to the two major parties and somewhat
curiously, an opportunity for the parties to develop
the responsibility and maturity which, if it ever
existed, has been absent in our party system for some
years. 22 p^^ simply, the presence in large numbers of
Independents may force the American parties to
articulate issues and offer alternatives that will
seem responsible, sensible, and attractive to the
many millions of uncommitted voters who will be judging
these alternatives without the selective perception
normally attendant to partisanship.
Paul Lutzger, from his vantage point at the
Democratic National Committee, argues that, "From a
22An argument is not made here for a dramatic
change in our party system in the direction of the
•responsible' British model sought by Schattschneider
and his American Political Science Association
colleagues. Though such an argument can well be made,
the thrust here is to encourage the parties toward a
more clear and developed presentation of the issues and
their positions on those issues, rather than the
attempted stimulation of old loyalties and symbolic
responses which has characterized the party system in
recent years.
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long-range point of view, they've (the parties) got
to re-orient their policy positions to be more
appealing to the people than they are now—they're tied
now too much to the old New Deal thing. "23 Lutzger
feels the parties will be more issue-oriented in their
appeals to the electorate, since that electorate's
eventual decision now rests heavily on the actions of
the nominally 'uncommitted* Independents—a group not
easily stimulated by appeals designed only to activate
party loyalties. Dick Thaxton sees the challenge
facing the Republicans in much the same way, claiming
that one effect of the new Independents will be to make
the parties "...work harder. It forces the party to
spend an increasing amount of time csimpaigning to
attract what you might call the 'opposition'—the
Independents and Democrats needed to win who aren't
going to respond to a call to rally 'round the party.
This places the premium on organization and on issues
and candidates that will get a positive response from
the public. "2^
23personal interview with Dr. Lutzger, January
197^ » Washington, D.C.
2^Personal communication from Dick Thaxton,
February 197^
•
30^
One ramification of the two parties* current
need to "convert*' large numbers of voters in order to
win elections is that campaign propaganda will have
to be addressed toward other goals than simply
stimulating and building enthusiasm for old loyalties. 25
And. while it may be a bit of an idealized assumption,
it is just possible that parties and campaigners in
the future will direct their efforts toward addressing
the problems and issues of the day in such a way as
to afford the Independents—and all voters—the
opportunity to exercise their electoral choice in
a more meaningful way than they have in the past.
In an ironic way, it may well be that the Independents-
many of whom left the party system because of their
distaste for parties and because of that system's
apparent irrelevance to their most important political
concerns—will, in the long run be responsible for
nudging that system back toward the role envisioned
for it in democratic theory. Such a nudge would be a
beneficial one in the ongoing maturation and development
of our political system.
•^It may be that, with the advent of the
Independent voters, the old party tactic of avoiding
stances on the issues will become outmoded. With
partisanship itself at such a low ebb, it is no longer
efficacious for the parties to merely avoid offending
people.
Aristotle wrote in The Phvsin. that,
"Those
things are natural which, by a continuous movement
originated from an internal principle, arrive at
some completion...26 m the ongoing development of
America's political community, the eventual role of
the Independent voters-especially as they exist in
197/,-.is still not wholly clear. But their presence
is, above all, 'natural* and causes one to look
forward—not without some optimism—to "some
completion."
26^3.j_g^Q^3_g^ The PhvsicR . iQ9a i^^b/. biq.oo
collected in W.D. Ros s, ed. ' AristQtL/^pioA+^^^ '(New York, Charles Scrlbne^'s" ^oLfwil p! U9?
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